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Teaching to Transgress  
 
Prospective Immigrants Please Note 
- Adrienne Rich 
  
Either you will 
go through this door 
or you will not go through. 
 
If you go through 
there is always the risk 
of remembering your name. 
 
Things look at you doubly 
and you must look back 
and let them happen. 
 
If you do not go through 
it is possible 
to live worthily 
 
to maintain your attitudes 
to hold your position 
to die bravely 
 
but much will blind you, 
much will evade you, 
at what cost who knows? 
 
The door itself makes no promises. 
It is only a door. 
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Abstract 
 
“Conceptions of Pregnancy” explores narratives that articulate pregnancy beyond the bounds 
of “normative,”1 American reproductive politics.  By enlisting these narratives, and focusing 
on the narrative substance of pregnancy itself, I argue that pregnancy can be refigured as a 
significantly critical position by which to critique lingering ideas of the Enlightenment 
subject2 and embodiment.  This dissertation covers select literary texts from the antebellum 
era through the 21st century that encounter significant historical contexts and, in response, re-
shape pregnancy and maternity toward this radical end:  slave women and transgressive 
motherhood in the wake of the Civil War; the “gaps in people’s lacks” or marginalized 
“pregnancies of the southern US, spanning the years of the Great Depression through the 
Civil Rights era, with the particular regional and national strain of eugenic classism and 
racism that directed women’s reproductive choices; and the Second Wave and Third Wave 
feminists’ intersections with Critical Disability Studies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
at the site of pregnancy. 
My dissertation engages pregnancy as a potential space both to reconsider and to reclaim 
embodiments beyond the residual static, independent Enlightenment subject. In an American 
feminist context, pregnancy has long been associated with patriarchal culture’s oppressive 
policies, which have limited women to their potential reproductive capabilities, to their 
presumed “nurturing” essence, and to the domestic sphere.  Feminism(s) have worked 
significantly to divorce these restrictive connections from female subjecthoods, specifically 
enlisting the post-Roe v. Wade rhetoric of “choice.”  Nevertheless, this resistance has often 
resulted in pregnancy and maternity being largely abandoned as the detritus of a patriarchal, 
oppressive history.  On the other hand, pregnancy in the mainstream remains largely outlined 
via medical and legal discourses – veiled by the common perception that such are “neutral” 
or objective texts – leaving it to be at once both a critically under-theorized, yet nonetheless 
highly policed, embodiment.   
These sets of discourses—feminist theoretical inquiries and juridico-medical texts—may 
approach pregnancy from widely diverging perspectives.  Nevertheless, I argue that they 
                                                
1 I enlist the term “normative” problematically yet necessarily to evoke pregnancies that best align themselves 
with widespread American cultural narratives. (I would note that, much like the “Enlightenment subject” 
referenced and explored extensively in this dissertation, no one person neatly fits this role.  Yet the further 
removal from it marks a subject suspiciously as “different.”) I do so in tandem with “hegemonic pregnancies” – 
with the suggestion that what is normative (modeled as the dominant) is likewise maintained through 
institutions of power (the dominant hegemony).  In an American context, with historical fluctuation, this has 
most largely meant:  a biologically identified women of US citizenship, legally bound in heteronormative 
marriage, able-bodied, middle-class socio-economic background (and the financially basis to care “for herself” 
and future children), and likely (currently) some form of higher education. 
   
2 My use of the “Enlightenment subject” references its particular prevalence in construction of American 
identity.  Ostensibly, he (sic) has been a white, heterosexual, able-bodied male, of or risen to middle-class 
socio-economic standing. While this will be more fully explored in Chapter 1, this construction in brief further 
relies on several humanist tenets:  the static, stabile self (where rationality reins in the “unruly” body, as in the 
mind-body split); independent and self-sustaining (relying on rationality, this typically extends to financial well-
being); and largely in control of one’s own life and choices via his will (of the Horatio Alger, rags-to-riches, 
bootstraps mentality). 
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ultimately risk a similar outcome:  they replicate the narrow notion of “normative” pregnancy 
without considering it beyond this restrictive legacy.  Likewise, they do so at substantial cost 
to the diverse American women who have been systematically denied access to this 
“normative” pregnancy ideal.  And finally, they restrict the potential reconsideration of 
pregnancy, as one of fluid and multiple subject positions, which provides transgressive 
potential for refiguring the subject. 
In particular, the current discussion of pregnancy is articulated by a rhetoric of “choice,” the 
result of 1973’s Roe v. Wade ruling.  My first chapter considers how this legislation in part 
deters a critical, historicized reading of pregnancy: the dialogue articulated by “choice” itself 
rhetorically perpetuates a limited context of pregnancy.  Choice references a legally 
acknowledged  “right,” and as such the ruling has indeed provided enumerable advancements 
for women by legalizing abortion and reframing aspects of women’s reproductive rights.  
Nevertheless, choice also suggests a kind of neutral, objective access to pregnancy and 
reproduction despite lived realities and disparate privilege to the contrary.  My project seeks 
to inform this argument by interjecting narratives of non-hegemonic pregnancies and 
mothering radically to shift and to recuperate the potential of pregnancy narratives – 
particularly as they offer alternative articulations of embodiment.   
In advancing this exploration, the next three chapters of “Conceptions of Pregnancy” 
incorporate narratives from decidedly different positions of non-normative pregnancies.  
Chapter 2 engages the unique aspects of Black women’s historical reproductive politics in 
American slavery.  I engage Harriet Jacobs’s slave narrative, Incidents in the Life of a Slave 
Girl (1861), along with Toni Morrison’s neo-slave narrative, Beloved (1987), to explore how 
the female protagonists are subversive in and ultimately empowered by their pregnancies and 
maternity.  In a system that relied on commodifying these women and their labors, not the 
least of which were their own children (as future slaves), slavery exposes very different 
narratives of motherhood in which strategic maternity afforded these women access to 
“personhood” categorically denied them.  Their enactment of motherhood in the texts 
transgresses in part their objectified, oppressed non-identities as slaves.  In turn, Chapter 3 
engages pregnancy and motherhood within the context of Southern gothic literature, a tense 
intersection of racism and classism in the mid-20th century.  I consider William Faulkner’s 
Depression era As I Lay Dying (1930) alongside the more contemporary re-membering of the 
story in Suzan-Lori Parks’ Getting Mother’s Body (2003).  Both center on narratives of 
deceased mothers, with troubled relationships to “normative” maternity, alongside their 
daughters’ developing, “illegitimate” pregnancies.  These generational mothers and mothers-
to-be share parallel narratives that disrupt concurrent notions of normative pregnancy, down 
to the (impoverished) language they have to articulate their burgeoning maternity.  
Lastly, Chapter 4 builds on the previous chapters to reconsider subjecthood outright: 
particularly in the context of dis/ability. In this chapter, I grapple with the parallels between 
“Othered” pregnancies and dis/abled embodiments.  In particular, I include Anne Finger’s 
memoir, Past Due: A Story of Disability, Pregnancy, and Birth (1990), grounding my 
discussion in the larger conversation of Critical Disability Studies.  Finger insightfully raises 
uncomfortable questions at the intersection of disability and pregnancy, arguably the tense 
juncture that will inform future, bio-technologically advances in reproductive politics.  As an 
abortion clinic worker and feminist activist, Finger is also ostensibly identified as a disabled 
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woman due to the lingering effects of a childhood bout of Polio.  Her decision to have a 
child, and to discuss this with other critical feminists, brings to light many current conflicts in 
feminist conversations.  Under the sway of biopolitics, as well as the continuing cultural 
trend to cast women as caretakers, the intersection of potential disability and pregnancy 
illuminate the highly public aspects of “choice” in American pregnancy.  Both embodiments 
help conceptual alternative understandings of “dependency” and “autonomy.”  It is here I 
suggest the radical conversation of pregnant embodiment be resumed:  by addressing this 
intersection not as an opportunity to replicate past arguments but as a rife space to continue 
to pressure ideas of the “subject” and embodiment. Furthermore, it also provides potential to 
refigure subjects that acknowledge and value the porous boundaries between the “self” and 
the “Other.”  Here, at this intersection of radical consideration of pregnant and dis/abled 
embodiments, we find space to splinter current ideas of the subject (which enduringly applied 
to no one) and in their stead re-imagine a new kind of relational “I.” 
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Introduction 
“What we need… is a redefinition of what we have learned to recognize as being the structure and the aims of 
human subjectivity in its relationship to different, to the ‘other.’ ” – Rosi Braidotti, “Mothers, Monsters, and 
Machines” (77) 
 
I. Potential in Pregnant Embodiment 
II. Critics of the Normative: Equal Opportunity Critiques? 
III. Radical Embodiment, Feminism, and Pregnancy – an Impossible Triumvirate?  
IV. Outline of the Chapters 
I.  Potential in Pregnant Embodiment 
In a dissertation particularly focused on pregnancy, I cannot resist beginning with the 
inception of this project.  The propelling problematic I explore – ultimately, how might 
pregnant embodiment/s (specifically those enacted notably “at the margins” of normative 
pregnancy) provide radical reconsideration of a woman and in-utero fetus that can be 
extended to a broader concept of individual-communal relationships?  In other words, how 
might pregnancy be rearticulated and reclaimed as a space by which to chisel away at the 
elusive, yet still pervasive, Enlightenment subject? 
 These questions first began to materialize during my graduate program in Women’s 
Studies.  At the core of our disciplinary inquiries, we sought to dismantle wholesale signifiers 
of gender, race, sexual orientation, class – oppressions articulated by the “-isms.”  I 
remember a professor outside the department once asking me, quite curiously, “So, I suppose 
it must be odd to study a field whose ultimate goal is its own demise?”  I had not quite 
considered it in this manner, but I conceded truth there.  Our project did seem to be one of 
continually wielding “the master’s tools” and, as best as we could, dismantling each 
proverbial “master’s house” in sight. 
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 Nevertheless, a seminar in Critical Disability studies jarred my perspective. As I 
fairly soon learned, through the works of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, the rhetoric of 
Otherness itself that remains pervasive across discourses still relies heavily on the pejorative 
“dis/ability” trope.  Difference read in the body – from the monstrous, to the excessive, to the 
hyper-sexualized, to the lacking – has consistently been used to derogate a subject to 
oppression.  And it has likewise been conveyed in a language of disability. Consider 
“female” in this context, articulated from Aristotelian thought to Freud’s Victorian prose, as 
a kind of “deformed” male.  Saartjie (“Sarah”) Baartman, the so-called “Hottentot Venus,” 
provided spectacle in 19th century exhibitions to uphold exotic, hyper-sexualized narratives 
of African women; and again, her narrative not being one restricted to a short time period, for 
her vulva remained on display in a French museum until the 1970s.  Women’s bodies have 
been pejoratively Othered in their differences from the Western, white male subject.   
 Nevertheless, the largely poststructuralist turn of our theoretical underpinnings 
sometimes fell short of acknowledging this flesh, these materialities – of these differences 
under deconstruction – particularly those at the basis for “physical disability.”  Often it felt 
just as we were acknowledging these claims to difference, however culturally scripted they 
were, we lost grounds to articulate them with any authority.  Judith Butler’s Bodies That 
Matter engages this very critique, yet seems to replicate its oversights:    
it must be possible to concede and affirm an array of ‘materialities’ that 
pertain to the body, that which is signified by the domains of biology, 
anatomy, physiology, hormonal and chemical composition, illness, age, 
weight, metabolism, life and death.  None of this can be denied.  But the 
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undeniability of these ‘materialities’ in no way implies what it means to affirm 
them… these are both persistent and contested regions (66-67).  
Yet, even here, her bodily differences fails to mention “disability” or to contextualize such a 
substantial, historical signifier.3  For me, it brings to mind a thoughtful query she raises in the 
same text:   
How will we know the difference between the power we promote and the 
power we oppose?  Is it, one might rejoin, a matter of ‘knowing?’ For one is, 
as it were, in power even as one opposes it, formed by it as one reworks it, and 
it is this simultaneity that is at once the condition of our partiality, the measure 
of our political unknowingness, and also the condition of action itself.  The 
incalculable effects of action are as much a part of their subversive promise as 
those that we plan in advance. (241)  
And while this quotation brings me even less certainty, it nonetheless energizes me in its 
ambiguity.  If the “goal” of our discipline, or perhaps what would be more accurately 
articulated as the larger theoretical efforts in our field among others, was its “own demise,” 
might it not require that we disconnect our own reliance on this “dis/ability” trope?  (How 
much of our normative critique has elided the disparity in whose normative it described?)  
Otherwise, were we not reliant on merely shape-shifting the problem, throwing shadows into 
the proverbial corner in poor attempts to distance ourselves from a rhetoric itself once used to 
categorize “woman”? 
                                                
3 For more consideration of the previous quotation and the materialities of disability, see Ellen Samuels’s 
article, “Critical Divides: Judith Butler’s Body Theory and the Question of Disability” in Vol. 14, No. 3 NWSA 
Journal (Autumn 2002).  Likewise, there has since been made (2010) a fascinating film of Judith Butler and 
Sunaura Taylor as the latter traverses her “every day.”  They discuss Deleuze’s “What Can a Body Do?” as they 
encounter the lived realities, daily maneuverings of Taylor as an ostensibly disabled woman.  Significantly, they 
land on the subject of “assistance” as a disruption to “individualism.”  Butler asks do we live in a culture that 
acknowledges we help one another, not based off personal beliefs, but larger social understandings? 
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II.  Critics of the Normative: Equal Opportunity Critique? 
While these larger theoretical issues were stirring, I encountered a significant story 
about expectations of pregnancy that enacted them – that embodied them.  My professor, Dr. 
Nirmala Erevelles, shared a particular anecdote from her own research findings.  Some time 
in the past, she had been interviewing a young woman with Down’s Syndrome.  Professor 
Erevelles asked the woman multiple questions, but one in particular leaps to memory: she 
asked the woman what her hopes were for her future.  Though the woman’s verbal 
communication was at times difficult to understand, she made her intentions clear.  She 
gestured toward her left ring finger and said, “children, family.”  As Professor Erevelles 
related this story to us, she admitted her own knee-jerk reaction: despite accessibility issues 
of difference, it seemed that the normative narrative about a “woman’s place” had prevailed!  
But Professor Erevelles’ mind changed a bit when, later, she had the opportunity to speak to 
the woman’s mother.  When she shared the interviewee’s response about “family,” her 
mother became extremely emotional and sad.  She told Professor Erevelles that, due to the 
woman’s disability, she had had (unknown to her) a hysterectomy at a young age.  She had 
never in fact menstruated, and she would not biologically be able to bear children.  And 
implicit in these arrangements furthermore was the fact this woman with Down’s Syndrome 
had largely been stripped of her own sexual autonomy. 
 Here we can address the two responses: first, the impulse to interpret the 
interviewee’s prospective plans as merely a byproduct of traditional feminine cultural roles.  
And while this remains not entirely untrue – for such roles are prevalent and dispersed 
widely – the problem lies in stopping short here.  For in her case, we have to acknowledge 
5 
 
 
such cultural roles never intended to include her in the first place.  She had been medically 
sterilized so as to make them an impossibility in fact, a normative narrative of which she had 
most certainly been written out.  Likewise, the medical procedure gestured toward the 
socially presumed asexuality of many disabled individuals, their reproduction as well as 
sexual identities considered culturally taboo and intensely policed in the public sphere.  
These realities suggest strains of eugenics, historicizing disability alongside parallel 
scenarios of monitored race, nationality, ethnicity, and class reproduction issues (and even 
gender – for, worldwide, a baby’s birth as a female can still serve as a death sentence).   
I continued to pursue this unraveling, this paradigm rupture caused by the woman’s 
experience, and came to appreciate the heightened policing surrounding pregnancy and 
reproduction.  Increasingly, I realized more exclusions from the normative narratives of 
pregnancy and maternity lack critical consideration in mainstream feminist circles.  Here, for 
example, we can see an overlap with Angela Davis’s critique of white Second Wavers and 
their large oversight of institutionalized racism in the pro-choice movement: they largely 
failed to acknowledge the vastly different historical narratives informing the reproductive 
politics of American women of color.  In their stunted access to the “Compulsory 
Motherhood” of white mainstream culture, women of color had not simply “a desire to be 
free from pregnancy, but rather the miserable social conditions which dissuade them 
[particularly Blacks and Latinas] from bringing new lives in the world [as well],” resulting in 
these women’s marked “absence” from the birth control movement of the 1970s (“Racism, 
Birth Control, and Reproductive Rights” 87).  The realities of these claims continue to assert 
themselves, in reparations for Black women and Latinas forcibly sterilized, or recipients of 
“Mississippi appendectomies,” during the 20th century (often throughout the 1970s, a decade 
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widely heralded for feminist legal advancements in reproductive politics).4  Locating 
reproduction, pregnancy, and mothering within the narrow context of their so-called 
normative iterations, or articulating these ideas persistently as decontextualized “choices” in 
feminist circles, neglects these lived materialities, these stories, only offered here in brief.  
III. Radical Embodiments, Feminisms… and Pregnancy – an Impossible Triumvirate?  
 Grounding my project here, I turn specifically to the intersection of pregnancy and 
feminist disability theory to reconsider these vast oversights.  I locate three particular focuses 
of inquiry that guide this larger project:  1) How does feminist theory largely replicate 
oppressive, normative practices of the patriarchal culture it critiques?  Namely, for the 
purposes of my interests, why must “pregnancy” be largely jettisoned from critical, 
recuperative consideration (particularly, as we have shown, with its neglected diverse 
iterations)?  Its considerable oppressive legacy notwithstanding, pregnancy remains the 
means by which all human beings enter life as we currently understand it.  Likewise, its 
association with the body seems less a reason for its oversight and more so a trait in its favor, 
                                                
4 For instance, Scott Neuman, in his article “North Carolina Set to Compensate Forced Sterilization Victims” 
for National Public Radio (http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/07/25/205547272/north-carolina-set-to-
compensate-forced-sterilization-victims), notes that the state of North Carolina agreed to pay $50,000 
retribution to individuals forcibly sterilized between the 1920s and mid 1970s.  The so-called Eugenics Task 
Force (part of the Office of Justice for Sterilized Victims, see http://www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov), charged 
by Governor Bev Perdue, sought out some 2,000 survivors of sterilization in North Carolina and interviewed 
them for their loss.  Most of these individuals, the first group like them to be compensated despite the fact that 
over three dozen states once followed similar practices, were Black women who had been ruled as young, 
“unfit” parents at the time of their forced operation.  Additionally, discussed in a May 2013 article by Vivianne 
Schnitzer entitled “Latinos Disproportionately Sterilized for Decades in California” 
(http://www.ns.umich.edu/new/releases/21493-latinos-disproportionately-sterilized-for-decades-in-california), 
the University of Michigan reported a study that identified what it characterizes as a “disproportionate amount” 
of women and men sterilized between 1907 and 1980 – 1/3 of the 60,000 forcibly sterilized – had Spanish 
surnames.  Tellingly, most of these Latina individuals had likewise been ghettoized to psychiatric or 
“developmentally disabled” homes.  Rationales for sterilization included:  “sexual deviance, ‘feeble-
mindedness,’ epilepsy, out-of-wedlock adolescent status, and an IQ of 70 or lower.” Nevertheless, the general 
ignorance surrounding these individuals and their experiences – indeed, in a nation that continues to divide 
issues of reproductive politics into the simplified rhetoric of pro-life and pro-choice – prevails, including the 
undercurrent of eugenicist rationale that elides institutional influence and rather posits responsibility with the 
individual.  (The study, completed by Lira and Stern, is currently under review in Chicana/o Studies Journal.) 
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highlighting its potential as we continue to theoretically contextualize “the body” (long 
subject to mind-body split dualism).  Otherwise, are we not committing a similar derogation 
by either facilely sweeping pregnancy aside or leaving it to be largely shaped by dominant 
patriarchal institutions, as they have been doing for some time?  2) The subject of pregnancy 
remains one of the primary topics still acceptably explored in “how to” guides, reminiscent 
of 19th century conduct manuals.  Instead, in the spirit of “her-story” and standpoint theory, 
how might we extend this project by resuscitating diverse women’s voices on their own 
pregnancy and mothering experiences?  The shift from midwifery to professionalized 
medicine (1847), from homebirths to the hospital5 – all figure changes best interrupted by a 
reclamation of women’s stories and narratives themselves. I pose a potential “poetics of 
pregnancy” to provide an alternative space for these articulations outside of dominant 
discourses. 3) Lastly, how can these narratives of American non-hegemonic pregnancies 
inform, via a critical feminist disability lens, a larger shift in how we articulate difference and 
radically rethink the idea of “dependence” and “autonomy” (recontextualized both in the 
womb relationship as well as through alternative embodiments within dis/ability)?  Pregnant 
embodiments and physical disability share many common underlying narratives about the 
“body” and the “subject” in general.  For instance, disability recipients as well as incorrectly 
stereotyped “welfare queens” share a stigma surrounding “dependence” where fault is 
popularly ascribed to the individual devoid of his or her larger cultural and institutional 
contexts.  How can uniting these narratives invite a broader examination of the vilification of 
dependence, acknowledging in fact its prevalence from our “originary” relationships to our 
realistic life expectations as we age? 
                                                
5 Note, here I do not state this without acknowledgement of the significant advancements institutionalized care 
has promised women, but to draw attention to the disconnect created by moving pregnancy and birth from the 
site of the mother and her body to institutionalized, public spaces. 
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Methodology 
My approach likewise takes its inspiration from my own “click moment” as I have 
shared: a story. Fortunately, as I work within the literary field, it is no stretch for me to 
consider the power of poetics in articulating the otherwise “unspeakable” – the gaps, pauses, 
struggles themselves to lay claim to identity “outside” of scripted roles.  Pregnancy itself 
comes as such a hyper-vigilantly managed narrative – and here I reference the kind of 
monolithic notion of pregnancy that is maintained foremost through medical science 
discourses and upheld through legal recourse.  Placing, in their stead, these personalized 
narratives of pregnancy that openly wrangle with the mainstream expectations of “expecting 
mothers,” I argue, starts this project by fracturing monolithic pregnancy in the first place.  
These narratives raise significant questions:  whose choices are these?  What social 
conditions frame these choices?  What do we find when we historicize these choices, and 
how does this often overlooked context(s) remain nonetheless prevalent in choices? 
IV.  Outline of Chapters 
 This dissertation attends to these questions in four chapters.  First, in Chapter 1, “On 
the Non-Subject of Pregnancy,” I establish my theoretical framework for the larger project.  
Much of my analysis considers the language and history resulting in the bedrock of the 1973 
Roe v. Wade ruling, along with the subsequently developing rhetoric of “choice” and 
“privacy.”  The chapter then turns to the alternative articulation of pregnancy offered in Luce 
Irigaray’s essay “On the Maternal Order” from Je, Te, Nous.  Here, in a dialogue with Hélène 
Rouche, the two women discuss the imposition of competitive, patriarchal discourses on the 
womb to explain the woman-fetus exchange.  Rather than forcing this originary relationship 
into man-made terms, they reverse the reading.  Instead, they suggest a “placental economy” 
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in which the placenta mediates beneficially to both parties: “without recourse to differential 
combat—the female body engenders with respect for difference” (42).  Irigaray’s inquiry sets 
the tone for challenging the narrative framework of normative pregnancy throughout this 
dissertation. 
 Next, Chapter 2, “Choice, Transgressive Pregnancy and Re-membering Motherhood: 
Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl and Toni Morrison’s Beloved,” moves to 
historicize pregnancy within the American institution of slavery.  First, I consider how the 
politics of slavery uniquely characterized Black women’s relationship not only to their own 
subjecthood (as they were legally denied personhood by law), but also how this influenced 
their connection to the domestic sphere or “homeplace,” and particularly their children.  In 
particular opposition to contemporary critiques of queer theorists’ projects, which resist 
kinship associated with heteronormativity, narratives of slavery expose that in fact 
subjecthood and identity were specifically denied slaves on the grounds of lacking familial 
connection and autonomy.  Harriet Jacobs’s 1861 slave narrative relates her own struggles to 
reclaim personhood, which she uniquely frames in a gendered context.  The sexual politics of 
Black women in slavery were predominantly rape; Jacobs suggests her attempt to have a 
child with Mr. Sawyers, rather than her lusty master Dr. Norcom, was a possible way to 
evade this violence and claim subjecthood.  Morrison’s Beloved is in part a fleshy rendering 
of Jacobs’s story, presenting the politics of lactation and maternity, and the living violence of 
slavery’s intervention at the very personal level of the “self” and “family.”  Likewise, both 
texts contextualize the larger struggles of slave mothers, their inability to secure their 
children as their own, and how normative narratives of pregnancy and motherhood have 
historically been constructed and maintained along racial lines. 
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 In a more contemporary vein, Chapter 3 “Southern Gothic Pregnancy and ‘the gaps in 
people’s lack’: William Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying and Suzan-Lori Parks’ Getting Mother’s 
Body” extends this conversation through the prevalent racism, recast, and classism of the 20th 
century.  This chapter works through the grotesque rendering of pregnancy and motherhood 
through spaces “outside” of normative motherhood as rendered in the Southern gothic 
literary spirits.  In As I Lay Dying, Addie Bundren speaks as at once both a mother, a 
physical body that pervades the piece, but also as a disembodied voice beyond death.  Her 
critique of motherhood centers on what she identifies as the inarticulate dynamic of 
pregnancy and motherhood (the “gaps in people’s lacks”).  Her daughter Dewey Dell’s 
hidden pregnancy raises considerable issues concerning poor whites in the South during the 
Great Depression.  Alongside this text, I consider its 2003 re-imagining, Suzan-Lori Parks’ 
Getting Mother’s Body.  Set in Civil Rights era Texas, the text shifts narrators parallel to 
Faulkner’s text, focusing at times on young Billy Beede’s “baby belly” as well as her 
deceased mother’s thoughts, expressed in blues-like poetics.  The inverted quest motif of 
both of novels complement the specific language they enlist to upset normative notions of 
maternity, marginalized by socio-economics and race.   
 Chapter 4, “Pregnancy as Other: Cyborgs, the Monstrous, and Anne Finger’s Past 
Due: A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and Birth,” turns to contemporary context.  The 
chapter extends discussions of the preceding chapter’s grotesque, encountering the 
monstrous.  I explore the technological advancements of technology informing the changing 
parameters of the mother-fetus relationship, starting with the 1965 LIFE photo-essay first to 
feature fetuses in utero.  From here, I extend this conversation to the intersection of 
pregnancy and disability, an ongoing space of contention.  In particular I enlist Anne Finger’s 
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now out-of-print memoir, Past Due:  A Story of Pregnancy, Disability, and Birth (1990), 
further contextualized by the larger debate between feminist and disability theorists.  This 
chapter aims to consider reframing the pervasive ableist trends common in pregnancy 
narratives, from amniocentesis to abortion, and extends a final push toward alternative 
embodiments figured there. 
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Chapter 1 - On the “Non-Subject” of Pregnancy 
 
“Religions and various fundamentalisms have so brutally assigned women to reproduction alone, and, in 
counterpoint, female liberation movements have so ferociously opposed this ‘repression’ that – against all 
evidence – it seems difficult to speak of motherhood today without being accused of normative thinking” (54). 
- Julia Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness 
 
As a limited narrative, the dominant language of mainstream “pregnancy” in the 
United States textually erases diverse women’s experiences while perpetuating a perspective 
of oppressive limitations within pregnant embodiment.  Women have historically been 
confined to a restrictive role of “mother” in patriarchal cultures.  As a result, feminist 
theoretical engagements of pregnancy have sought frequently to distance women in their 
inquiries from this oppressive legacy.  As a result, pregnancy remains a largely monolithic 
production, predominantly shaped via medical and legal discourses.  Informed by vestiges of 
traditional patriarchal pregnancy, these perspectives largely fail to challenge the restrictive 
narrative of pregnancy and the diverse women’s lives it informs.  Despite these restrictive 
and traditional renderings, I argue that pregnancy can offer alternative ways of re-imagining 
the subject-in-process.  From its vantage of being both the subject and at once “decentered, 
split, or doubled,” it offers a “radical challenge to dualism” (Young 47-8).  By critically 
contextualizing pregnancy beyond these limited dominant narratives, we find potential 
renderings of the body and the self that radically reconsider ideas of in/dependence, 
dis/ability, and Otherness. 
Much like the gestational process itself, pregnancy in its cultural consideration often 
becomes a process to define something else:  the origins of the “subject”; gendered sexual 
mores; or specific reproducible values of a “body politic.”  As Rickie Solinger notes in 
Pregnancy and Power, pregnancy and reproductive decisions have historically been about 
“how to solve certain large social problems facing the [United States]” (4).  Fundamentally, 
13 
 
 
critical discussions on pregnancy reveal anxieties concerning the boundaries of the “subject” 
in legal, medical, and cultural articulations.  Pregnant embodiment stands in opposition to 
this neatly static ideal.  In a sense, then, pregnancy and a woman identified by her pregnant 
embodiment occupy a kind of “non-subject,” critical to the subject’s formation yet ever 
Othered from it.6   
For this fundamental reason, feminist theoretical analyses frequently approach 
pregnancy and impending motherhood in the spirit of critique. They acknowledge 
pregnancy’s traditional association with oppressive gender roles and the lingering cultural 
echoes of the Freudian mantra “destiny is anatomy.”  Pregnancy and maternity are grouped 
with heteronormativity.  For these compelling associations, Dion Farquhar in her essay 
“(M)Other Discourses,” goes so far as to suggest that “a key part of any feminist 
reproductive project should be the disarticulation, not only of maternity – which spans a 
complex social relation of desire – from women and women’s bodies, but also of maternity 
from pregnancy” (214).  Women have long been restricted in their agency due to their 
cultural associations with mothering and childbearing, and this feminist theoretical resistance 
has culminated in numerous, significant shifts in women’s relationship to their reproductive 
politics and identities in the public sphere.   
Nevertheless, as an additional result, the recuperation of pregnancy by feminists 
remains a tenuous project – despite the fact that pregnancy remains a biological, social, and 
                                                
6 While I consider my project directed toward a different vein, specifically the relationality of pregnancy and 
stories by which it is articulated, it must be noted that both Nietzsche as well as Derrida query “woman” as an 
alternative subject space to challenge dualisms.  For instance, in Spurs (1978), Derrida notes that “the question 
of the woman suspends the decidable opposition of true and non-true and inaugurates the epochal regime of 
quotation marks which is to be enforced for every concept belonging to the system of philosophical 
decidability” (107). Diana Fuss in Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, & Difference (1989) points out, 
however, about these attempts that “one has to recognize that positing woman as a figure of displacement risks, 
in its effects, continually displacing real material women” (14).  I hope to suture this loss through the poetics of 
pregnancy explored in Chapters 2-4. 
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personal experience unique to women.7  Pregnancy and mothering remain ubiquitously 
bound up in women’s cultural identities for, as Nancy Chodorow notes in Reproduction of 
Motherhood, “women’s mothering is one of the few universal and enduring elements of the 
sexual division of labor” (3).  Their prevalence demands continuing critique but also 
reconsideration: pregnancy warrants to be a central focus of feminist inquiry.  Pregnancy, 
foremost, has complicated history of its own that continues to inform different women’s 
identities on a personal level.  Also, the kind of relationship pregnancy poses between 
subjects offers radical potential.  Without pressuring dominant narratives, however, 
pregnancy remains subject to limiting, normative narratives – as do the women whose lives 
are impacted by them.   
Pregnancy: Challenge to Enlightenment Thinking 
One of feminisms’ greatest projects remains deconstructing the Enlightenment 
subject.  In particular, Enlightenment claims loosely adhere to the following:  universality of 
certain truths, independent of their context or place in time; the privileging of the mind and 
rationality (in contrast to the atomized body); the neutrality possible within science, and 
furthermore the discipline’s ability to liberate human thinking from restrictive mythology and 
folklore; and that “false knowledge is the result of corruption of power” (McLaughlin 7).  
Feminist inquiry broadly interjects by: illustrating the influence of positionality on an 
individual (and even how said “individual” is constituted); contextualizing, both socially and 
historically, knowledge and rationality; demonstrating that discourses of science are not 
unadulterated or free from other mitigating narratives of belief; and showing that knowledge 
                                                
7 I pause here to note that “women” is likewise a term of reconsideration within feminism (articulated most 
memorably in Simone de Beauvoir’s “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”) recognizing that it is not 
a static term free of cultural construction itself.  I highlight this association mainly to show that pregnancy and 
maternity constitute a significant point of inquiry for feminists for these reasons. 
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is always already subject to power relations (7).  Considering these feminist responses to the 
Enlightenment subject – which nonetheless remains an enduring paradigm in American 
liberal society – pregnant embodiment offers a great point of departure.   
Pregnancy and “the body”: Feminism and Deconstructing Dualism 
Parallel again to dominant pursuits of feminist inquiry, pregnancy calls into question 
the neat, dualistic vestiges of the Enlightenment subject by revealing its contradictions; in 
Matryoshka-like nesting terms, the pregnant woman brings to the fore multilayered anxieties 
about “the body” in general.  The mind-body split bears out several tenets:  first, that the 
body is merely the “alien, as the not-self, the not-me” and merely the “enveloper for the inner 
and essential self”; that, in keeping with the texts of Plato, Descartes, and Augustine, the 
body be “experienced as confinement and limitation,” in opposition; and lastly, that “the 
body is the locus of all that threatens our attempts at control” as it “overtakes, overwhelms… 
erupts and disrupts” these efforts (Bordo 92).  
The hypervisible and fleshy pregnancy, on the other hand, pressures these fictions 
concerning the integrity of “the body” (as a static, closed, independent entity or as some clear 
indication of a subject’s boundaries).  Often mythologized as the receptacle for the self, the 
body and its boundaries are in fact always under constant transformation.  Pregnancy 
dramatically exposes this fluid reality, bringing to the fore potential perspectives on porous, 
ever-changing boundaries at the site of the body.  Removed from this already elusive 
normative body ideal, a pregnant woman illustrates that, indeed, there is “no ‘natural’ body” 
(92).  Secondarily, as a “mother-to-be,” she as subject(s)-in-process exhibits the fluid ability 
to be both self and Other; to straddle the demarcation between the “multiple” and the 
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“singular”; and to embody both the statically “independent” and the pathologically cast 
“dependent.” 
Situating pregnancy as an entirely biological concept suggests a pre-discursive body, 
and neglects the many social and cultural constructs that “map” the body as we understand it 
(Fuss 6).  A woman with a telltale swollen abdomen signifies, then, not only new life 
underway, but multiple layers of subject construction:  she is both the site of active human 
procreation as well as social re-creation, symbolically bound up in “regulating reproduction 
as a means to ensure reproduction of the social order” (Siegel 149).  As an ostensible mother-
to-be, she is likewise cast as a “pivotal actor in the sphere of social reproduction” (Chodorow 
11).    
Nevertheless, rights are “inherently static and abstracted from social conditions… 
[often] staked within a given order to things” (Petchesky 107).  They furthermore “do not 
challenge the social structure, the social relations of production, and reproduction” (107).  
Therefore, interwoven into these seemingly objective and dominant discourses are the 
significant historical legacies of race, ethnicity, nationality, class, sexual orientation, 
dis/ability – of plural differences and disparate privileges – that “mark” bodies at the 
periphery of the hegemonic “subject.”  The body itself hinges on historical constructions, for 
“a body to have meaning for us… it must be signified within an historically specific 
discourse of meaning” (Butler via Hekman 254).  Conceptions of pregnancy then, despite 
their biological bases, likewise do not occur in a vacuum.   
 Rather than being left as the undesirable detritus of patriarchal, dualist thinking, 
pregnancy may be seen as the significant moment about which the struggle between ideas of 
the “self” and “Other” continues.  Pregnancy similarly occupies one of the consistently most 
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complicated yet ubiquitous spaces for contesting and policing the meaning of these terms in 
American society.  Or, as Battersby puts it in Phenomenal Woman, let us consider pregnancy 
as a default:  
a ‘person’ could normally, at least potentially, become two.  What would 
happen if we thought identity in terms that did not make it always spatially 
and temporally oppositional to other entities?  Could we retain a notion of 
self-identity if we did not privilege that which is self-contained and self-
directed? (2).    
How then can we reconsider our understanding of the self, how we interpolate the 
self, in such a way that more accurately captures embodied, lived identity?  In particular, how 
can we wrangle with notions of “autonomy” and the “individual” that allow these 
uncertainties to be considered, unresolved?   For as Iris Marion Young notes in “On Female 
Body Experience,” “pregnancy… reveals a paradigm of bodily experience in which the 
transparent unity of self dissolves and the body attends positively to itself at the same time 
that it enacts its projects” creating a loss of firm boundaries between “where my body ends 
and the world begins” (47, 50).  This experience stands in contrast to the notion of a subject’s 
autonomy in which, as Margrit Shildrick outlines:  “the body must appear invulnerable, 
predictable, and consistent in form and function, above all free from the possibility of 
disruption” (232). Pregnancy itself, I believe, offers a powerful and potentially radical 
reconsideration of the body as it forces these potential characteristics – those that trouble any 
seemingly simplified idea of the individual self – to be reckoned with.  
 As Rosalind Pollack Petchesky notes in “Beyond ‘A Woman’s Right to Choose,’” a 
“woman’s reproductive situation is never the result of biology alone, but of biology mediated 
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by social and cultural organization” (107).  Pregnancy extends beyond physical embodiment 
as a locus of cultural mores, socio-economic factors – as an historically informed, political 
narrative(s).  In this sense, the language of Roe v. Wade risks perpetuating a problematic 
“hegemonic” – namely, a white, middle-class, able-bodied, heteronormative – relationship to 
pregnancy.   
Roe v. Wade and “Choice”:  the Source of Contemporary Pregnancy Rhetoric 
Reproductive rights are articulated in the post-1973 Roe v. Wade age as “choice”; it 
has come to “fully replace the language of rights soon after [the Court ruling], first in legal 
discourses and then in popular feminist and public discourse” (Thoma 411).  This rhetoric of 
choice is often presented neutrally, as a right carefully carved out in the legal ruling and 
bolstered by medical knowledge of human development. In the context of feminism 
particularly, Roe v. Wade is indisputably a groundbreaking ruling that has established and 
defined federal, legal abortion rights for women. My project here does not contest this 
reality.  I do, however, wish to pressure the limits of the ruling’s advancements in order to 
see what inequities they continue to elide and perpetuate; it’s use of choice and privacy 
“abstracts the conflict from the social context in which judgments about abortion are formed 
and enforced” (Siegel 152).   
 We have already discussed in part the prevalence of Enlightenment language in the 
US, and Roe v. Wade remains reliant on it. While neo-liberalism has witnessed the 
considerable broadening definition of this “subject” (from its original 18th century American 
iteration, the white male landowner) and the rights which one can claim, there is a marked 
lapse in corresponding access and privilege.  Rights rely on the residual Enlightenment 
subject and, despite their purported “universality,” have never been extended to all 
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“subjects.”  Or, in a sense, they have worked to limit which individuals could claim this 
subject status.  Furthermore, feminist critics have widely debated their universality, noting 
that “recent history proves that it is not feasible to obtain universal rights within the liberal 
state” (McLaughlin 30), as the liberal state “becomes ever more transparently invested in 
particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations” (Brown 392). 
“Choice” then can be raised as a suspect term, and one for our particular 
reconsideration around the history and social contexts of diverse American women’s 
pregnancies.  Choice remains in part a product of patriarchal law, even as it troubles more 
traditional boundaries.  Judith Butler articulates this kind of replication through law in 
Gender Trouble: 
Juridical power inevitably ‘produces’ what it claims merely to represent; 
hence, politics must be concerned with this dual function of power: the 
juridical and the productive.  In effect, the law produces and then conceals the 
notion of ‘a subject before the law’ in order to invoke that discursive 
formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates 
that law’s own regularity hegemony. (5) 
Despite the gains of Roe v. Wade – not the least of which include the legalization of 
abortion in particular circumstances and legally protected right of “privacy” – we can see that 
its enduring language of choice jeopardizes more critical considerations of reproductive 
politics.  In part, it contributes to a kind of mainstream, seemingly objective narrative about 
pregnancy and abortion that writes out “difference.”  Revisiting our discussion in the 
previous section about Enlightenment claims and feminist rebuttals, we can see then that 
uncritically referencing “choice” falls in the former category.  
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For as much as “choice” highlights the rights of the individual, it does so at the 
expense and reality of diverse people’s lives.  By creating a seemingly universal and 
transparent “right,” characterizing the individual as the site of agency par excellence, it 
denies the institutional power dynamics and historical differences that privilege certain 
people.  The illusion of equality is extended and homogenously applied, but its material 
outcomes remain disparate.  Here, we may consider the spirit of Butler’s admonishment:  
“Feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of ‘women,’ the subject of 
feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which 
emancipation is sought” (5).  
On the one hand, we have the liberation of choosing not to carry a child to term.  This 
larger understanding of “pro-choice” relies on the specific history and context of “privileged 
women [white, affluent, able-bodied, heterosexual]… often treated as reproducers of the 
species – and of the nation” (Ehrenreich 7).  These socially encouraged mothers-to-be have 
furthermore been subjected to pronatalist norms, “norms that often require them to sacrifice 
their own interests (in career, health, or personal fulfillment) in order to fulfill their duty to 
produce (and care for) the nation’s children” (7).  19th century American notions of 
Republican Motherhood for women of privilege – women associated with these “hegemonic 
pregnancies” – illustrate the repressive legacy of reproduction for white women and the 
significance of a rhetoric of “choice” that would arise out of Roe v. Wade.8   
                                                
8 While perhaps more detailed than warranted by the scope of this essay, specific legal and medical discourses 
of the mid-19th century through the 20th century may be traced to show this larger project underway: i.e. Muller 
v. Oregon  (1908):  “reproductive capability of working women became the basis for justifying prevailing labor 
practices.  Her maternal strength and the quality of the baby she produced were the concerns of the nation” 
(Solinger 89).  
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However, as we have noted, these reproductive politics bear unique contexts.  In his 
ruling, almost as an afterthought, Justice Blackmun hints at macrocosmic factors influencing 
choice. In the introduction of his closing remarks, he states:   
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional 
nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even 
among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that 
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the 
raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward 
life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and 
seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and 
conclusions about abortion.  
        In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones 
tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem. (14) 
Even in his facile acknowledge of contexts, Blackmun continually frames them in terms of 
the individual.  He references a litany of “one’s…” own convictions, and concludes with a 
brief list of the potential societal implications of the ruling – “population growth, pollution, 
poverty, and racial overtones” (14).  Here, he reveals the residual, patriarchal understanding 
of the “subject” and indicates that Roe v. Wade remains predicated on it.  Nevertheless, in my 
continuing discussion of diverse women’s pregnancies, many of the elisions lie with the 
concluding line – with the larger implications the ruling has on diverse societal differences 
and their histories.  Justice Blackmun’s reference to “population growth” and “racial 
overtones” suggest the prevalence of biopolitics only in passing, despite a national history 
founded on, in part, reproductive violence, eugenics, and reproduction as privilege. 
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 Nevertheless, these historically prevalent pregnancy norms for privileged women 
implicitly relied upon constructed spaces of marginalized women – those outside the bounds 
of Republican Motherhood, seen as poor reproductive receptacles for the nation’s future 
sons.  Citing this history, Angela Davis notes in her essay “Racism, Birth Control, and 
Reproductive Rights” that “the ranks of the abortion rights campaign [in the early 1970s] did 
not include substantial numbers of women of color” (86).  Issues of choice among women of 
color and lower socio-economic background were complicated by privilege and racist 
politics:  “when Black and Latina women resort to abortions in large numbers, the stories 
they tell are not so much about the desire to be free of their pregnancy, but rather about the 
miserable social conditions which dissuade them from bringing new lives into the world” 
(87).   
Contemporary to Roe v. Wade’s 1973 inception, we can find further contradictions to 
its neutrally posited right of “choice.”  The ruling coincided with a revival of sterilization, 
then “the most rapidly growing form of birth control in the United States… rising from 
200,000 cases in 1970 to over 700,000 in 1980” (Roberts 90).  Juxtaposed against the 
rhetoric of choice, these sterilizations were often involuntary and disproportionately 
performed on women of color and low socio-economic status.  “Mississippi 
appendectomies,” a common nickname given to hysterectomies administered to Black 
women in the South, were widespread.  Likewise, sterilization campaigns “left more than 
25% of Native American women” and “one-third of the women of childbearing age in Puerto 
Rico” infertile during the 1970s (Roberts 94-5).  As justification for their sterilization, poor 
women were legally identified as incapable of rational judgment – again in the spirit of the 
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Enlightenment subject.9  In contrast, considerable documentation indicates that contemporary 
white women of middle-class standing who sought tubal ligation or hysterectomies were 
often deterred from these operations (Roberts 94).     
As much as we have the limitations of choice, we can extend this critique to its legal 
foothold:  the right of privacy. Despite the fact that “privacy” itself is absent from the United 
States Constitution, in Roe v. Wade the right to privacy derives from a reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “due process clause” (in instances of “fundamental rights”):   
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.  
Here, the implied notion of privacy suggests certain fundamental individual rights remain 
beyond the immediate jurisdiction of the state “without due process of law.”  By way of 
privacy, and pertinent to our consideration, the ruling extends a level of reproductive control 
– the right to abortion – as a “fundamental right” of humankind. Nevertheless, with this 
suggestion of privacy the case ruling additionally sets up provisos for the right’s override by 
the State.    
                                                
9 There are considerable examples of these efforts, predicated on enduring stereotypes such as “welfare 
queens.”  For instance, in the state of Louisiana, the state’s constitution punished the “poor choice” of 
illegitimate motherhood with “citizenship rights… women with out-of-wedlock babies could not vote” 
(Solinger 189).  Solinger furthermore makes a hypothesis that in the wake of a slowly disintegrating Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s, welfare became a new means for oppressive measures (with clear racial and 
economic biases) (Solinger 188-9). 
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Necessarily in the legal extension of “privacy” rights, the Court explicitly establishes 
what is not private.  Regularly throughout the case proceedings, Justice Blackmun clearly 
indicates the transience of “privacy” rights and their ultimate subservience to the rulings of 
law:   
The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that 
some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.  As noted 
above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, 
in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life…. The 
privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute (29)…. A 
pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy … it is reasonable and 
appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, 
that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes 
significantly involved. (31) 
We can see that the private/public spheres’ separation is illusory.  As Rickie Solinger notes in 
her historical analysis Pregnancy and Power, “reproductive politics clarifies the way that 
‘the public’ is always penetrating ‘the private,’ and vice versa” (15).  Furthermore, “how can 
‘private’ decisions be made without being shaped by ‘public policies’ ” (16)?  However, 
returning to the case, we can see specifically how this transient space of “privacy” further 
limits a woman’s choice by legally upheld, medical definitions of time. Women’s “privacy 
right to make decisions about abortion” becomes a “right to be exercised under the guidance 
of a physician” (Siegel 151).  Her privacy then bears an expiration date.  Of course, I note 
this not without acknowledging the aging process of the fetus and biological processes that 
do indeed transpire with time.  I am more interested, however, in how time is configured here 
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as a “natural” interruption to human rights, as a signifier to the boundaries of the self, and yet 
as one that can only be read uniquely through the privileged lens of medical and legal 
discourses.  Time, then, becomes an incontrovertible entity as it ultimately defines the outline 
of the self – when the woman’s singularity is trumped by the developing fetus’s viability. 
 Here we can further contextualize time, which has a far from neutral or immutable 
history in dictating women’s subjecthood at the site of pregnancy.  Pregnancy bears a unique 
relationship to temporality and potential reconsideration of the subject, as Julia Kristeva 
notes, “pregnant existence entails… a unique temporality of process and growth in which the 
woman can experience herself as split between past and future” (239).   However, medical 
jurisdiction over a mother-to-be, as her fetus10 comes to term, has inversely increased with 
respect to women’s ability to define “how far along” they are.  Through the mid-19th century, 
and prior to the professionalization of the male-dominated medical field in 1847, the 
American Medical Association understood woman’s pregnancy by a different narrative of 
time – one in which she was uniquely aware and an active participant in interpreting.  
“Quickening,” or the first feeling of a fetus’s movement within a woman’s womb sensed by 
the mother-to-be, was widely understood to signify the time in which she had an “Other” 
within (Reagen 80).  Prior to this development, to which she alone remained absolutely 
privy, her use of abortifacients were legal and considered to be socially benign.  Rather than 
“terminating” her pregnancy during this time, the remedies that effectively induced 
miscarriages did not acknowledge a developing baby; they promised instead to 
“recommence” menstruation (80).   
                                                
10 Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 4, medical jurisdiction similarly labels when “embryo” and “fetus” 
are applied and what significance are imparted to each. 
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By discrediting quickening in the mid-19th century, and subsequently outlawing 
abortion, the American Medical Association not only granted professionalized doctors a 
particular credibility in terms of scientific knowledge (Reagen 82).  It also reconfigured and 
privileged a different time scale by which a woman’s pregnancy and subsequent fetus’s 
development was and is formally understood.  The controlled creation of privacy serves only 
to reify this intrusion at the site of women’s developing pregnancies.  Notably, this 
temporality removed credibility from women’s own embodied experiences.  It also was done 
in response to increasing anxieties over changing gender roles via industrialization and racial, 
classist concerns as immigrants’ numbers continued to increase around the turn of the 
century.  The insistence of pregnancy became articulated through outside gauges.  
Irigaray’s “On the Maternal Order”:  Reconceptualizing Pregnancy  
“Placental economy… equally respects and supports the life of both [mother and fetus]… without recourse to 
differential combat—the female body engenders with respect for difference.” – Luce Irigaray 
 
In our extended discussion of choice and privacy, we have established how dominant 
discussions of reproductive politics replicate particular Enlightenment concepts. Even those 
heralded by feminism fall short of fully contextualizing the differences women encounter in 
American reproductive politics.  In her essay “On the Maternal Order” from Je, Te, Nous, 
Luce Irigaray offers an alternative way to articulate pregnancy. 
At the core of her critique, Irigaray poses a tension between the “individual” and the 
Other or “external” as they are particularly established in pregnancy.  She challenges what 
she contends to be the two dominant behavioral models in patriarchal human culture: the 
Darwinian and Pavlovian models (37).  She furthermore illustrates that these models are 
forcibly imposed on a pregnant woman, her womb, and the developing fetus.  For instance, 
she notes that in the Darwinian model, “we are said to be always struggling against the 
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external environment... and with other living beings” (37).  Alternatively, in the Pavlovian 
course, she instead notes that culturally, “we [are] trained in repetition, to adapt to a society's 
systems, and educated to do like, to be like, without any decisive innovations or discoveries 
of our own” (37).  She summarizes that “we are struggling against all forms of others to be 
able to live, and we are still subject to conditioned social rules that we confuse with freedom” 
(38).11   
Irigaray speaks to the tension of the liberal Enlightenment subject, the ideological 
paradigms that temper and shape understandings of the “self” and the “freedoms” afforded 
said self.  Through a dialogue with a biology professor of the Lycée Colbert, Hélène Rouch, 
Irigaray forges a model that contests our working understanding of the competing self and 
other.  She does so around the site of the overtly biological:  the placenta. 
Some feminists may be inclined to balk at this turn toward the body as a kind of 
essentialism – essentialism of the womb and pregnant woman, or of pregnancies in general.  
In fact, this larger reticence to reconsider pregnant embodiment as a potential model can feel 
like a recession back to “mother Earth” and goddess feminists, where the female body is 
valorized as somehow a superior, peaceful, more “natural” space than others.  However, as I 
will further explore in chapter four, the potential for Irigaray’s consideration extends well 
beyond this restricted space but instead encompasses diverse embodiments and lived 
relationships in the era of the cyborg.  And, as Emily Martin reminds us all in her “The Egg 
and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-
                                                
11 This questioned framework may be further illumined by Zillah Eisenstein’s The Radical Future of Liberal 
Feminism in which she notes, “One of the major contributions to be found… is the role of the ideology of 
liberal individualism in the construction of feminist theory.  Today’s feminists either do not discuss a theory of 
individuality or they unself-consciously adopt the competitive, atomistic, ideology of liberal individualism….  
Until a conscious differentiation is made between a theory of individuality that recognizes the importance of the 
individual within the social collectivity and the ideology of individualism that assumes a competitive view of 
the individual, there will not be a full accounting of what a feminist theory of liberation must look like in our 
Western society” (29). 
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Female Roles,” the narratives used to articulate and make meaning of biological processes 
are porous and ever-informed by the cultural space in which they are constructed.  With 
Irigaray, we may see how our perceptions of something “biological” have already been 
predetermined by culturally prevalent, dominant systems (such as Darwinian and Pavlovian 
relationships). How might these dominant systems continue to dictate perspectives regarding 
pregnant embodiment, mother and fetus relationships, and in turn extended to human 
interactions and characterizations on a broad scale? 
Irigaray and Rouche identify the placenta as third entity and mitigator that makes 
readings of “self” and “Other” inadequate and reductive, which furthermore challenges these 
competitive dualist systems.  They suggest a placental economy, which troubles temporally 
self-contained notions of “self” and “Other” while likewise overriding contemporary 
mainstream narratives of pregnancy and woman/fetus relationships. In her discussion, 
Rouche clarifies that “the placenta... cannot be reduced either to a mechanism of fusion (an 
ineffable mixture of the bodies or blood of mother and fetus [Pavlovian]), or, conversely, to 
one of aggression (the fetus as foreign body devouring from the inside, a vampire in the 
maternal body [Darwinian])” (39).  By way of referencing these dominant narratives, she 
exposes the potential to refigure the placenta – and the metaphoric but significant placeholder 
as it has served in these narratives. She concludes that “these descriptions are of imaginary 
reality and appear quite poor indeed – and obviously extremely culturally determined – in 
comparison to the complexity of biological reality” (39).  In other words, medical discourses 
and cultural understandings of human relationships frame the placental economy – and 
originary relational space of pregnancy – always already in constricting terms. 
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As an alternative, Rouch characterizes the placental economy as one of constant 
negotiation (41).  The organ itself is at once both “a formation of the embryo” and yet 
“behaves like… [it] is practically independent of it” (39).  The placenta thus mediates 
between woman and fetus, “establish[ing] a relationship between mother and fetus” (39).  
Markedly, Rouch does not suggest a veritable merging of the two entities:  there is a clear 
“recognition of the other” (41).  In fact, she furthermore notes that this recognition “of the 
other, of the non-self, by the mother, and therefore an initial reaction from her” is necessary 
“in order for placental factors to be produced” (41).  In this way, the difference between 
“self” and “other” occurs but is not a rigid division – instead, it remains a fluid connection, 
one being “continuously negotiated” (41).   
Notably, this status of being “continuously negotiated” may be used to characterize 
the seemingly static, if not rigid, language currently applied to pregnancy in a legal and 
medical framework.  Social and cultural factors, continually colliding with amended legal 
measures and technological advancements in medicine, betray the fluidity of “self” and 
“Other” at pregnancy.   
Irigaray’s “placental economy” complements our earlier discussion of pregnancy’s 
potential as a radical embodiment.  The way she and Rouche reframe discussions about 
pregnancy can directly impact how we view the relationship between a mother-to-be and the 
fetus; and it can be extended as an alternative (to, say, the Pavlovian and Darwinian models 
they mention) to discussing human relationships.  With pregnancy, we have within one body 
the becoming of two with the placenta mitigating, benefiting all involved in the process.  
How could this model of relationality be used to challenge the vilification of “dependence” 
so prominent in American contemporary culture?  In a sense, all humans are relationally 
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dependent, sharing community, yet our current framework that reveres the individual 
misrepresents and distorts this reality.  We will return to these inquiries in upcoming 
chapters, particularly Chapter 4 which considers this narrative in a disabilities context.  
“She is required to identity against herself”: a Poetics of Pregnancy 
 Irigaray furthermore illustrates that pregnancy itself is a kind of narrative.  Our 
analysis so far has explored how its cultural and social expectations have affected its legal 
and medical status, as well as how they have overshadowed varying lived experiences, 
embodiments, and identities.  The dominant narratives of pregnancy are ones in which, 
problematically, a woman is “co-opted into participation in an experience from which she is 
explicitly excluded; she is asked to identify with a selfhood that defines itself in opposition to 
her; she is required to identify against herself” (Fetterley xii, emphasis my own).   
 This notion of being required “to identify against herself,” or in other words to find an 
“I” within the text that is sympathetic, speaks to the larger narratives of “pregnancy” that still 
dominate mainstream discussions.  Again, I do not seek to merely trouble and dismantle the 
usefulness of the “pro-choice” mantra that has deliberately sought agency for women long 
relegated silent on matters of the body, law, and medicine so intimately connected to their 
experienced lives.  Nevertheless, even here, it is a struggle in rhetoric to reclaim something 
akin to a male-oriented identity, of a singular, static individual with neatly composed 
boundaries of self.  Women, as with the case in other issues of liberal feminist advancement, 
have too long been restricted outside these normative subject boundaries, excluded from the 
daily rights, legal privileges, and self-autonomy they afford in traditional and contemporary 
western cultures.  Nevertheless, this adoption of a problematic identity of self and individual 
“choice,” though a politically strategic move of lesser evils, seems only to further embolden 
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the mythical idea of self, the original male identity, so longer heralded and observed as 
Othering, ultimate “self” (or subject, I). 
 Likewise, looking closer than the stories framing pregnancy and identity, we may 
consider the material implications of language itself.  How does it limit those within and 
without?  Much as Leonard Davis argues in “Missing Larry” on the poetics of disability, he 
“theorizes the ways that poetry defamiliarizes not only language but the body normalized 
within language.  A poetics of disability might unsettle the thematics of embodiment as it 
appeared in any number of literary and artistic movements” (118).  In a similar strain of 
reconsideration, Hortense Spillers contests the very language available for discussions in 
light of their historical legacy and context; responding to her essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s 
Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” she notes how she wrote her essay to expand and 
create such a space:  “Before I can get to the subject of the sexuality of black women I didn’t 
see a vocabulary that would make it possible to entertain the sexuality of black women in any 
way that was other than traumatic” (301).  Her project, rooted in not only reprimanding the 
Moynihan Report and its lasting interpretation of black paternity and maternity in the 20th 
century US, powerfully recognizes the narrative lapse the infamous report repeats.  Spillers 
cites the lapse on a broad scale, rooted in hundreds of years of servitude, slavery, sexual and 
dehumanizing violence – all tantamount to an absence, a lack, of adequate language to 
discuss African American kinship, families, and sexuality in twentieth century US.  In a 
sense, her radical disruption of the grammar used in this discussion goes hand-in-hand with a 
deliberate recuperation of a past where words such as “mother” gained unique, diverse 
meaning. 
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In this spirit, then, I strive to consider a kind of poetics of pregnancy – the narratives 
of its construction, its own narrative construction, and the undercurrent informing the very 
language used in its discussion. How do contemporary liberal efforts simply obfuscate, and 
in so doing, replicate narratives of pregnancy’s past?  How, then, can discussions of 
pregnancy productively expand to encompass a more radical and liberatory space if this 
conversation remains predicated on these narratives of self/identity, limited to this historical 
domain?  After all, this notion of self has likewise been used as justification for slavery, for 
institutionalized otherness by race, embodiment, age, and perceived ability – perpetuating 
such a bodily model arguably (though visibly, if carefully considered) conscripts more bodies 
and lived experiences than it can ever hope to free.   
 In a sense, then, pregnancy becomes a significant point of inquiry, ubiquitous yet 
marginalized, for limitation placed on bodies.  Pregnancy is figured as Other and outside – it 
is a constant and insistent reminder that current models of embodiment and understandings of 
the self are wholly inadequate.  A woman perceived as pregnant, also in terms of countless 
additional variables such as her ostensible race, socio-economic class, orientation, age, 
dis/ability – a sampling of such categories, unfortunately offered here as a facile list, bear 
unique and nuanced elements connected to perceived “reproduction” within society. 
 On the one hand, then, I seek to discuss pregnancy as a narrative itself – via both the 
dominant texts that inscribe it regularly within society as well as alternative, poetic and 
literary texts that extend this conversation beyond typical boundaries of the “self” 
constructed in legal and medical discourses.  Additionally, then, my project considers 
pregnancy as a narrative, but the potential of alternative narratives to refigure it and the 
experiences of diverse individuals at its site of embodiment.  In alternative, I propose self-
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acknowledged narratives of pregnancy:  spaces outside, beyond, against, beneath, in 
opposition too these dominant narratives.  In their overt acknowledgement, and then 
attempted disruption, I think we can locate here an historically-informed, context driven, and 
radical alternative sources for pregnancy narratives (in plural). 
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Chapter 2  Choice, Transgressive Pregnancy, and Re-membering Motherhood: Harriet 
Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl and Toni Morrison’s Beloved 
Childbirth, then, may be painful, dangerous, and unchosen; but it has also been converted into a purpose, an act 
of self-assertion by a woman forced to assert herself primarily through her biology. – Adrienne Rich, Of Woman 
Born (160) 
 
 In 2010, the state of North Carolina founded The N.C. Justice for Sterilization 
Victims Foundation “to compensate victims who were forcibly sterilized by the State of 
North Carolina’s Eugenics Board program” (“Sterilization Victims”).  By 2013, the 
Governor had signed Senate Bill 402 to create the “Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization 
Compensation Program.”  The program issued a brochure, also available on the state’s 
website, that defines “eugenics” and provides the history behind the state’s reproduction 
control efforts.  The sterilization program ran from 1929 through 1974, impacted over 7500 
individuals that were 85% female and over 40% minority (non-white) North Carolinians.  
While the Foundation is fairly unique, the policies it addresses were not discussed in 
American history:  32 states had similar eugenics politics in the 20th century (Severson).12 
The initial program offered sterilization as a “solution for poverty and illegitimacy,” though 
it notes with the 1950s it dramatically increased its focus on African Americans and women 
“not in state institutions.”13  In 2012, however, these efforts were tabled.  Among the 
concerns about the compensation budget, Republican Senator Chris Carney added, “If we do 
                                                
12 In the 1950s, as Rickie Solinger further notes in her text Pregnancy and Power, abortion related sterilization  
was also prevalent – 53% of teaching hospitals made “simultaneous sterilization a condition for abortion 
approval,” whereas the figure was some 40% in other hospitals (163).   
 
13 The N.C. Office of Justice for Sterilization Victims has put together an historical archive of primary sources, 
to be perused on their website.  In particular, it features pamphlets and articles dispersed to support the original 
sterilization efforts.  One in particular is a 1947 reprint from the N.C. Social Hygiene Society’s publication 
Better Health.  Entitled “Better Human Beings Tomorrow,” Dr. Clarence J. Gamble introduces sterilization as 
the plan for the future:  “Tomorrow’s population should be produced by today’s best human material.  Along 
with 27 other forward-looking states, North Carolina has written that conviction into her laws.”  Its primary 
focus is that of “feeblemindedness” – vaguely defined as including “mental defects” including illiteracy as well 
as “mental defects” – and individuals with epilepsy.  He further notes that by the state’s findings North Carolina 
“had the highest rate of rejectees among all the states.” 
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something like this, you open up the door to other things the state did in its history… And 
some, I’m sure you’d agree, are much worse than this” (“Payments for Eugenics Victims are 
Shelved”). 
 The United States’ history certainly presents considerable options to satisfy Senator 
Carney’s implication.  Any discussion of efforts to deny human subjects’ their full span of 
rights, no less in the reproductive realm, must nevertheless begin with slavery.  The “peculiar 
institution” not only functioned on an economy of rape and sexual violence, but it likewise 
influenced racial reproductive politics for generations after its abolishment. While we have 
discussed the origins of our current “rhetoric of choice,” the politics of choice in a sense have 
always been bound up in the hegemonic cultural ideals of America.  The determination of 
“fit” mothers, of a child’s and parents’ rights, of the patriarchal line itself – all insistently 
indicate that reproduction remains bound up in capitalist aims and in preserving a particular 
white power-structure status quo.  
  While there have been notable shifts in American politics concerning women’s 
reproductive rights, they obscure the continued trend of control over women’s decisions:  the 
language and the narratives of this lived reproductive politics discursively construct a narrow 
space of potential here.  The movement from outright legal oppression to the scientific and 
medical restrictions (often complicit with seemingly more liberal legislation) continues to 
distort a solid conception of “voluntary motherhood” (Siegel 151). The fabricated, limited 
nature of “choice” – hinged clearly on privilege and accordance with society’s notion of a 
“proper” mother – makes the lingering rhetoric not only misleading, but oppressive by 
eliding diverse women’s reproductive politics and outcomes.  Furthermore, as Reva B. Siegel 
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notes in “Abortion as a Sex Equality Right,” this rhetoric “abstracts the conflict from the 
social context in which judgments about abortion are formed and enforced” (152). 
The impoverished choices of reproductive politics in America may be found 
epitomized and outlined in the American institution of slavery that can, in many ways, serve 
to interrogate and complicate contemporary notions of “hegemonic” and “non-hegemonic” 
pregnancies about the issues of “privacy” and “choice.”  Despite its historical distance, the 
institution of slavery established specific lines of racial reproductive differences that pervade 
current societal inequalities to this day.  While the overt policies – from the compulsions to 
reproduce, as during slavery, to the shaming rhetoric aimed at Black mothers in the 1965 
Moynihan Report – have remained far from consistent, African American women’s 
reproductive histories indicate the prevailing intrusion of legal and medical discourses in the 
private/public sphere on racialized pregnancies.  Furthermore, their histories illustrate the 
complicated issues surrounding marginalized women’s material existence at the site of 
pregnancy. 
 Black enslaved women’s experiences of the 19th century severely complicate 
normative notions of the public and private spheres in the US.  For Black female slaves, the 
private/domestic and public spheres’ were entirely different from that of white privileged 
women.  Dramatically different power dynamics and materiality informed their experiences, 
fracturing dominant understandings of the public and domestic.  Treated as chattel and 
owned for their labor and reproductive purposes, Black women and their experiences far 
from paralleled the idealized setting of Republican Motherhood and the Cult of True 
Womanhood.  Angela Davis in Women, Race, and Class posits that domestic life was 
important as “the only space where [enslaved Black women] could truly experience 
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themselves as human beings” (17).14  In this sense, female slaves were “performing the only 
labor of the slave community which could not be directly and immediately claimed by the 
oppressor” (17); though the space remained vulnerable and could be “invaded at any given 
and arbitrary moment by the property relations” (Spillers 74).  Whereas the domestic sphere 
was the relegated space for white women of privilege, it became a tenuous but transgressive 
space for African American women in slavery.  Nevertheless, this realignment of the public 
and private spheres was predicated on an oppressive culture that defined slaves as laborers, 
their “subjecthood” legally denied as they were legally commodified as objects to be bought, 
sold, worked, and proliferated to serve the larger white American economy. 
 Reproduction politics for Black, enslaved women were vastly informed by an 
economy of rape. As Hortense Spillers’ addresses in “Mamas’ Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” “under 
conditions of captivity, the offspring of the female does not ‘belong’ to the Mother, nor is 
s/he ‘related’ to the ‘owner,’ though the latter ‘possesses’ it, …often fathered it, and, as often, 
without whatever benefit of patrimony” (74).  African American women’s reproduction 
during slavery did serve as a kind of “natural resource,” albeit quite differently from that of 
white women.  After 1808 and prior to Emancipation, Black enslaved women were made to 
produce and maintain the steady supply of laborers for the institution, often through sexual 
violation or forced reproduction by their masters.  Black women’s offspring served the larger 
institution of slavery, and for this reason, originating with the Virginia Colony legislation of 
1662 “An Act Defining the Status of Mulatto Bastards,” established that the children of 
                                                
14 bell hooks elaborates on this in her essay, “Homeplace”: “Black women resisted [white oppression] by 
making homes where all black people could strive to be subjects, not objects, where we could be affirmed in our 
minds and hearts despite poverty, hardship, and deprivation, where we could restore to ourselves the dignity 
denied us on the outside in the public world” (42).  Again, the notion of the “home” became a symbol of 
something quite different from that for white housewives; Black women had been associated with labor outside 
of their own homes, thus the privilege of a “homeplace” takes on considerably different context. 
 
38 
 
 
enslaved women followed the status of their mother – a clear aberration from prevalent 
patriarchal law in the Colonies and eventual US.  As such, Black women were forced to serve 
“as breeders with no formal rights or control over their own bodies, their sexual experiences, 
and their children constituted the ultimate degradation of enslaved persons and provided the 
foundation of the slavery system” (Solinger 30). 
 Narratives of pregnancy within the system of slavery further illuminate the 
complicated tableau of choices afforded enslaved women.  In her 1861 memoir, Incidents in 
the Life of a Slave Girl, Harriet Jacobs expresses her struggle to freedom from slavery 
centering on her role as mother—critiquing both the violent sexual economy of slavery as 
well the institution’s dehumanizing rupture of familial ties.  Resisting the advances of her 
master, she chooses to reproduce with a independent white man beyond the bounds of her 
master’s wishes or control, and she ultimately runs away and brings her children to safety in 
the North.   
Jacobs uniquely frames her narrative in her preface, as a testimony for the collective 
of slave women in a push beyond herself or the individual:  
I have not written my experiences in order to attract attention to myself….  
But I do earnestly desire to arouse the women of the North to a realizing a 
sense of the condition of two millions of women at the South, still in bondage, 
suffering what I suffered, and most of them far worse. (2-3) 
Her appeal to this collective is two-fold.  On the one hand, she offers her experiences by 
fluctuating between first and third person, providing generalizations and “a pattern of 
equivalence between her life and those of other female slaves” (Whitsitt  83).  She likewise 
bolsters her gendered critique of slavery, in an appeal to her presumably freed, white female 
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audience, by suggesting the intense level of gendered sexual violence in the institution: 
“slavery is terrible for men; but it is far more terrible for women” (66). Her testimony 
proceeds as a collective appeal, and it regularly acknowledges the multiple standards set in 
American society for different women – namely, enslaved women and freed, white women of 
privilege.  For Jacobs as well as other women in slavery, “choice” remains bound up in these 
material differences and she recognizes her impoverished, limited choices with a humble 
appeal to her more privileged audience.  Her narrative remarks on her inability to adhere to 
cultural gender norms of the day as not entirely a failing of the individual; she shows that the 
institution of slavery, an oppressive over-arching narrative itself, radically alters a woman’s 
relationship to her own personal decisions and those available to her.  As Novian Whitsitt 
suggests in “Reading between the Lines: The Black Cultural Tradition of Masking in Harriet 
Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl,” Jacobs not only “endorses” cultural mores to 
demonstrate their absence for slave women’s options.  She likewise uses “masking” to tell 
her story parallel to them, allowing her “to compose an acceptable explanation of events” for 
her white, middle-class, female audience while “challeng[ing] an ideology that denied her 
existence as an authentic woman” (73, 78).  
 In the opening of her narrative, Jacobs highlights the objectifying role of slavery, 
characterizing herself as an “object” and one of many “God-breathing machines” (11).  Here 
she candidly establishes the dehumanizing language of slavery particularly at the site of 
family and demonstrates that as “objects,” slaves are denied the normative bonds of kinfolk 
and family likely valued by her white female audience.  Her way in to the narrative 
specifically focuses on this rupture of human familial relations in slavery.  She relates for 
instance that as a child, her own father sought to purchase her but never could – she was ever 
40 
 
 
too “valuable [a] piece of property” (9).  She demonstrates the conflicting loyalties of 
slavery, when a child must answer to both his father as well as his master, through her 
brother Willie’s struggles.  And when her own father passes away, she is unable to mourn 
and is instead forced to spend the day gathering flowers for a social event of her mistress’s.  
 Prior to her own pregnancy, Jacobs also primes her audience by exposing the 
uniquely “peculiar sorrow” of slave mothers to her audience (17).  In preparation for the 
slave auction and separation, she addresses a mother’s despair on New Year’s knowing she 
will soon be parted from her children.  Here, as throughout the text, Jacobs also introduces 
the idea of death as preferable to these cruel disruptions of family through an archetypal 
example of a slave mother:   
She sits on her cold cabin floor, watching the children who may all be torn 
from her the next morning; and often does she wish that she and they might 
die before the day dawns.  She may be an ignorant creature, degraded by the 
system that has brutalized her from her childhood; but she has a mother’s 
instincts, and is capable of feeling a mother’s agonies. (17) 
As she highlights the ruptures in domestic life, Jacobs likewise turns to the rampant 
sexual violence of slavery that again uniquely targets slave women.  At fifteen, as her first 
narrative of romantic love emerges, Jacobs reflects on “Why does the slave ever love?” (33).  
Dr. Norcom, “the “hateful man who claimed a right to rule [her], body and soul” forbids her 
the love she desires.  Her first love as a young woman results inevitably in heartbreak at her 
inability to marry:  “when I reflected that I was a slave, and that the laws gave no sanction to 
the marriage of such, my heart sank” (34).  Jacobs’s experience illustrates the significant 
truth that slavery “established the right to choose a sexual and procreating partner as the 
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privilege of whites” and likewise that the heteronormative right to marry and raise (one’s 
own) children has been historically informed by racial privilege (Solinger 37).   
In her narrative, Jacobs grapples with this distinction, decrying her lack of access to 
the privileged Cult of True Womanhood that governed notions of respectability, and sexual 
chastity outside of marriage, for white women.  She appeals to her legally free readers, “But, 
O, ye happy women, whose purity has been sheltered from childhood, who have been free to 
choose the objects of your affection, whose homes are protected by law, do not judge the 
poor desolate slave girl too severely!” (48).  Again, a racially contextualized examination of 
the Cult of True Womanhood, retroactively cast as a vastly repressive and patriarchal system 
of social mores, illustrates that it was nonetheless denied to enslaved Black women.   Jacobs 
proceeds to cast her impoverished state in terms of a lack of agency, of not only limited, but 
very differently, contextualized choices: “If slavery had been abolished, I, also, could have 
married the man of my choice; I could have had a home shielded by the laws; and I should 
have been spared the painful task of confessing what I am now about the relate; but all my 
prospects have been blighted by slavery” (48). 15 
Without the prospects of a sanctioned marriage with the man of her affections, Jacobs 
becomes “reckless in… despair” as she feels “forsaken by God and man” (48).  And here, she 
settles on the only viable option she can find:  the possibility of an affair with a freedman, 
Mr. Sawyers, for it is after all “something akin to freedom” (48).  For Jacobs, her ultimate 
choice to become pregnant with Mr. Samuel Sawyer’s children – safely securing her, for the 
                                                
15 It is worth noting that the freedom of choices enumerated by Jacobs, while far more likely to be available to 
white women of privilege, remains contentiously informed by other racial, classed, and gendered expectations.  
Certainly, not all legally “free” women of the 19th century had freedom to marry as they chose. Nevertheless, 
for the purposes of my discussion, Jacobs as a slave does speak from a far less privileged position of power that 
is not closely rivaled by white female citizen contemporaries.  Again, “choice” holds nuance and, within the 
patriarchal discourses, works as a continuum upon which most women may be located rather than a neat binary 
of “choice” or absence of choice.  She shows how “choice” functions in a complicated relationship to 
“normative” social roles. 
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time being, from her master’s own sexual advances – locates her transgressively outside the 
bounds of prescribed slavery reproductive politics.  Her master’s responding anxieties clearly 
illustrate her level of subversion.  Upon learning of her pregnancies, Dr. Norcom threatens 
that he will never sell her, acknowledging her desire to be bought by her lover.  He 
furthermore offers her a chance for his forgiveness by severing her ties with her children’s 
father, thus ensuring the appearance of his own control and autonomy over his slave and her 
progeny.  Lastly, amid his threats and expressions of rage, he exerts dominance and reminds 
Jacobs that her “child was an addition to his stock of slaves” (53). 
 Jacobs’s choice to have her children remains a troubled one for her in the narrative: 
she both struggles to maintain the notion of female virtue, and she likewise deals with the 
threat of slavery reclaiming her children. In part, as demonstrated by her pleadings to her 
audience, she struggles with the guilt and social reception of her own “fallen” character that 
is the result of her sexual relationship and pregnancies out of wedlock.  She argues for her 
inability to follow standards set for chastity, her “outsider” status in relationship to white 
women’s social mores, as a female slave:   “I feel that the slave woman ought not to be 
judged by the same standard as others” (49).  Additionally, she experiences torment 
concerning her future children’s status as slaves.  Her first son, born sickly, provides her with 
many diverging emotions concerning his well-being.  She speaks of her love and adoration 
for him, but further notes “there was a dark cloud over my enjoyment.  I could never forget 
that he was a slave” (54).  Her access to contemporary sentimental narratives of motherly 
love again is evaded by her experiences, as she knows her children’s future is marred by her 
own status as slave.  Jacobs concedes that, mixed with her prayers for her son’s improving 
health were troubled prayers for his death, for ultimately “death is better than slavery” (54).  
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Her conflicted emotions as a mother suggest that slavery, and reproductive politics of the 
public sphere, mitigate and inform even her most intimate emotional attachments to family. 
 I do not wish to demean these particular iterations of agency enacted by Jacobs or her 
female slave contemporaries.  For Jacobs does enact a kind of autonomy and choice, to 
borrow the neo-liberal language of contemporary American reproductive politics, within the 
very limited space of her (non)subject position.  Significantly, then, the argument of “choice” 
and its accompanying rhetoric need not be its outright absence, but the particular material, 
socio-economic conditions, and cultural mores that inform the kinds of “choices” available to 
specific women.  
I likewise do not mean to suggest simplistically that bearing children necessarily 
affords a woman agency or freedoms, particularly in light of the slave economy’s history, 
human commodification, and the rape culture it entails.  However, in defying the economy 
that objectified and enslaved her, Jacobs uniquely claimed the product of her own labors:  
when her master grows desperate to sequester her in a cottage and overpower her with his 
sexual advances, she rebukes him by stating: “I will never go there.  In a few months I shall 
be a mother” (49).  Her choice to have her own children outside the condoned conditions of 
her master and the larger institution of slavery resonates as a kind of strategic reclamation:  
Jacobs’s attains a kind of power over her own body.   
Additionally, to further complicate this analysis, critics have come to question the 
validity of Jacobs’s claim of avoiding Dr. Norcom’s sexual advances.  In his essay, Whitsitt 
references this “double voice” technique by casting Jacobs’s with a “trickster-like 
disposition… bent [on] duplicity within the narrative” (81).  In this sense, his critique 
suggests that Jacobs’s exerts a power instead over her own story, for “well versed in the 
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standard style, content, and temperament of traditional slave narratives, Jacobs desired to 
construct her self-image outside of the victim status” (85).  Whitsitt, along with theorists 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Gabrielle Foreman, deliberate the truth of Jacobs’s ability to 
thwart Dr. Norcom.  They instead posit the likelihood that her first pregnancy was a result of 
her master’s rape, and that Jacobs sought an “intentional complicating of paternity” (74).  For 
his discussion, Whitsitt significantly distinguishes between “Brent,” the original pseudonym 
ascribed to Jacobs’s at the narratives publication, and Jacobs herself to articulate the 
rhetorical strategy of her memoir’s protagonist and the less “delicate” reality of her lived 
experiences as a female slave.  Regardless of the paternity of her child, we can note Jacobs’s 
strategic use of pregnancy as narrative provides agency and a partial path to her freedom. 
Furthermore, Jacobs’s relationship to what appears to be renegade heteronormative 
reproduction may actually also pressure contemporary theoretical ideas of the “post-humanist 
dream” where queer, non-traditional communities are celebrated as they demote 
heteronormative hierarchical narratives.  In a sense, these contemporary queer readings seem 
to cast off maternity and pregnancy as simplistically part and parcel of repressive 
heteronormativity.  How can we reconsider pregnancy and maternity within this radical 
spirit, rather than discard them as its easy and absolute antithesis?  What becomes of women 
in particular as they are historically associated with the maternal?  Jacobs’s maternity in 
slavery help us reconsider this trend. In The Queer Art of Failure, Judith Halberstam 
critiques this particular issue, noting the “risk of linking heteronormativity in some essential 
way to women, and, perhaps unwittingly, woman becomes the site of the unqueer:  she offers 
life, while queerness links up with the death drive; she is aligned sentimentally with the child 
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and with ‘goodness,’ while the gay man in particular leads they way to ‘something better’ 
while ‘promising absolutely nothing’ ” (118).    
Nirmala Erevelles extends this critique by addressing the material reality of slaves, 
such as Harriet Jacobs.  In her Disability and Difference in Global Contexts: Enabling a 
Transformative Body Politic, Erevelles points out that “the release from normative 
(heterosexual, patriarchal, and nuclear) kinship ties [do] not necessarily signify a release 
from their oppressive constraints, nor [does] it enable enslaved bodies to form alternative 
anti-patriarchal, queer relationships unconnected by bloodlines via rhizomatic extensions” 
(55).  Furthermore, she highlights that this disconnection from family directly resulted in 
their object status, as “they were transformed into commodity precisely because their 
exclusion from ‘natural’ kinship ties also denied their claims to sovereign subjectivity” (57).  
In other words, examining Jacobs’s “outlaw erotics” and resulting (relative) agency over her 
own children requires contextualization and a firm break with a neatly binarized 
understanding of “choice” as well as traditional, sentimentalist readings of pregnancy.  
Jacobs, as a slave, was clearly outside the domain of white female subjectivity (and human 
subjectivity at large) and, as a result, her relationship to her body and reproductive potential 
disrupt a mainstream understanding of women in the domestic sphere.  She further illustrates 
that a woman’s “choices” are honestly rendered only when they are contextualized by their 
relationship to the hegemonic or dominant narrative of power.  
 Jacobs’s narrative significantly disrupts notions of reproductive politics and a slave 
woman’s relationship to her body, to her womb, and to her potential as a mother.  Her case 
provides a formative example of how pervading, dominant narratives of pregnancy fail 
entirely to articulate her particular experience with maternity.  Her regular pleading against 
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the valued judgments imposed by her readers, a presumably white female audience, provides 
consistent reminders of her distance and marginalized status that make dominant narratives 
of pregnancy disjointed and entirely inadequate to address her own relationship to her 
children, her partner, and her own affected identity. In part, we can continue in the spirit of 
her critique in contemporary iterations of normative pregnancy.   
Re-membering Maternity:  Toni Morrison’s Beloved 
Significantly, as voiced within the genre of 19th century slave narratives, Harriet 
Jacobs’s memoir works both quite simply and quite complicatedly to humanize her.  In 
“Defining a Genre: Octavia Butler’s Kindred and Women’s Neo-Slave Narrative,” Guilliano 
Bettanin asks, as slavery qualified the enslaved as commodified objects rather than humans, 
how might former slaves recast themselves as “cultural and historical subjects”?  The oft 
quoted line from Frederick Douglass’s autobiography captures the particularly male, now 
male American, iteration of this claim:  “You have seen how a man was made a slave; you 
shall see how a slave was made a man” (92).  Jacobs’s narrative, as a slave woman’s 
perspective even more rare in the American canon, attempts a similar kind of interpolation.  
In the economy of slavery, Jacobs’s status as a female slave inevitably draws her 
reproductive potential to the fore.  In an effort to carve out a space for a women slaves, she 
grapples openly with the limitations imposed on her by race and chattel status, and she 
further fragments the identity of the “self” and its complications in American history.  
 Such narratives as Jacobs’ not only hold significant historical value, but they voice 
and respond to a disparity in racial reproductive politics that pervade to this day. Neo-slave 
narratives continue to be written and published to re-situate these African American 
identities, connected by a genealogy of violence.  Bettanin remarks that, “if original slave 
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narratives aimed to recover history, neo-slave narratives re-invent history.”  The neo-slave 
genre, articulated as “a fictional mutation of the autobiographies of nineteenth-century 
Americans who lived as slaves” (Crossley 265), regularly relies on first-person narratives and 
fantastic sensibilities, all underwritten by a violent, material realism.  Notably, these 
narratives often break with linear trajectories, suggesting an alternative, circular spirit of time 
and the significance of injecting their story in the contemporary moment.  Interestingly too, 
many of the primary examples of the genre center around radical breaks in the dominant 
narratives of American pregnancy.  They re-cast maternity and genealogy, offering 
alternative narratives of identity and self that are at once engaged with the contemporary 
moment as well as the past.  They reinvigorate the slave narratives of the 19th century, 
suggesting the lingering if not haunting body of stories still to be told. 
In Toni Morrison’s 1987 neo-slave narrative Beloved, Sethe’s story may be seen as a 
“fleshy” re-membering of Harriet Jacobs’s own appeals: the novel posits the maternal ex-
slave woman’s body at its center, along with her daughters and mother-in-law, to convey the 
story of maternity, “motherwork,”16 and infanticide.  As Abdellatif Khayati further notes in 
his essay, “Representation, Race, and the ‘Language’ of the Ineffable in Toni Morrison’s 
Narrative,” “whereas old slave narratives exercised a willed omission of trauma as a 
defensive armor against humiliating or embarrassing memories, Morrison… seeks to disrupt” 
(315).   From Baby Suggs’s church of the flesh – “in this here place, we flesh; flesh that 
weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in grass.  Love it” (88) – to Sethe’s developing 
identity and understanding of the self through maternity, bodies are fluid here while central 
                                                
16 “Motherwork” is a term used by Andrea O’Reilly’s Toni Morrison & Motherhood: A Politics of the Heart 
(2004) in which she argues that Morrison “defines motherhood as a site of power” (45).  It references 
specifically the mothering and act of the maternal, while working to de-essentialize this notion. 
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to the story.  Blood and breastmilk regularly flow and mix to give embodied substance to the 
reality of violence and oppression in slavery.  
The novel’s focus works, complementing the original 19th century slave narratives, by 
moving the (former) slave’s subject position from “object” under slavery to “subject” as a 
human identity, uniquely through a relationship to maternity.17 This tone of hyper-
humanization that disrupts the oppressive objectification of slavery extends even to 124 the 
house itself, the first character fleshed out in the text—which Denver regards (as perhaps we 
readers should too) “as a person rather than a structure” (29).  Furthermore, in these 
storytelling efforts to render full dimensions of humanness, we see distinctly the focus on the 
body and the embodied experience develop centrally.  In her essay, “ ‘You just can’t fly off 
and leave a body’: the Intercorporeal Breastfeeding Subject of Toni Morrison’s Fiction,” 
Edith Frampton goes further to suggest that Beloved’s “engagement with fluidity operates not 
only at the level of the body’s materiality but also at the level of subjectivity, as the 
phenomenology of the flesh is represented as inseparable from the psyche, from affect, 
spirituality, and history” (151, emphasis mine).  In a sense, then, the story revisits the lived 
experiences of slaves in maternity, bringing the body and bodily functions to the fore.  The 
narrative furthermore demonstrates how intimately connected these bodily bearings are on 
the spiritual and psychological underpinnings of slavery’s legacy, which transcends 
generations.  Much as Sethe notes about her own daughter Beloved, this neo-slave re-
membering is compelled to “come back…in the flesh” (200). 
In this unique focus on the construction of the subject through maternity, Beloved also 
relies on a circularity of the narrative as re-membering – both concerning the body as well as 
                                                
17 Beloved was in part inspired by the lived experiences of Margaret Garner, who tried to escape slavery and 
committed infanticide in 1856. 
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the firsthand memories recounted.  Immediately, the story conflates the memories of birth 
and death with commodification and sexual violence:  Sethe recollects sexual favors in a 
graveyard to have “Beloved” etched on a stone and wonders how she might have secured 
more.  Likewise, the larger story itself turns on the metaphors of maternity and death, 
regularly referencing the pain of remembering but the necessity of it for rebirth:  “anything 
dead coming back to life hurts” and “nothing heals without pain” (35, 78).  Notably, these 
metaphorical narratives of rebirth and re-creation hinge on Sethe’s relationship to the 
maternal as an (ex) slave.  
The pain revisited in the novel centers largely around one recurring scene, which 
particularly captures the commodification of slave maternity: the white boys’ violation of 
pregnant Sethe by forcibly nursing from her, in the barn at Sweet Home.18  Sethe is already 
lactating for her first daughter, who has gone to live in freedom with Baby Suggs in Ohio.  
Sethe is pregnant with another baby, her future daughter Denver.  Sethe and her breastmilk 
are violated, there in a barn alongside the cows; her status is clearly that of chattel, her milk 
stolen by the white men of Sweet Home when her body has created it uniquely for her own 
child.  The scene holds resonance for many reasons revisited in the text, specifically as her 
breastmilk becomes a focus, an enduring symbol for her, and her reclamation of her children, 
her freedom, and a developing self-identity.  It also informs her past relationship with her 
own mother, as Sethe reflects on her absence and the resulting neglect of her surrogate, Nan. 
                                                
18 This scene inevitably figures as a perversion of the final and redeeming image in The Grapes of Wrath.  Set 
in a humble barn as well, Rose of Sharon figures as a white, labor-class Madonna, breastfeeding a grown man 
who is not her child:  “For a minute, Rose of Sharon sat still in the whispering barn.  Then she hoisted her tired 
body up and drew the comfort about her.  She moved slowly to the corner and stood looking down at the wasted 
face, into the wide, frightened eyes.  Then slowly she lay down beside him.  He shook his head slowly from side 
to side.  Rose of Sharon loosened one side of the blanket and bared her breast.  ‘You got to,’ she said.  She 
squirmed closer and pulled his head close.  ‘There!’ she said.  ‘There.’ Her hand moved behind his head and 
supported it.  Her fingers moved gently in his hair.  She looked up and across the barn, and her lips came 
together and smiled mysteriously” (455). 
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Sethe remembers that Nan: “had to nurse whitebabies and I too because Ma’am was in the 
rice.  The little whitebabies got it first and I got what was left” (200).  Much as a slave 
woman’s children were not her own, her breastmilk created on their behalf by her body was 
likewise not hers.  A female slave who had recently given birth would oftentimes become a 
wet nurse to the master’s children as well.  Any nurslings on the property became fair game, 
and again the fundamental biological and psychological bonds between mother and child in 
slavery were severed.19  The scene of the white boys at Sweet Home, suckling forcibly from 
Sethe, graphically depicts this violation openly – it is the crux of the novel as well as the 
scene in which Halle loses his sanity, his connection to his wife, and his humanness at large.  
Indeed, the politics of breastfeeding resound shortly after Beloved’s murder scene, when 
Sethe feeds her remaining daughter still sullied by the act:  “so Denver took her mother’s 
milk right along with the blood of her sister” (152).  
Harriet Jacobs conveys her story with a self-conscious decorum and politeness 
concerning maternity, a rhetorically sound move for her antebellum audience; Morrison’s 
Beloved, on the other hand, re-members the fleshy, mother body in its rendering, making no 
hesitation in presenting its characters’ grittiest reflections and violations.  For Baby Suggs, a 
mother of eight now freed by her late son Halle, openly confesses to her own limited memory 
and how a mother in slavery must be vigilantly careful about such:  “I had eight.  Every one 
of them gone away from me,” and she can remember that only of her first-born that “she 
loved the burned bottom of bread” (5).  But Sethe reflects, “That’s all you let yourself 
                                                
19 I add here that breastmilk also has a history of being communally shared, which continues with 
contemporary breastmilk banks (see the Human Milk Banking Association of North America).  However, the 
compulsion and stealing that characterize the exchange of breastmilk during slavery indicates the considerable 
disconnect from the redemptive Rose of Sharon scene mentioned in the previous footnote.  Instead, this denial 
of breastmilk autonomy extended the objectifying narrative of slavery that located slaves as secondary, denied 
nourishment, and furthermore disconnected from their own mothers as much as possible. 
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remember” for she herself “worked hard to remember as close to nothing as was safe” (5-6).  
And here, the limited political access slave mothers experienced with their own children 
becomes explicit in the psyche of each individual woman.  These untraditional maternal 
sentiments and outright dehumanizing coping mechanims—such as strategically forgetting 
one’s own children outside of mundane toast preferences—are the realities of maternity in 
slavery.  Likewise, they become a method of survival for women trapped within this 
oppressive system, creating an entirely alternative, muzzled relationship between mother and 
child.  Indeed, the gentle appeals of Jacobs regarding her own relationship to her children are 
voiced here, likened to pawns in a cruel game: slaves are “moved around like checkers” and 
the reality that “nobody stopped playing checkers just because the pieces included [Baby 
Suggs] children” (23).  The objectified status of slaves here directly counters any kind of 
kinship bonds, as previously discussed, shattering the context of the subject, of the mother, 
and any kind of relationship she may have with her own children.  
Sethe goes on to discuss her ability to love her children, in contrasting terms with that 
of traditional, selfless motherhood.  She specifies her experience relative to her own status as 
slave; becoming a legal human subject in freedom, she gains a likewise liberating dimension 
in relationship to her children particularly.  Nevertheless, her relationship with motherhood is 
voiced in a way that contrasts sharply with the selflessness of the Cult of True Womanhood.  
She speaks of it as “a kind of selfishness I never knew nothing about before” in which she 
felt “big… and deep and wide and when I stretched out my arms all my children could get in 
between” (162).  Sethe further suggests, as we have discussed, that familial love and 
communal attachment such as in motherhood becomes uniquely contextualized by her status 
as an enslaved woman:  “look like I loved em more after I got here.  Or maybe I couldn’t 
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love em proper in Kentucky because they wasn’t mine to love” (162).  She struggles to 
articulate her relationship to her children through an implicit reconsideration of herself as 
subject and through the nuanced context of politics and space. 
The final climax of the text works to articulate Sethe herself as a subject (the “Me?” 
she struggles with in the conclusion) and in particular to articulate her maternity and 
relationship to motherhood that includes infanticide.  At one point, Sethe seeks to explain her 
actions to Paul D, a former fellow slave of Sweet Home who has just recently learned of her 
past murderous actions.  Sethe first tells him of her escape and runaway with her children, 
and of the sense of autonomy she felt in her actions.  Sethe’s thoughts complement the 
impoverished conditions in Jacobs’s emotional struggles, as she seeks to claim something of 
her actions as “her own” and contextualized as a kind of “choice” within the distorted and 
violent institution of slavery: 
I did it.  I got us all out.  Without Halle too.  Up till then it was the only thing I 
ever did on my own.  Decided.  And it came off right, like it was supposed to.  
We was here.  Each and every one of my babies and me too.  I birthed them 
and I got em out and it wasn’t no accident.  I did that.  I had help, of course, 
lots of that, but still it was me doing it. (162) 
Her repetitive use of “I” in her claims acknowledge a kind of primacy in self-agency – the 
identity she will question and attempt to articulate in the final lines of the novel.  
Nevertheless, Sethe acknowledges that she had help, gestures toward the collective, without 
seeing that as a detractor from the fact that “still it was me doing it.”   
She goes on to recount, in cryptic and fleeting imagery, her decision to murder her 
own child.  She senses the potential chasm between her and her audience, the lack of 
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empathetic connection, that would render her actions unexplainable and unforgivable to 
many, “that she could never close in, pin it down for anybody who had to ask. …but the truth 
was simple” (163).  She sums up the “simple” truth by surmising, “Well, all I’m saying is 
that’s a selfish pleasure I never had before.  I couldn’t let all that go back to where it was, and 
I couldn’t let her nor any of em live under schoolteacher.  That was out” (163).  Paul D does 
not clearly understand, and he asks her if she succeeded; she replies simply, “It worked.  … 
They ain’t at Sweet Home.  Schoolteacher ain’t go em. …It’s my job to know what is and to 
keep them away from what I know is terrible.  I did that” (165).  Her admission parallels her 
earlier empowered “I” phrases with relationship to motherhood; it is here that we can see the 
two are not entirely incommensurate expressions in terms of her circumstances. 
In her text Toni Morrison and Motherhood, Andrea O’Reilly notes that “Beloved 
speaks the hitherto silenced maternal narrative of slave women” by creating “an alternative, 
subversive, discourse of black motherhood” (128).  In a sense, however, Morrison’s novel 
does so predicated on the disruption caused by 19th century slave narratives such as Harriet 
Jacobs’s.  She suggests that an alternative framework for maternity must be constructed, in 
light of slave women’s impoverished choices: 
O virtuous reader!  You never knew what it is to be a slave; to be entirely 
unprotected by law or custom; to have the laws reduce you to the condition of 
chattel, entirely subject to the will of another.  You never exhausted your 
ingenuity in avoiding the snares, and eluding the power of a hated tyrant; you 
never shuddered at the sound of his footsteps, and trembled within hearing of 
his voice.  I know I did wrong.  No one can feel it more sensibly than I do.  
The painful and humiliating memory will haunt me to my dying day.  Still, in 
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looking back, calmly, on the events of my life, I feel that the slave woman 
ought not to be judged by the same standard as others. (49) 
Jacobs’s words complement Sethe’s sentiment, particularly as Paul D confronts her with 
infanticide.  She attempts to explain herself, but notes the circularity of it, “that she could 
never close in, pin it down for anybody who had to ask.  If they didn’t get it right, she could 
never explain” (163).  She contemplates the moment as “simple,” of her immediate responses 
of “Nonono” and safety.  Namely, when the promise of life regulates one to object status, 
death and freedom are the only choice.  Jacobs’s expresses her own attempt to explain this: “I 
wanted no chain to be fastened on my daughter, not even if its links were of gold.  How 
earnestly I prayed that she might never feel the weight of slavery’s chain, whose iron entereth 
into the soul!” (68).  Her resolve, at the conclusion, parallels Sethe’s as well: “Reader, my 
story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage.  I and my children are now 
free!” (164). 
For Sethe’s choice, to murder her own child, she demonstrates what maternity looks 
like in the warped space of slavery and racial violence. Hearing her story, Paul D recoils, 
desperate in his assurance that there must have been “some other way” (165).  She resists.  
When she presses him, he instead offers a judgment on her actions that align her again with a 
beast of burden, her once enslaved status, and the pivotal scene of her violation in the barn:  
“You got two feet, Sethe, not four” (164).  And, in that moment, “a forest sprang up between 
them; trackless and quiet” a division that clarifies even as Paul D fails to relate and 
understand Sethe’s circumstances as a freed slave and mother.  He, even a former slave, 
cannot fathom Sethe’s choices and chooses instead to judge her by standards – human, social 
standards for a mother – that she has clearly demonstrated were not hers in the first place.  
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Her context, her choice, can only be read by others as a simplistic absolute and antithesis to 
mothering:  “infanticide.” 
However, though we have worked through the critique and violence steeped in 
Beloved, we must in turn consider the redemptive scene in the novel:  Sethe and Amy 
Denver, communing together at Denver’s birth.  As much as the narrative focuses on the 
legacy of pain enduring from slavery, it here offers a scene of healing, as Sethe labors with 
Amy’s help.  Often neglected in critical analysis, Amy Denver provides what Nicole M. 
Coonradt calls “one of Morrison’s ‘bridges’ to deeper understanding” in the novel (169).  For 
our analysis, the scene that culminates around her and Sethe’s (and Denver’s) communal 
labors offers us a glimpse of solidarity through pregnancy and birth. 
As the novel predominantly features relationships across race lines as commodified 
ones – slavery, in short – Sethe initially hesitates with Amy: [narrated by Denver] “You 
could get money if you turned a runaway over, and [Sethe] wasn’t sure this girl Amy didn’t 
need money more than anything” (77).  We can think back to Irigaray’s essay, which 
summed up many human relationships in terms of competition and survival; there are plenty 
of reasons that Amy and Sethe’s interaction might have conformed to such.  Amy is 
impoverished, we learn, and fleeing to Boston for the seemingly ludicrous, yet luxurious 
thrill of velvet in Boston (a symbolic pleasure, of which we easily gather Amy has had few).  
But Amy Denver and Sethe’s relationship is shaped by something markedly different.   
Amy and Sethe instead become “two heroines [who] immerse themselves in the 
rituals of community,” united by the circumstances defining their previous lives (Harding 
and Martin 40).  Sethe, a Black runaway slave, and Amy, a white indentured servant with 
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“fugitive eyes,” are both marginalized women (Morrison 78).20  Though we know 
considerably less about Amy, we gather she is also orphaned as well born and raised in a 
culture of sexual violence:  “Joe Nathan said Mr. Buddy [who had a “right evil hand” and 
whipped her often] is my daddy but I don’t believe that, you?” (80).  They are two “throw-
away people, two lawless outlaws” that nevertheless create “something together 
appropriately and well” in delivering Denver (84).   
With baby Denver, we see that Amy remains memorialized through her name as kin. 
Amy’s name, from the Old French “ ‘Aimee’… or ‘beloved,’ ” suggests her own connection 
and role as a poor white woman to the novel’s redemptive response to pain (Coonradt 170). 
She evokes a kindness and tender love for Sethe when her body has become entirely 
bedraggled, by maternity and pregnancy and her flight to freedom.  Amy’s intervention, as 
she assists Sethe and Denver into the world, is one of grace.  The deferential “miss” from 
Sethe, and Amy’s recognition of Sethe’s lower social status – “[Amy] wouldn’t be caught 
dead in daylight on a busy river with a runaway” (85) – remind the reader that these women 
are not entirely equitable in their social background and privilege.  Nevertheless, their 
vulnerabilities there on the margins/banks of the Ohio River unite them as they share this 
struggle for (re)birth: “ ‘Push!’ screamed Amy.  ‘Pull,’ whispered Sethe” (Morrison 84). 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                
20 It is worth noting that indentured servitude was made illegal in the XIII Constitutional Amendment – the 
same Amendment that outlawed slavery (Coonradt 171).  
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Chapter 3  Southern Gothic Pregnancy and “the gaps in people’s lack”: William 
Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying and Suzan-Lori Parks’ Getting Mother’s Body 
 
“[for] the hegemonic construction of subjectivity that feminists seek to displace… not by appealing to the real 
or the material, but by magnifying key aspects of that construction, turning them into grotesques” 
 – Susan Hekman’s “Material Bodies”  
 The specter of Sethe and Amy Denver, working together toward Denver’s birth on the 
symbolic banks of the Ohio River, guide us to a 20th century rendering of these women re-
membered.  While both of these characters fled north, the severe racial and class lines 
remained and transfigured anew with the new century:  Jim Crow laws maintained 
segregation and supported racial violence; Social Darwin trends and eugenics movements 
sought to limit reproduction on a national level.  For this chapter, we follow the genealogy of 
Sethe and Amy Denver’s collective vulnerable subjects back into the South, where the 
Southern Gothic genre uniquely captures the policing, the violent silences, and the macabre 
of non-normative pregnancies in the mid-20th century. 
Historical Tableau:  Non-Hegemonic Pregnancy and Choice in the 20th Century 
We return to the setting of our North Carolina Eugenics Board, seeing through the 
ideology that upheld its proliferation through the 1970s.  Such practices were relegated 
widely across the South. In particular, the early 20th century was characterized by Social 
Darwinism and accompanying eugenics technology and research concerning reproduction.  
Reproductive politics saw new measures emerge in the US that openly attempted to maintain 
patriarchal, white dominance on a wide scale – in part through the eradication of the “unfit” 
from proliferating.  Midwives were displaced, a trend that we see only recently beginning to 
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shift again on a national level,21 and by the 1930s births started to occur with more regularity 
outside of the home. 
 Along with the shift from the home to the hospital, from an individual woman to the 
professionalized field of male-dominated medicine, pregnancy garnered political response of 
another nature.  With the 20th century, concerns about immigration and the decline of 
whiteness in the United States became marked, contributing to the eugenics movement.  
Doctors maintained not only supposed superior knowledge to women concerning 
reproduction, but they had a vested interest in limiting particular women’s access to abortion.  
Any challenges to the law of the father, or the traditional heteronormative family, came under 
strict censure for the doctor served as mediator between a (married) woman and the state.  
Doctors’ arguments regarding women’s health, particularly potential abortion, “focused on 
the physiology of reproduction, the structure of the family, and the dynamics of population 
growth,” as “regulating reproduction…[became] a means to ensure reproduction of the social 
order” (Siegel 149). 
Expressing the dominant white anxieties over increasing urban populations of 
immigrants and individuals of color, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed in 1905 that 
“racial purity must be maintained” (Davis, “Racism” 88).  Leading up to the Great 
Depression, reproductive politics became overtly addressed in the public sphere and in 
legislature and judicial decisions:  the National Origins Act (1924), which instated quotas for 
immigrants into the US; and various eugenics state legislations, upheld by Buck v. Bell 
                                                
21 Via the Midwives Alliance of North America (MANA, mana.org), midwifery licensing varies from state to 
state, and comes in three classifications:  Certified Nurse-Midwives, trained in both nursing and midwifery who 
work exclusively in hospitals (they can legally practice in all 50 states); and both Certified Professional 
Midwives (or CPMS, who can practice currently in 28 states) and Certified Midwives (also CMs, who practice 
legally in three states), who are able to perform births in any setting of the states in which they are legal.  
Legislation in multiple states is underway to amend CPMs’ legality and to adjust outdated laws on record or to 
address laws that attempt to reduce “competition” between doctors and midwives. 
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(1927). The Depression developed further need to control reproductive and population 
expansion. 
Heightened issues of race and class again informed the politics of the era.  Birth 
control alongside sterilization and eugenics policies further problematized hegemonic 
pregnancy – “choices” again were clearly informed by a woman’s material reality, racial 
identification, and class standing.  Furthermore, social mores prevailed in dictating 
“appropriate” mothers.  In many senses, due to the increasing populations and urban growth, 
racism and classism influenced burgeoning feminism.  Birth control as a “privilege” for 
white women shifted to a kind of “duty” for lower-classed women and women of color 
(Davis, “Racism” 88).  Margaret Sanger’s American Birth Control League, a predecessor to 
Planned Parenthood, exemplifies this particular intersection of race, class, ability, and 
prevailing biopolitics.  While earlier First Wave feminists primarily pushed for women’s 
suffrage but maintained traditional perspectives on women’s nurturing and mothering 
potential, abortion and birth control became more central concerns to feminists in the 1930s 
onward.  Sanger shifted her own rhetoric to align women’s access to birth control in order to 
garner control from men and other general naysayers of women’s reproductive freedoms.  
Her shift from a focus on individualized freedom in sexuality and reproduction, to a 
“campaign in eugenic terms” presented birth control as a means to further the “nation’s 
interests” (Roberts 72).  Issues of women’s individual sexual autonomy and gratification 
were downplayed, and birth control was cast foremost as a means of population control.  
Those deemed “unfit” or, in Sanger’s terms, “morons, mental defectives, epileptics, 
illiterates, paupers, unemployables, criminals, prostitutes, and dope fiends” were 
recommended for sterilization (Davis, “Racism” 89).  Sanger’s choice to side with eugenics 
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rhetoric in promoting her ideas of gendered liberation continues to fall under severe critique.  
The American (white, male) public at large found women asserting control over their own 
reproductive potential only palatable as it bolstered narratives of American whiteness and 
dominance, a trend that has not entirely subsided.  By 1932, due to the prominence of the 
Eugenics Society, at least 26 states had compulsory sterilization laws on record – and “birth 
control” became dangerously affiliated with “population control” (Davis 89).   
On a national level, President Theodore Roosevelt lamented the possible “race 
suicide” or the trend of privileged, white women opting out of motherhood; in 1905, he 
instead demanded that “racial maturity must be maintained” (Davis 87).  In turn, the 
“privilege” of birth control for the bourgeoisie became a “duty” for those marked as by lower 
socio-economic or non-white status (88).   
Southern Gothic Pregnancies, or Where the Normative Becomes Unfamiliar 
In light of these social shifts, coupled with the heightened racial and class anxieties of 
the region, the Southern Gothic’s focus on, if not outright nurturance of, the peculiar, the 
Other, and the monstrous provides a shadowed, recasting of the “familiar” in the family, 
home, and small town.  This unsettling of the familiar can be as jarring as it is 
complementary to a reconsideration of romanticized visions of domesticity, of which 
pregnancy and motherhood comprise the hallmark.  In this chapter, I extend this discussion 
of non-hegemonic pregnancies by looking to texts within the tradition of 20th century 
Southern gothic literature:  Eudora Welty’s “The Petrified Man,” which recasts and 
defamiliarizes an arguably normative pregnancy narrative; then, to a dialogue on the 
inarticulate or illegible maternity in the “gaps” and respective “holes” of marginalized class 
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and race experience, in both William Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying and Suzan-Lori Parks’ 
Getting Mother’s Body respectively.   
Already a site of Otherness, American Southern gothic literature bears a significant 
relationship to outcast, grotesque bodies – as an ongoing genre struggling itself as a severed 
Other from dominant American identity.  In her text Dirt and Desire, Patricia Yaeger 
describes this propensity in Southern narratives:  “in a [culture] dealing with crisis, unable to 
handle changes in the course of everyday life [here, referencing segregation struggles, Jim 
Crow legacies, and a continued “behind-ness” celebrated and steeped in tradition – what 
Yaeger touts as “arrested systems of knowledge”]… change erupts abruptly, via images of 
monstrous, ludicrous bodies” (4).  Centered around this struggle against change, the 
reproductive body in particular proves significant, a rife space to reconsider what it is that is 
being reproduced and by whom.  A place of transition, yet one at once engrained in tradition, 
Southern Gothic texts’ consideration of pregnancy has a particular kind of currency for 
discussing change and larger challenges to normativity.  To continue in this vein, Yaeger 
notes that, “when new ideas are born, when new practices and ideologies make their way into 
public discourse against resistance, what emerges is the figuration of monstrosity” (4-5).22  
Pregnancy raises to the fore sexual mores and racial stigmas, classist perceptions alongside 
forbidden desires and miscegenation – what better space to unsettle notions of the individual 
than at the site of the forbidden yet visibly defiant Southern, swelling pregnant body?   
 The Southern Gothic genre in particular casts the darkened side of public surveillance 
of the private sphere.  In a space of taboo mixings, where reproduction and recreation of a 
                                                
22 The notion of the “monstrous” furthermore complements a discussion of margin and center, which will be 
explored in a particular dis/ability context in chapter four.  In Contours of Ableism:  The Production of 
Disability and Abledness, Fiona Kumari Campbell notes that: “the ‘monster’ is a neologism for ‘boundary-
crossing,’ crossing boundaries of acceptability” (161). 
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new identity were rife, the anxieties and conventions of larger American culture reveal 
themselves.  Notably, too, in the spaces afforded for women’s voices – and in their notable 
gaps or ephemeral qualities – the articulation of pregnancy finds an alternative space that, 
perhaps in its ambiguity, gains proximity to being articulating beyond the limiting bounds of 
proscriptive medical and legal discourses.  To foreground this Southern Gothic space and the 
issue of reproductive politics, I first enlist Eudora Welty’s well-known short story, “The 
Petrified Man.”  For my own consideration I find the story to refigure the anxieties and 
surveillance of reproductive politics all neatly contained within a beauty parlor visit.  This 
short story offers itself as a direct antithesis and disruption to the nesting refuge of female 
solidarity and comfort so famously captured in Robert Harling’s southern play, Steel 
Magnolias – in which the seasonally advancing narrative also revolves around the space of 
the beauty parlor.  In Welty’s story, rather than a gendered refuge, this space serves as a 
microcosm for the impotent struggle of women to claim autonomy over their own identities, 
reproductive politics, and power in small-town Southern culture.   
 Next, I consider two novels in conversation with one another around the site of the 
pregnancy “at the margins” – William Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying alongside Suzan Lori-
Parks’ more contemporary reconsideration of the narrative, Getting Mother’s Body.  In both 
texts, the phantom of the matriarch’s body looms and speaks, or riffs in lines of the blues, 
alongside the unfolding narrative of her teenage daughter’s “illegitimate” pregnancy.  The 
scrapes of class (and near absence of race within As I Lay Dying) speak to the overt racism 
tackled alongside poverty in Getting Mother’s Body.  Both, together, capture a Southern 
Gothic rendering of pregnancy and the world of a teenaged woman’s possibilities and 
limitations – and where a mother speaks most candidly from the grave. 
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Policing the Normative:  Southern Gothic Reproductive Politics in Eudora Welty’s 
“The Petrified Man” 
 Southern Gothic literature remains centrally focused on space.  The beauty parlor 
setting of Welty’s “The Petrified Man” for instance clearly establishes its stakes and scope:  
it is a significant and tense exchange point between the elusive private and public spheres.  
The beauty parlor serves as a transformative space for one’s personal performance to be 
brought into compliance with a pronouncedly public (here, beauty) standard.  Here, among 
the accouterments of beauty and female socialization of the salon, is the intimacy of 
woman’s hair dye and style secrets, brought to bear on the public expectations of femininity 
and the limits of individual power. Ultimately, the parlor and women’s interactions within 
reveal the power of narrative: women share here their own stories, others’ stories 
(unbeknownst to them, by way of gossip), and the stories of their own imaginary creations, 
all combined in an attempt to exert a sort of narrative agency over their own lives.  For my 
purposes of analysis, I locate Mrs. Fletcher’s pregnancy as the telling focal point around 
which this tense struggle is waged:  the fluidity of her identity construction and how it is 
narratively wrought and communally (however invidiously) composed.   
For my consideration in particular, the stories center around Mrs. Fletcher’s recently 
secret pregnancy and both its public perceptions and growing narrative life, beyond her 
control, which reframe her as expectant mother.  The space suggests female intimacy and a 
blurring of public and private matters as women both commiserate and prevaricate.  The 
indirect power struggles and dissembling betray themselves in fleeting moments of banal 
subtleties, as when Mrs. Fletcher “looks expectantly at the black part in Leota’s yellow curls 
as she bent to light the cigarette” (52).  The masking of her hair color suggests Leota’s own 
64 
 
 
duplicity, soon revealed in the text.  The very potential of changing one’s appearance and self 
in a beauty parlor proves to be not entirely left to one’s choosing.  Lastly, the unclaimed son 
who has the final word – a defiant cliché that resounds at the end of the story – suggests an 
ominous future for self-autonomy.   
The tone of futile struggle is set with the opening line:  despite the fact that Mrs. 
Fletcher visits Leota for her services in the form of a haircut, Leota is first to deliver a 
command.  Power, and the ability to enact agency, is apparently muzzled and tenuous at best 
here – enacted in the weak attempts for the women’s pauses and actions to struggle over 
dominance.  This power struggle reaches a fever pitch, somewhat offhandedly by Leota, with 
regards to Mrs. Fletcher’s “delicate condition.” 
Mrs. Fletcher’s full name is never revealed, and her identity remains predicated on 
her married status and her husband’s name.  For the reader, she evokes the idea of normative 
wife and woman.  She then also falls within norms of viable pregnancy, but the narrative 
unfolds to reveal her lack of power in shaping her experiences with it.  She first admits that 
she finds her hair to be unruly, particularly riddled by dandruff.  “I couldn’t of caught a thing 
like that from Mr. Fletcher, could I?” she nervously asks Leota, expressing an anxiety 
surrounding a biological mixing with others and its social implications; even if it is her own 
husband, she conveys it all in the disgusted language of infection. Yet Leota, who on the 
surface attempts to allay Mrs. Fletcher’s fears, reframes her concern in an even more tenuous 
manner.  She first assures, “it just ain’t your fault” for, though she “doesn’t mean to insinuate 
or anything…” she lets slip that “Thelma’s lady just happ’med to throw out… that you was 
p-r-e-g, and lots of times that’ll make your hair do awful funny” (53).  Rather than being the 
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problem, the dandruff becomes the symptom – and the conversation reveals a level of 
commonplace surveillance over the most intimate of conditions. 
Leota’s admission creates considerable irony in Mrs. Fletcher’s concerns of having 
contracted something undesirable from her husband. Now the stigma of poor personal 
hygiene, potentially suggested by her dandruff, loses its sting as Mrs. Fletcher focuses on 
who first outted her pregnancy.  There is pregnant pause, as it were, in which she and Leota 
lock eyes in the mirror; the multifaceted truth of identities, constructed in the slippery 
narratives of Others’, is nevertheless shared in this combative visual exchange. The mystery 
intensifies as the other beautician, Thelma, is of little use remembering – mirrors abound, 
along with the strangeness and misrecognition of self.  She herself is jarred by her own 
reflection: “I forgot my hair finally got combed and thought it was a stranger behind me” 
(54).  Self-recognition and power seem both in question, as Mrs. Fletcher in part becomes 
familiar with her “self,” the gossiped mother-to-be, which she had previously kept closeted to 
herself.  She tries to rein in this idea futilely, as the confusions mount. 
When Leota presses to find out “how far gone” Mrs. Fletcher is, she further replies, 
“Why, I just barely knew it myself!”  While it becomes Mrs. Fletcher’s primary focus to 
determine who spread word of her pregnancy, the selection reveals the kind of alienation a 
woman experiences from her own body, perceived responsibility and choice, as public 
policing radically changes her understanding of herself; while she may have been 
biologically pregnant before, she now becomes publicly pregnant in this moment and scripted 
uniquely by that publicly known signifier.  Her understanding of herself, her interpolation as 
a pregnant woman, comes not from her own realization but rather from one imposed by those 
around her.  
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Mrs. Fletcher, who confesses she does not much care for children, notes that “it 
wouldn’t be too late, even now” to change her status.  But Leota notes the limitations, as 
growing awareness about the pregnancy hem in Mrs. Fletcher’s options:  “Mr. Fletcher 
would beat you on the head if you didn’t have it now… after going this far” (54).  Relayed by 
gossip and imposed by surveillant social mores, the time for Mrs. Fletcher to maintain 
agency over herself diminishes.  Leota urges surrender:  “you just get you one of those Stork-
a-Lure dresses and stop worryin’.  What people don’t know don’t hurt nobody, as Mrs. Pike 
says” (54). 
 Layered atop this focus on Mrs. Fletcher’s pregnancy is the fantastical construction, 
or at the very least fallible recollection, of Leota’s new friend Mrs. Pike.  Alongside her 
unfolding narrative, filled with many inconsistencies and outright contradictions, Leota spins 
not only Mrs. Pike’s story but brings up the “travellin’ freak show” (55).  Mrs. Fletcher, in a 
moment that she seems to reclaim some control over her rogue identity, pertly renounces any 
interest in declaring, “I despise freaks” (55).  As a pointed return to Mrs. Fletcher’s 
vulnerability, and in an at once snide comparison of pregnancy (and Mrs. Fletcher) to the 
monstrous in one offhand comment, Leota encourages her client, “Aw.  Well, honey, talkin’ 
about bein’ pregnant an’ all, you ought to see those twins in a bottle [at the ‘freak show’], 
you really owe it to yourself” (55). 
 The morbid description that follows defamiliarizes, and distances, the experiences of 
pregnancy and birth by discussing the congenital, “Siamese” twins. They were born full-
term, though now deceased and preserved, and their “freak” disability is attributed to the fact 
that “their parents were first cousins and all like that” (55).  Raising the incest taboo again 
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strikes a blow at Mrs. Fletcher, who flares up in her jarring protest: “Me and Mr. Fletcher 
aren’t one speck of kin” (55). 
 Critic Terry W. Thompson conceptualizes the preserved twins as a reference to the 
myth of Janus, the “two-headed Roman god of new beginnings” (228).  On the one hand, 
they reinforce the recurring spirit of “two-faced” personalities in the beauty parlor and the 
duplicitous nature of the characters in the story.  Thompson goes on to suggest that as Mrs. 
Fletcher’s pregnancy becomes a “subject of community dialogue” (230), she is neatly 
presented with two choices herself:  an illegal abortion to terminate her pregnancy or the 
decision to have the child.  Nevertheless, I argue that the contexts of choices for Mrs. 
Fletcher become far more nuanced here and contrast to the “peace” Thompson cites in Mrs. 
Fletcher’s final “fixed smile” (231).  For, as Mrs. Fletcher openly laments: “If a certain party 
hadn’t found [the pregnancy] out and spread it around, it wouldn’t be too late even now” 
(58).  Perhaps rather than just the subject of pregnancy being under contention, we might see 
this dialogue of the subject extends most broadly to “subject” itself.  Pregnancy here 
becomes a significant way of casting a person’s relationship to the fluidity of identity in 
subjectivity itself.  She is always in a flux, her decisions qualified before fully available; and 
should we doubt this pervading struggle, even as Mrs. Fletcher acknowledges her loss of 
choices, she is very nearly muzzled and straitjacketed: “Leota was almost choking her with 
the cloth, pinning it so tight, and she couldn’t speak clearly.  She paddled her hands in the air 
until Leota warily loosened her” (58). 
 The silences, pauses, sideway glances, and misattributed information trouble this 
articulation of pregnancy and raises broader questions about individual identity and how 
much control over it one has.  The ambiguity about identities, and where people’s power falls 
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and to what extent it is shaped by others and outside perceptions, regularly reverse.  The 
recognition of the title character, “the petrified man” – or Mr. Petrie, the carnival spectacle 
who turns out to be a man wanted for raping four women – occurs because the elusive Mrs. 
Pike thought “he just looked familiar” (60).  The resolve, and reward, collides with the only 
male character to speak in the entire piece:  Billy Boy, the child wreaking havoc on the salon.  
Mrs. Fletcher catches him and, precluding Leota’s public paddling of him, notes, “I guess I 
better learn how to spank little old bad boys” (61).  The spanking, accompanied by his 
“belittling screams,” creates a parallel spectacle in the beauty parlor that summons onlooking 
women.  In a sense, Mrs. Fletcher validates herself in the public gaze by implicitly accepting 
her role as mother (and, inevitably, to a male child).  He returns violent kicks to Leota and 
Mrs. Fletcher – “as hard as he could” – but Mrs. Fletcher remains unmoved, now wearing 
“her new fixed smile” (61).  Her identity has been regulated and, for the time, reined in and 
she has performatively succumbed to the forcible role of normative “mother-to-be,” imposed 
by the salon community. 
 The entire vignette raise issues of spectacle, the monstrous, fear of intermingling and 
integrity of the self – who outlines the self? Where are her parameters, and how much agency 
does she exert over them as opposed to what extent is she at their mercy?  The narrative 
power harnessed in this space, particularly by Leota, suggests both the vitality and necessity 
to create meaning from realities in the form of stories – but likewise, how so much truth may 
be constructed in lies.  Mrs. Fletcher, known always by her married name, still reveals the 
haunting concern about sexual intermingling (at first framed by her concern for dandruff) and 
the significance of the social environment to exert and attach meaning to her experience and 
status.  The theme of both the familiar and unfamiliar, shifted from Mrs. Fletcher’s own 
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resistance to her body and identity’s public reading (“pregnant”) parallel that of the carnival 
spectacles – the babies preserved in the jar, or the white make-upped face of Mr. Petrie, the 
“petrified man,” parallel alongside Mrs. Fletcher’s role as pregnant woman.  
 This outside Otherness centers around Mrs. Fletcher’s developing pregnancy.  The 
mundane setting contrasted with the extraordinary spectacle of the grotesque in the traveling 
carnival – and connected through the sexual violence enacted by Mr. Petrie (“petrified”) – 
illustrate the marginality. The Southern Gothic genre allows us to read pregnancy, even 
within so-called normative restraints, as constrained and muzzled construction. 
Pregnancy at the Margins:  As I Lay Dying and Getting Mother’s Body 
 While our discussion has largely focused on pregnancy, here we will deliberately 
parallel the unfolding narrative of motherhood within the context of developing pregnancy..  
One may not be born, but become a woman; yet, as Roosevelt Beede matter-of-factly 
remarks in Getting Mother’s Body, “Without a mother, you don’t get born” (50).  I would 
like to begin by grounding my discussion of the “mother” as a subject-in-process position:  
not only a fruitful place to reconsider the Enlightenment subject (what does it mean, to at 
once be both the subject and the object, the dialectic that resolves to be “two” individuals?), 
but specific women’s relationships to the position of motherhood.  So often, “the mother” is 
discussed as though as it is a kind of monolithic idea to which a woman, once she has borne a 
child or nurtured a comparably dependent human being, is attached.  Even diverse narratives 
about motherhood often still simplistically reference “the (archetypal) mother” as though it is 
some static, overarching signifier that references that woman’s entire entity. 
 Not only am I interested in pushing beyond this reading – that itself is nothing new.  
Seeing women as wombs, while culturally persistent, prompts the heart of feminist critique 
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of patriarchy and sexist oppression. Yet, perhaps with more nuance, I want to look at the idea 
of “the mother” as a transient space, about which the self may be defined and related, even as 
it is attached to singular women’s lives.  As a contested space that is still largely imbued with 
as the meaningful “beginning” of the self, the ultimate parameters on consciousness, what 
does it mean for a woman herself to travel in and out of this space of “mother”?  How does 
pregnant embodiment locate a woman distinctly “at the margins”? 
 In particular, I would like to consider two texts that construct a dialogue around this 
notion of the Southern pregnancy and the mother:  William Faulkner’s 1930 novel As I Lay 
Dying and Suzan-Lori Parks’ responding text, Getting Mother’s Body, from 2003.  These 
texts’ intertextuality, particularly considering the clear and deliberate effort of the latter to 
reimagine and reconsider Faulkner’s text centered around African Americans’ experiences – 
notably absent in Faulkner’s original story – provides a host of analyses.  At the core of these 
two texts, we have both the disembodied voice of a mother (either dead or dying) 
accompanied at some distance by her lingering materiality and physical body (often seen as a 
“burden” – evidenced in Faulkner’s matriarch Addie Bundren’s very name); and a teenaged 
woman, her daughter, driven by her own burden: a socially viewed illegitimate pregnancy 
underway.  In each texts’ commentary, however, they share an interesting perspective on this 
idea of the mother as a subject-in-process and the unique spaces she fills and relative to the 
other characters.  I read them both as providing radical reconsiderations of women’s 
relationship to pregnant embodiment and their status as mothers. 
 Both texts, As I Lay Dying and Getting Mother’s Body, encounter illegitimate teenage 
pregnancy, with significantly different valences of race and class, but all neatly outside the 
constraints of socially accepted pregnancy.  Likewise, the presence of the mother – both the 
71 
 
 
physicality of her body’s burden as well as her disembodied, haunting voice – directs the 
narrative.  The retelling and remembering of these bodies, to reconsider these narratives, 
mark time in much the way Yaeger addresses Southern women writers’ work.  While the 
texts work within a particular Southern tradition, they are still notably “outside” of Yaeger’s 
focus.  Nevertheless, I feel that the evocation she mentions below resonate and illuminate the 
texts considerably: 
Repetition – with stories that will not go away, that keep repeating themselves 
endlessly, helplessly, in a kind of literary stutterance that creates a rich field of 
intertextual neurosis, while black lit about the South contributes to the 
exorcism of this repetition by ringing these stories backwards, providing white 
mammies for black babies and digging children out of ditches as fast as white 
culture flings them in. (13)  
Faulkner’s 1930 novel As I Lay Dying moves primarily through its male characters’ 
actions – yet, notably, they arguably move about what Marc Hewson has called “the almost 
absent center of the novel,” Addie Bundren (551).  Central as both the dying woman and, 
later, corpse that motivates her family’s struggles to bury her, Addie likewise unites the 
family even in her unconventional presence as its matriarch.  While she remains largely at the 
margins of the story per se – only one chapter affords her the space to speak in the novel – 
her body and the roles bound up in its earthly existence nevertheless shape and direct the 
text’s and other characters’ actions thoroughly. In the token chapter of As I Lay Dying in 
which Addie Bundren does narrate, she speaks from beyond the confines of mortality and the 
restraints of her matriarchal body and role in marriage.   
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Critics largely complicate Addie’s role in the text, fluctuating between a reading of 
her maternity and, almost alternatively, her materiality.  As the matriarchal figure, Addie 
may be construed as steering her family’s movement through mother nature-like forces, 
which are matched by their natural surroundings and disasters of the journey, to be sure.  On 
the other hand, the specter of her death and her grotesque corpse loom over the story’s 
unfolding, much as does her oddly disembodied narration at the core of the text.  Engaging 
these two readings, however, demonstrate not only how the text interrogates motherhood and 
Dewey Dell’s developing pregnancy, but it also reconsiders the marginality of maternity – 
for Addie Bundren complexly remains both “outside” the definitive text but likewise shapes, 
directs, and even connects the slippage of her family’s story as direct result of her matriarch 
position. 
Not surprisingly, these two contrasting positions, of body and margin, complement 
Addie’s character further; as the mother of the family, she is the literal source of life for the 
family members.  Interestingly, while she creates the basis for shared community between 
the (mostly male) Bundrens, her voice expresses an urge toward individuality.23  
Nevertheless, her presence overshadows all by its connection to her imminent death. In her 
essay on the novel, “Extremities of the Body: the Anoptic Corporeality of As I Lay Dying,” 
Erin Edwards posits a fascinating consideration of Addie Bundren’s role as this matriarchal 
corpse.  Edwards discusses Addie Bundren’s role in the language of “necropoetics,” which is 
“an experimental and vertiginously uncertain tropology through which the body is composed 
and decomposed, becomes the defining mode of corporeal experience in the novel” (739-40, 
                                                
23 Cinda Gault, in her essay “The Two Addies:  Maternity and Language…,” notes that Katherine Henninger 
observes in Faulkner’s work, “the tension between men’s desire to have women represent collectivity, and 
women’s desire to assume the perceived power of individualism is embodied in the battle for control of bodily 
reproduction” (440). 
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emphasis my own).  In a sense, she grounds her discussion on the two dominant readings of 
the body in the text:  that of the Foucauldian body “produced or ‘inscribed’ by social power” 
and some notion of a body whose “materiality precedes the influence of culture” (740).  She 
sees the narrative reaching beyond these limitations, extending the constant question of, 
“What is a body?” and contesting such borders through the prevalence of Addie as corpse. 
To this end, she posits Addie Bundren as the extension of this question, noting that as 
a corpse, Addie “inaugurates the strange life of a previously unaccountable corporeality.”  
For Edwards, the phantom and physical presence of Addie’s dead body, of the speaking 
corpse and fetishized burden of her family’s trek to fulfill her dying wish – for, as Tull notes, 
“She wanted it.  She come from it.  Her mind was set on it” – disrupts the larger discursive-
materialist debates of the body. Edwards goes so far as to suggest that Faulkner reverses 
Judith Butler, “revealing an emergent ontology of the body, continually reiterated and 
reformed.”  Nevertheless, as largely neglected by Edwards’ critique, the specificity of the 
maternal body undergoes a kind of reversal here.  We have the unique situation of a dead 
mother – a symbol of birth, and life’s beginnings, but likewise the division between the self 
and the other.  These women’s narrations suggest the mother’s subject position as both ever-
present (in the at times macabre struggles with the coffin and family’s journeys) but also 
ever-elusive, as she herself articulates near the center of the novel, from a space just 
“beyond” the constraints of time and embodied mortality.  What does it mean to have the 
voice of maternity, the matriarch of a family, the site at which traditional individuation has 
been suggested to occur, speak from the dead?  To have the elusive idea of a “mother,” 
something both larger than and contained with Addie Bundren’s identity, with which she and 
her family grapple?  Not only does Addie trouble “what is a body?” through her narrative by 
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“trac[ing] the contours of containment for mothers in [her society]” (Gault 441), but she 
furthermore pressures further the question, “whose body?”  This question, mystified by 
Addie’s removal from the text, can be seen as guided by Dewey Dell’s emerging pregnant 
embodiment that concurrently develops in the text. 
While other critics have expounded at length on Addie’s role as mother (see Hewson, 
Holcombe), they often discuss pregnancy as secondary to language.  Many inscribe the neat 
life/death binaries to Addie’s life, noting for instance that “as a giver of life she is made 
weak, yet as a corpse she is strong (445).  By imposing this kind of starting and stopping, a 
linearity to life that seems defied in the text foremost by the fact that a woman “speaks” 
despite being dead, negates the alternative generational space suggested in the text.  Her 
subject position, as both one with a voice and one who is dead, may be construed as a 
position that evades a neat life and death subject-position.  In part, this too gestures toward 
the potential of the larger critique offered in Addie’s words.   For instance, Deborah Clarke 
observes in Robbing the Mother that “one needs oral expression to challenge, and possibly 
hold off, maternity” as exemplified through Addie Bundren’s experience (44).  While it is 
important to note the politics of voice, it seems naïve to impart to it such great value – even 
when granted it, in her immaterial state, Addie Bundren uses words and their lacks to critique 
the system therein.  It is not only the access to language and expression of self that oppresses 
her; it is the languages themselves that threaten in their evasion to limit her expression and 
confine her experiences as mother and woman.  She offers a critique not only of the power 
structure responsible for her impoverished choices with regards to reproduction and social 
roles – the matriarch that she is – but she seems to struggle at the margins with the margins.  
Rather than having access to something within, she demonstrates the futility of the 
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framework itself.  All individuals enter life via some understood construction of pregnancy or 
motherhood, at the very least from a biological experience – how telling is it that she 
insinuates such a concept nevertheless remains evasive and twice removed (“gaps in people’s 
lacks”) from expressing a kind of authentic meaning? 
I cannot help but think that her interrogation of the body may be paralleled usefully in 
the consideration of its maternal history.  Addie’s distance and connections to the other 
characters in the novel hinge on her role as mother.  Significantly, her chapter devotes 
considerable attention to her connection to maternity and marriage.  She candidly reflects on 
the oppressive roles of wife and mother that she has held.  She speaks frankly on her struggle 
with maternity and life as a wife and mother, declaring that she “was not a true mother.”  
These “un-mother-like” sentiments are expressed as she struggles to articulate the idea of 
motherhood, the language used and the very word itself:  
I knew that motherhood was invented by someone who had to have a word for 
it because the ones that had the children didn’t care whether there was a word 
for it or not… I knew that that word was like the others:  just a shape to fill a 
lack… [and] that words are just the gaps in people’s lacks. 172-174 
 Critics have considered at length Addie’s soliloquy and relationship to the power of 
language – or its lack, and what it might mean that a woman can only speak freely with a 
disembodied voice, and in fact an ostensibly dead subject position.  What I am interested in 
here, however, is this recurring idea of a space, of a vessel, of something twice removed – of 
a gap in a person’s lack – and this articulates the absences in discourse to accurately 
articulate pregnancy and resulting motherhood.  This excerpt of her thoughts suggest at once 
both space and absence, critical to Addie’s story as well as her own instance of dis/embodied 
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disruption in the text.  How might her words further illuminate this idea of maternity as the 
margins, of the margin that is pregnancy?  Likewise, how does her struggle illuminate 
semantically, in their gesture towards absence and at once excess?  
One the one hand, throughout As I Laying Dying, the Bundren men in particular 
struggle uniquely with Addie’s death.  Each one’s story may be read as suggesting the “gap” 
in their unique lacks that she has filled, as they alternately place Addie literally or 
metaphorically within vessels or alternatively piercing or hollowing out these spaces.  For 
instance, for Vardaman, it is captured in a chapter famous for its brevity as well as its density 
– his mother is, after all, “a fish.”  He realizes his own mother’s mortality through the fish’s 
that he has caught, and the simplicity of the equation, “My mother is a fish,” alternatively 
fills the vacant page of words with extended meaning.  For Cash, she is the reason and future 
inhabitant of his neatly beveled coffin, which he handicrafts outside the window of her 
sickroom.  He painstakingly crafts this “space” for her, macabrely as she in part looks on.  
The space’s significance is highlighted in the text as it is one of only two times Faulkner’s 
novel manipulates the textual writing and surpasses the arbitrary system of language to 
convey meaning. Here in the novel, coffin is physically represented in the text with the 
outline drawn on its side, “clock-style,” a picture iconic as a traditional coffin-shape captured 
there on the page. The image serves as an inverse to the womb, instead serving as the space 
in which Cash needs to confine his mother.  Tellingly, furthermore, Addie is ultimately laid 
to rest upside down in the coffin, to preserve the integrity of her burial, or wedding, gown.  
Thus, the space manipulates her own, the dress given the wider, clock-like end so the dress 
will not be compromised by the narrower end of the box.  Likewise, her modeling a head-
first dive into death neatly parallels the ideal model of birth, with an infant’s head exiting the 
77 
 
 
mother’s birth canal first.  Convention is broken and her own bodily form is made secondary 
to the preservation of a symbol, all in spatial parameters:  of yet another placeholder, the 
beginning of her narrative as mother, her narrative as wife.  Serving again these needs, these 
pursuits, the often empty rituals of the male Bundrens around her, Addie is not only laid to 
rest 10 days late and upside down in a box.  She likewise suffers the mangling indignity of 
holes being pierced in her face while in the coffin, a misguided and macabre effort by 
Vardaman to provide her with air holes in his need to preserve his illusion of her as a living 
being. 
Addie’s attempts her own articulation of these subsequent containing and hollowing.  
She remarks of her own body, in reference to her status as a married woman and mother: 
“The shape of my body where I used to be a virgin is in the shape of a          [where, in the 
text, a blank space is deliberately preserved]” (173).  Addie defines her identity in 
motherhood continually as a disparate collection of meanings, contained in that “space, 
vessel” or word “mother” – motherhood, rather than being her identity, becomes the space 
through which she has moved, by which she is defined and understood among the text’s other 
characters.  The title of the text itself suggests this:  knowing that it references a dying 
woman, “laying” suggests the past tense yet ongoing action, the in-process of becoming that 
Addie tries to discuss.  As both her story and Willa Mae’s in Getting Mother’s Body feature 
discussions of life from an out-of-time narrator associated with death, they refashion an idea 
of “motherhood” outside the conventional bounds of linear time. 
In addition to filling these “gaps” and being made to suit the maternal needs of the 
Bundrens in life as well as in death, Addie’s narrative itself works to highlight these 
absences.  Likewise, her words become a foreshadowing frame to pregnant daughter Dewey 
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Dell’s growing narrative in the text.  Beyond the position of maternal, she critiques in part 
the position of maternity, of the “mother’s body” at large.  This aspect of Addie Bundren’s 
narrative recalls Julia Kristeva’s thoughts on maternity particularly as she notes that 
“pregnancy has no subject… it is a cipher” (79).  Her use of “cypher” reflects the struggle 
between absence and excess once again, for one of cypher’s definitions is “an arithmetical 
symbol or character (0) of no value by itself, but which increases or decreases the value of 
other figures according to its position.”  Likewise, this mathematically and spatial notion is 
extended to include “a person who fills a place, but is of no importance or worth, a nonentity, 
a ‘mere nothing.’ ”  Yet alternatively, along the vein of meaning making, a cypher can be “a 
secret or disguised manner of writing, whether by characters arbitrarily invented…, or by an 
arbitrary use of letters… intelligible only to those possessing the key.”  In a sense, then, it 
occupies a space yet constitutes nothing or likewise may be an arbitrary mode that 
nonetheless serves meaning making.  The continuing slippage between what seem to be 
opposite dualities throughout the text – presence and absence; birth and death; meaning and a 
placeholder for meaninglessness – serve as textual guides to a rereading of maternity and 
pregnancy.  They afford a stance of critique, voiced predominantly by Addie Bundren but 
likewise conveyed through absences – her own; the lack of support Dewey Dell seeks in her 
burgeoning pregnancy; the silences in the text like the holes in punctured (ultimately futilely) 
in Addie’s coffin and face.  
 Dewey Dell takes up this gauntlet, as her own body both connects to her mother’s and 
the larger notion of a mother’s body, through her developing pregnancy.  The transformation 
and sequence suggests the circular nature of maternity.  In the proverbial and literal act of 
relocating Addie Bundren’s body, her daughter Dewey Dell is undergoing an embodied 
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transformation as well which notably prohibits the acceptance of her own mother’s passing.  
She notes, in her struggle, “I heard that my mother is dead.  I wish I had time to let her die” 
(120).  Struggling with her secret pregnancy, Dewey Dell’s fearful thoughts tellingly 
fluctuate between acceptance of her mother’s passing and her own approaching status as 
“mother.”  She, like her mother, occupies a kind of liminal space – but, again, in a play of 
inverses, Dewey Dell conveys the seeming opposite of her mother’s death in her own fleshy 
excess.  Though her thoughts are tempered throughout with this anxious secret, throughout 
the novel her pregnancy remains invisible to those around her.  The insistence of time and 
her acquisition of a mother’s body concern her.  These fears become embodied, and are 
expressed in the telling form of a persistent heartbeat, suggestive of life itself – a sure 
metronome punctuating the insistence of time’s passage and pregnancy’s development:  “too 
soon too soon too soon” (120). 
Whereas the Bundren men each displace “their gaps,” the empty space of Addie onto 
some fetishized object (a fish, a horse, a coffin, a new pair of false teeth), Dewey Dell 
physically and metaphorically moves into the space vacated by her mother.  She likewise 
narrates about her own identity and materiality, waxing crudely raw in terms of her 
developing mother’s body, referencing herself as a “little tub of guts” that clearly does have 
something “else important in it” (58).  She wonders about the parameters of her self here in 
her emerging pregnancy, playing with ideas of aloneness, singularity of self, and her 
subjectivity.  Her thoughts read curiously like a riddle, as she works through the frustrating 
articulations of self and not/self.  First, she laments her aloneness: 
It’s because I am alone.  If I could just feel it, it would be different, because I 
would not be alone.  But if I were not alone, everybody would know it.  And 
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[the doctor] could do so much for me, and then I would not be alone.  Then I 
could be all right alone. (59) 
Such a bewildering stream of existential thoughts, yet they are at once insightful as she 
reveals the faults in this narrative of the “I” and of the self. Early in her pregnancy, Dewey 
knows about her excess (and developing baby) through a lack only – the lack of menstruation 
blood.  She longs “to just feel [the fetus]” as part of knowing – here, she references 
quickening and feeling the fetus move.  She would not be alone, for she would have proof 
that her “little tub of guts” – her corporeal self – houses something Other than herself.  And 
yet here, as she struggles back against this desire to feel and to know that she is not alone, 
she acknowledges the other alienating feelings that would arise.  These social pressures force 
her to keep her pregnancy secret as well as to struggle for an abortion in private.   
 Historically, it is important to note the struggles of Dewey Dell are in large part 
enforced legally during the Comstock era.  As Holcombe notes in his essay, “Faulkner of 
Feminine Hygiene, or, How Margaret Sanger Sold Dewey Dell a Bad Abortion,” he argues 
that the primary female characters in the novel (Addie, Cora, and Dewey Dell) all “undertake 
a commercially thwarted protest against enforced maternity” (204).  He calls all three 
women’s efforts “failed maternal protests” further “exposing that motherhood is not a reserve 
for female agency under the terms in which [Dewey Dell] is obliged to engage in it” (217).  
He concludes by suggesting that Faulkner “makes visible the work of disciplining the 
potentially subversive power of the maternal body, work that is achieved by containing its 
generative capacities within a strict rubric of profitability enforced by denying women the 
language, the rights, and the means required to control their reproductive practices” (218).  
These arguments poignantly raise the oppressive legacies of pregnancy, to be sure – that 
81 
 
 
women denied these reproductive political abilities are fettered by their reproductive 
capabilities.  Their names suggest the inevitability of their relationship to motherhood:  
Addie Bundren, whose name may easily be read as “adding” or ever expanding on 
“burdens,” as her family inevitably proves to be; as well as Dewey Dell, whose name 
suggests clear sexual, fecund meaning (Kovesdy 261). 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the value of such a critique, I would like to 
extend this argument to consider a more fragmented conclusion.  By framing these women’s 
relationship to reproductive politics as one of either “failure” or “success” would seem to 
oversimplify the clear resistance in the text to accommodate neat binaries.  The self/Other, as 
the ultimate binary that we likewise find at the cite of pregnancy, can likewise be seen to 
originate the broad spectrum of “gray” explored at length in both Addie’s monologue and 
later, Dewey’s thoughts. Never uninformed by the material conditions or historical politics of 
the Depression era in which these women reside, their experiences are framed by a much 
farther-reaching set of narratives that in their origination make discussion about pregnancy 
and identities evasive, elusive, and lacking in the first place (and, arguably, provide firm 
foundation for the de jure restrictions and lasting de facto discrimination that lingers to this 
day).   
In her reflections, Dewey also reveals the alternatives to and of the space outlined by 
the “mother”:  rather than revealing the parameters of the self, she exposes the unraveling of 
such an idea.  Dewey laments being “alone.”  Her aloneness comes as result of diverse 
narratives – her inability to articulate herself for fear of social upbraiding, and her own 
struggle to grasp herself as no longer a not-one.  She cannot share her state, she has lost 
guidance (particularly in the form of her own mother), and sharing her state risks any sense 
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of community support which she direly needs – and tellingly, what she might have 
understood if she too had been privy to her mother’s monologue that was otherwise told out-
of-time and mortality.  That, in one sense, her not being alone alienates her into solitude – her 
womb’s content, the fetus or Other, limits her ability to share her state with others while 
likewise revealing the always already tenuous limits of her (the) self.  Her anxiety here 
reveals a great deal about the ambiguity of the “self” only exacerbated, but not exclusive, to 
pregnancy.   
She likewise gestures to the institutional narratives that construct her “aloneness” and 
how it can rightly be maintained or enforced.  With outside assistance, in the form of (illegal) 
abortion from a doctor, she would ultimately return to a complete state of “being alone” – but 
“being all right alone,” docilely brought back into line with the social sexual mores presumed 
of a young, single woman so long as it precedes a visible pregnancy.  Dewey Dell’s 
inheritance, then, of the mother subject-in-process illustrates the stark contrast of anxieties of 
the self, and their illusions; and her deliberations reveal not only the oppressive challenges to 
women’s materiality in pregnancy – for, as we have established a poor, unmarried, white 
teenager in the Depression, Dewey surely falls “outside” the bounds of a socially acceptable 
mother-to-be.  Her own struggles to identify her “self” and “Other” with satisfaction clearly 
connect back to the death of her own mother, the birth of herself.  She struggles with this 
connection, the possibility of collectivity:  “I feel my body, my bones and flesh beginning to 
part and open upon the alone, and the process of coming unalone is terrible” (62).  
Billy Beede’s Baby Belly and Getting Mother’s Body 
Bookending this struggle is Suzan Lori-Parks Getting Mother’s Body.  The title itself 
references the overt arc of the quest motif – the search for the grail, the womb in fertility 
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rituals.  Furthermore, they are inverted again, in the spirit of Faulkner, by the macabre 
destination of a dead mother’s body in her grave developed alongside the emerging 
pregnancy of her teenage daughter.  Faulkner’s text may be read as a struggle to bury a body, 
to trouble the distinctions of the self and the other in the phantasmic presence of a deceased 
matriarch in a wandering family displaced by modernity.  Whereas, on the other hand, Parks’ 
novel develops around the unearthing and resurrecting of a mother’s body with her assets – 
playfully, the quest becomes a treasure hunt of sorts, a play on Addie’s commodifiable 
children’s names, Cash and Jewel.  Both narratives form the backdrops against which a 
teenage daughter’s pregnancy develops.  In a sense, then, both consider what it means to 
apprehend, to develop, or (in the title of Parks’ work) to get a mother’s body as one’s own.  
While Faulkner’s text continually returns to the idea of spaces, as words (in what 
feels like a grim structuralist critique among other things) and gaps for meaning and identity, 
Getting Mother’s Body pursues this focus with its recurring notion of “the hole.”  We may 
consider this in correlation to the central effort of each text that is outlined by their titles:  
while Faulkner’s “central conceit” is the “seeming impossibility of burying the dead and 
rotting body of Addie Bundren,” or of containing her in a space(s) such as the grave or a 
neatly crafted coffin, Parks’ text moves opposingly to inter the buried body of the mother, 
Willa Mae Beede (Wright 143).  Notably, both struggles occur concurrent to the developing 
trajectory of a teenage daughter’s unwanted and unexpected pregnancy.  Additionally, both 
of these models contest the neat genealogical, teleological and forward movement from 
child- to motherhood.  Instead, in their gaps and absences, they suggest a more nuanced and 
ambiguous understanding of lineage, birth, and death as well as the outlines of the 
self/individuality. 
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Importantly, Parks’ piece address a notable gap in Faulkner’s original novel:  she 
continues the reflection on sexual mores and motherhood in poor, southern United States.  
Yet she contextualizes the discussion overtly by addressing race and the dense, historical 
legacy informing such mores for southern non-whites.  In Faulkner’s novel, the Bundrens are 
identified as poor, rural-dwelling southern whites.  Racial diversity in the text is limited to, 
interestingly, off-hand comments about the Bundrens as they approach “blackness” in their 
remove from privilege. 
While Parks’ text stands of its own accord, and there is to be sure something 
problematic about continually harkening back to its male-written predecessor in comparison, 
the text is necessarily an homage, offshoot, and re-rendering of the original.  To read it as 
such, so deliberately cast as it is, seems only to highlight the ideas that may be seen as 
conveyed by the text.  Dewey Dell’s and Billy Beede’s narratives of pregnancy mirror the 
exchange made between the two texts and matriarchal figures:  in As I Lay Dying, Dewey 
Dell’s pregnancy remains in its early (“invisible”) state yet persistent, known only to herself, 
Lafe, and her brother Darl.  Billy Beede, on the other hand, bears ample evidence of her 
“getting (a) mother’s body.”  She’s ever characterized as “Billy Beede and her baby-belly 
and no husband” (48).  For this, she gets to more candidly respond to others’ dismay at her 
swelling, defiant body. 
The idea of the “hole,” Getting Mother’s Body reply to Addie’s “gaps in people’s 
lacks” and even the visual omission on the page in her monologue that expresses where her 
hymen used to be.  This is the inherited philosophy Billy Beede learned from her deceased 
mother.  We see it in practice first, through Billy Beede, then hear the words of the dead 
Willa Mae in blues stanzas of a subsequent chapter explain it. It is telling that Billy first uses 
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it when trying to get a wedding dress for a reduced price – a moment when her maternity as 
well as her relationship as daughter are both featured prominently.  Playing on Ms. Jackson’s 
sympathies, Billy Beede reminds her of her “lack” of mother’s status, even at the moment her 
growing status as a mother-in-process shows: 
“You make your dress yrself too?” I asked.  “My mother made mine for me,” 
Mrs. Jackson says.  And then she goes quiet.  The Hole shapes more words in 
my mouth, all I gotta do is let them out.  “Willa Mae, you know, my uh –“  
“Your mother,” Mrs. Jackson says, saying ‘mother’ out loud for me.   
Finding this “hole” in Mrs. Jackson through an appeal to pathos – referencing both her own 
lack and excess as an orphaned mother-to-be – Billy Beede succeeds in getting the wedding 
dress for far less than its initial price.  In return, there is a persistent “hole” in Billy’s speech 
that Mrs. Jackson fills here – that of her mother.  Then, the omissions in language become as 
telling as the present words.  Further complicating this omission in the growing presence in 
Billy that signifies her own beginning pregnancy and connection to motherhood herself.  
Willa Mae suggests both the vulnerability and inevitability of the “hole” – referencing 
Addie’s idea of words as spaces, or lacks: 
When I say Hole you know what I’m talking about, dontcha?  Soft spot, sweet 
spot, blind spot, Itch, Gap, call it what you want but I call it a Hole.  
Everybody’s got one, just don’t everybody got one in the same place.  …Not 
just a lack, now, but the craving too. 
Here, the “Hole” becomes a way in – a person’s lack always suggests a corresponding desire. 
And here, we return to Kristeva’s text and the suggested space of the “mother” as a cipher – 
as that space, a non-entity, a hole that nevertheless suggests a way in towards meaning(s).  
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Willa Mae’s phantom presence urges on treasure hunters; and her daughter’s final decision to 
see her pregnancy through. 
 This idea of “hole” then becomes a flagrant space to reconsider how absences and 
presences work.  How, in the sense (as modeled through Addie Bundren) a woman’s 
pregnancy is both an acquired presence at the loss of a hymen (the “hole” or biological as 
well as cultural understanding that she is porous to the “Other,” open and even available for 
invasion). 
 To be “the gaps in people’s lacks” furthermore reckons with the idea that a woman 
suffers from lack – the fleshly penis in Freud’s reading or the more elusive power of the 
phallus for Lacan.  In either case, Addie’s words extend the metaphor further to embrace the 
idea. 
 Both texts play off this notion of a hole, of an absence that at times is highlighted for 
its emptiness and need to be filled, and others.  I am intrigued by this idea because it feels at 
once both a critique and an inversion of the idea of mother as womb, as receptacle.  Rather 
than her containing the space, as something to be filled, as a child in utero, the texts 
reconceptualize her as shaped, contained, and fetishized within this space.  Motherhood has 
been the serviceable, cultural “gap to fill people’s lacks” – a cipher forced to contain and fill, 
yet hold, tenuous origins of the self/Other.  In a moment that may be at times (however 
frustratingly) characterized as a post-feminist moment, reverting to discussions of the 
biological (so steeped in a history of essentialism and oppressive limitations) may seem 
suspect at best.  But in continued critiques of the subject (of the Enlightenment tradition), I 
think pregnancy narratives (such as these, that challenge popular and cultural renderings of 
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the mother and that likewise capture socio-economic and racial disparities in the cultural idea 
of “the mother” are a rife space, for lack of a better word, to start.  
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Chapter 4 Pregnancy as Other: Cyborgs, the Monstrous, and Anne Finger’s Past Due: 
A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and Birth 
 “And it is of course not only the pregnant woman but also the fruit of her belly that is affected by being 
discussed in the context of probabilities and risks which, strictly speaking, make sense only for groups; her 
unborn is transformed into the crumb of a population.” (28) – Barbara Duden, Disembodying Women 
 
As we have moved from the narrow discussions of pregnancy to alternative 
vocabularies for “non-hegemonic” pregnancies, I would now like to consider different 
narrative perspectives, alternative embodiments, to refigure pregnancy for future discussion.  
Here, the discussion leads us to consider pregnancy not only as Othered from normative 
subjects and embodiment, but now celebrate it at the margins and the radical potential it 
shares there with other marginalized bodies. 
 We have refigured motherhood, and now we look to the potential of identifying 
pregnancy as, and with, the utterly alien.  Julia Kristeva remarks that, in pregnancy, 
“indomitable, there is an other.  And no one is present within that simultaneously dual and 
alien space to signify what is going on.  ‘It happens, but I’m not there.’ ‘I cannot realize it, 
but it goes on.’ Motherhood’s impossible syllogism” (Kristeva, Desire in Language 238).  
What can come from locating “the abject” in pregnancy?  Alternately, how does pregnancy 
complement discussions of the cyborg, further removing us from a notion of the organic, 
normative individual?  
Boldly Go… Fetal Images, the Monstrous Maternal, and Cyborgs 
 In the April 30, 1965 edition of LIFE magazine, American readers were given their 
first sighting of a developing human life in the womb.24  The photography of Lennart 
                                                
24 As noted earlier, impositions of time via medical and legal discourses continue to impart particular meanings 
to stages of human development aside from a pregnant woman’s experiences.  For clarification, “embryo” 
comes from the Greek work “to swell” and is used to identify developing human life until the age of roughly 7 
to 8 weeks (in particular, as this article explains, the formation of the “first real bone cells that replace cartilage” 
mark the shift from embryo to fetus).  Then, “fetus,” meaning “young one” in Latin, is used.  
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Nilsson, and accompanying article entitled “Drama of Life Before Birth,” captures colorized 
images of “humans in their natural embryo state.”  The photo essay creates a powerful 
connection through the visual narrative, with scientific copy guiding the viewer’s 
identification of his or her own humanness in the developing embryo.  First, at three and a 
half weeks, the spectators behold an “embryo so tiny – about a tenth of an inch long – that 
the mother may not even know she is pregnant.”25 Despite the fact that this initially 
unidentifiable entity is the developing embryo, the captions graft familiarity onto the earliest 
images:  for instance, the captions urge the viewer to recognize “the bulge” at four weeks that 
“is the lower-jaw-to-be.” 
 We can see in action, through these photographs, the significant visual shift marking 
the “personhood of the fetus.”  Revered by the pro-life movement, this narrative runs parallel 
to the rhetoric choice  As many critics have noted,26 setting a precedent for this narrative, 
there are minimal connections made in the captions as well as in the images to the mother’s 
body and lived existence during pregnancy.  Instead, offset by the disconnect of the black 
background, the embryos and fetuses appear in a vacuum, not unlike specimens floating in 
formaldehyde-filled bell jars.  This effect accomplishes two unique outcomes: first, in 
disconnecting the fetus from the mother’s body entirely, we see the fetus cast as the emerging 
                                                
25 This aside indicates the full shift from the “quickening” model, discussed in chapter 1, maintained through 
the mid-19th century in identifying pregnancy.  In the progression from the AMA’s professionalization and 
claimed authority over pregnancy, we see with these fetal images the full arrival of the empirical, “clinical 
gaze” in the womb. The article suggests the woman’s own uncertainty of her pregnancy, an aside which seems 
symbolically significant (in effect acknowledging that “we can see and know what a woman doesn’t about her 
own body”) more than factually so. (It clearly could not be the case of the unique embryo in question as that 
woman is having her womb intimately photographed.)  It would seem rather to function as our, the audience’s, 
induction into this authoritative gaze. 
 
26 In her essay “Renegotiating Reproductive Technologies: the ‘Public Foetus’ Revisited,” Georgina Firth 
chronicles this shift noting that “vision has become the primary sensory experience of the pregnant woman” at 
the expense of a woman’s “alienation… from her own body” (56).  This shift has likewise occurred in 
opposition to the intimate tactile sense of touch. 
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“I” from the womb – an individual foraging for life (for the essay is entitled “life before 
birth,” after all) in the Darwinian spirit of solitary and bleak wilderness.  The copy at twenty-
eight weeks notes that the fetus will soon open its eyes “on a lightless world.”  In her essay 
“Foetal Images,” Rosalind Petchesky speaks to this disconnection between the fetal images 
and a larger and cohesive narrative to the origins of life: “foetal imagery epitomizes the 
distortion inherent in all photographic images: their tendency to slice up reality into tiny bits 
wrenched out of real space and time” (175).  These “slices” of reality become even more 
apparent in, for example, the eleven weeks’ photograph.  A small insert image is offered – 
“[here] the fetus is practically enveloped by the blood-rich placental mass” – in which the 
viewer cannot discern a fetus at all but sees a spongy sphere afloat instead.  In comparison, 
the larger image is offered with the lead, “but when the placenta is peeled away…” and the 
image of the fetus’s face and upper body are recognizably exposed.  Reflecting back on 
Irigaray’s “Maternal Order” essay, it seems that the intrusion of the photographer not only 
requires obscuring the mother but the distortion of the fetus’s state as well (and to its 
detriment, as the placenta “envelopes” the fetus for the exchange of nourishment).  
Interestingly, the probing eye of the gaze in these images extracts not only a fetal-centric 
narrative at the loss of the mother and of their shared duality, but it does so at the expense of 
the fetus’s own integrity.  
Secondly, the macabre images also frame the fetus in a kind of monstrous tone.  
Particularly in the twenty-eight weeks’ photo, where the copy editor waxed a more romantic 
tone, the fetal membrane “drapes like a veil,” and the dull eyes soon to look upon (the 
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previously referenced) “lightless world” teem above a neck noosed by an umbilical cord.27  
The caption also makes reference that “the fetal membrane is the ‘caul’ of folklore.”  While it 
looks hauntingly like a shroud in the photograph, the occult reference summons a long list of 
cultural references of babies born still wearing the caul and having magical abilities or 
second sight as a result.  All of these cadaverous elements arise interestingly just as the fetus 
appears most human, in the final section subtitled “A Thumb to Suck, a Veil to Wear.” 
Interestingly, this morbid turn in the essay is amplified by the fact that photographer Lennart 
Nilsson later admitted that many of the fetuses photographed “had been surgically removed 
[from their mother’s womb]… for a variety of medical reasons.”  Those that were not had 
similarly ominous fates; in the LIFE 50th anniversary homage to the piece, the article 
constructs a kind of eulogy on their behalf:   
not all of the embryos or fetuses seen… lived very long beyond the moment 
that Nilsson made their portraits.  Doomed to a mortal end, they gained a kind 
of immortality through a photographer’s inspired vision and tenacious pursuit 
of what so many, for so long, deemed the impossible. 
This copy, published in 2005, concludes with an intriguing tone – the melodramatic language 
complements the suggestion of an unconquerable frontier.  In this narrative, the embryos’ 
and fetuses’ lives are mourned as a kind of selfless sacrifice to a “vision.” 
 This intervention of technology at the site of the fetus has been used in part to portray 
their singularity and “viability” at earlier developmental ages.  However, as we bring the 
maternal body back into focus, we see that the pregnant body and mother-to-be’s experience 
are also impacted by these advancements in medical technology.  As a disruption to the static 
                                                
27 Despite the darker imagery, the article does diffuse the tone later by returning to more matter of fact tone and 
reassuring the reader that the umbilical cord, “seen here passing around the baby’s neck” is “not uncommon” 
and that the fetus is “not in much danger.” 
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singular self – which, though we have discussed at length in its contradictions, nevertheless 
gains new life in the “personhood of the fetus” narrative – we have the cyborg.  Donna 
Haraway’s “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” and subsequent work in the 1980s and 1990s on the 
cyborg work to challenge “natural” or “organic” ideas of the self-sustaining body.  Her 
project is in part a narrative one that complements in part our previous discussion of 
Irigarary’s “Maternal Order” for, as Haraway notes in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature, “grammar is politics by other means” (3).  At first glance, the cyborg 
may seem at odds with any argument rooted in the womb or fleshy narratives of embodied 
pregnancy.  Nonetheless, I feel that the cyborg is pertinent here in our conversation as it 
poses not only an alternative notion of the parameters of the subject, but it does so critically 
by interpreting (albeit quite differently) the rise in technology that likewise contributes to the 
“personhood of the fetus.”  It broadens the understanding of the subject to a spectrum, which 
we will continue in our consideration of the monstrous as well as the Othered premise at the 
core of critical feminist disability theory. 
  Haraway establishes the narrative quality of the “cyborg” as it is both “a matter of 
fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women’s experience in the late 
twentieth century” (191).  She grounds the premise of the cyborg on the “flaccid 
premonition” found in Foucault’s biopolitics.  Michel Foucault describes “biopolitics” as “a 
set of processes such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, [and] the 
fertility of a population,” which focus broadly on the normalization of the general population 
(“Society Must Be Defended” 243).  Within an era of biopolitics, the focus is on the broad 
“improvement of…human capital” (“The Birth of Biopolitics” 228).  As theorist Jana 
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Sawicki notes, women’s bodies and subjectivities thus are a crucial “dimension of… 
biopower” as they are the ostensible “reproducers” in society (191).28   
 Haraway’s cyborg politics expand these dimensions considerably:  “no longer 
structure[d] by the polarity of public and private,” the cyborg furthermore “has no origin 
story in the Western sense; a ‘final’ irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos 
of the West’s escalating dominations of abstract individuality, an ultimate self untied at last 
from all dependency, a man in space” (192).  For our discussion, the cyborg offers a potential 
space to reconsider the limiting and fallacious narratives of “biological-determinist ideology” 
that attempt to hem in neatly the boundaries of the human and the Other.  The boundary 
between the “physical” and “nonphysical” is exposed as a fluid one.  While this project 
breaks in part with her proposed post-gender terms, Haraway opens up possibilities for 
further de-naturalizing the narrow scope of “the body” and showing the way different 
subjects can inter-relate (her suggestion of “affinity” over “identity”).  
While the cyborg looks forward, from science fiction to contemporary technology to 
embrace alternative embodiments and relationships, the monstrous harkens back to the 
grotesque, folkloric Other of horror.  Rosemary Betterton, in her essay “Promising Monsters: 
Pregnant Bodies, Artistic Subjectivity, and Maternal Imagination,” gestures toward this 
potential space of the monstrous.  She discusses pregnancy in the defamiliarized language of 
the monstrous, an “otherness [‘the other’ being those things against we define ourselves] is 
enclosed in our bodies, as yet unknown… growing inside our own flesh and blood” – a time 
that ultimately creates “the body’s alienation from itself” (81).  Ultimately, for Betterton, 
                                                
28 While Foucault’s conception of biopolitics hinges largely upon the greater population, rather than the 
individual, it is worth noting that it likewise equips society to police the general site of pregnancy as both the 
actual and metaphoric space of reproduction.   
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“the embodied pregnant woman, like the monster, thus destabilizes the concept of the 
singular self, threatening to spill over the boundaries of the unified subject” (85). 
 This potential for the monstrous references a legacy of anxieties about women’s 
reproductive capabilities and “maternal power” as perceived within a patriarchal society, 
which we have historicized in part.  This artistic project suggested by Betterton borrows 
overtly from Rosi Braidotti’s work on the reclamation of the monstrous.  For her, “the 
monster is a process without a stable object.  It makes knowledge happen by circulating, 
sometimes as the irrational non-object” (150).  Furthermore, as we consider the potential of 
the monstrous in terms of pregnancy and alternative embodiments, we must do so with yet 
another renewed narrative from its historical legacy:  “the challenge that the hybrid, the 
anomalous, the monstrous others throw in our direction is a disassociation from the 
sensibility that we inherited from the nineteenth century, one which pathologized and 
criminalized difference” (Braidotti 213). 
 Braidotti describes her project – “by MONSTERS, I mean a third kind of discourse” 
– as a means of creating this alternative way into “the history and philosophy of the 
biological sciences, and their relation to difference and different bodies” (61).  Her interests 
combine at the intersection of both the “horrible” and the “wonderful,” the bases for the 
Greek root word for monsters, teras.  She weds these grotesque narratives with contemporary 
biotechnology, and finds pregnancy at their intersection: 
… the power of science over the women’s body in favor of placing increasing 
emphasis on the rights of the fetus or of embryos.  This emphasis is played 
against the rights of the mother – and therefore of the woman – and we have 
been witnessing systematic slippages between the discourse against genetic 
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manipulations and the rhetoric of the antiabortion campaigners.  No area of 
contemporary technological development is more crucial to the construction 
of gender than the new reproductive technologies.  The central thematic link I 
want to explore between mothers, monsters, and machines is therefore my 
argument that contemporary biotechnology displaces women by making 
procreation a high-tech affair.  (63, emphasis my own) 
As we move from the cyborg to the monstrous, we continue alternative narratives of the 
Other that I feel lead to new developments in feminist disability studies. This core idea of 
Otherness, challenged by these diverse narratives haunting its margins, we have connected 
not only to pregnancy but found in diverse bodies beyond the single subject ideal.  To 
continue this analysis, centered around a critique of this “pathologized” Other, I look to 
critical feminist disability theory.  Furthermore, disability and pregnancy complement a 
critical reconsideration of the Enlightenment subject in two distinct ways. 
 Pregnancy and disability become mutually informative embodiments, both socially 
constructed and hemmed-in, yet biologically informed and present with a kind of insistence 
of the body’s materiality.  In her essay, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson suggests that “shape 
structures story” serves as the “informing principle of disability identity” (114).  Garland-
Thomson bases her argument off a previous one made by historian Catherine Walker Bynum.  
Bynum’s proposition was that “shape or body is crucial, not incidental, to story.  It carries 
story; it makes story visible; in a sense it is story” (qtd by Garland-Thomson 113-4).  She 
further suggests that “shape (or visible body) is in space what story is in time…. Identity is 
finally shape carrying story” (114).  At the heart of her query, and the one taken up by 
Garland-Thomson in her article, is “How can I be the same person I was a moment ago?” 
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(113).  In other words, how can we neglect the inevitable change in the body and its 
immediate effect on the individual, on the concept of identity, and on the story at that 
moment in time?  Such questions are central to the idea of narrative, as Garland-Thomson 
goes on to define as the “way of constructing continuity over time; it is a cohere knitting of 
one moment to the next” – making narrative “the link between time and human materiality” 
(113). 
For Garland-Thomson’s project, she highlights the prevailing “myth” of the 
“certainty and compliancy” of the human body (114).  How does such a myth, predicated on 
ideas of the Enlightenment self previously discussed, continue to elide narratives of 
pregnancy?  To shape and contain these narratives to conform to such a normative idea of the 
human body?  Lastly, what does it mean to have such a perspective on bodies and narratives 
– what Garland-Thomson goes so far to describe as that “we would prefer to believe that 
story is independent from shape, perhaps we would even prefer to go as far as to claim that 
story structures shape” (114) – inform the diversity of narratives available on pregnancy?  
Pregnancy itself figures outside these embodied norms and rather than leaving it be inscribed 
by patriarchal and institutional norms, particular through legal and medical discourses, how 
might the radical, shape-driven stories of pregnancy be reconsidered? 
Disability and Pregnancy in the Biopolitical Age:  Anne Finger’s Past Due: A Story of 
Disability, Pregnancy and Birth 
As one of the foremost voices of feminist disability studies, Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson situates the theoretical field as it “reimagines disability”:  “it aspires to retrieve 
dismissed voices and misrepresented experiences.  It helps us understand the intricate 
relations between bodies and selves…. Disability, it argues, is a cultural interpretation of 
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human variation rather than an inherent inferiority, a pathology to cure, or an undesirable 
trait to eliminate” (“Feminist Disability Studies” 1557).  Conceptions of disability inform the 
larger discussion of pregnancy as they are central to contemporary biopolitics.  Despite 
women’s expanded agency and gained reproductive rights over their own bodies, 
technological advancements and the current age of biopolitics place the female body – and 
the human site of reproduction – into a newly tenuous space.   
With this emphasis upon reproduction, biopolitics informs the construction of 
subjectivities starting in the womb, dictating their “value” as “human capital” (Foucault, The 
Birth of Biopolitics 229).  This focus places particular pressures upon pregnancy, 
motherhood, and women’s embodiment in general as producers for the “State.”  In many 
ways, this contemporary trend harkens back to the concept of “Republican motherhood,” 
ingrained in eighteenth and nineteenth century American cultures.  Nonetheless, with 
burgeoning technology and developments in prenatal care, women’s role as producers has 
become arguably more problematic.  In their article “Republican Motherhood Redux? : 
Women as Contingent Citizens in 21st Century America,” Rose and Hatfield argue women 
face even greater societal pressures in recent years due to such advancements.  Though they 
do not directly address Foucault’s conception of biopolitics, Rose and Hatfield’s findings are 
commensurate with his theory; they postulate the  “ ‘de-volving’ women’s social and 
political citizenship rights to the states, where they will once again be highly variable and 
often contingent upon women’s mothering status” (Rose and Hatfield 5). 
While likewise placing female pregnant embodiment under greater scrutiny, bio-
power further relegates the formation of “proper” subjectivities:  demographically, who is fit 
to propagate in society, and what is their ideal progeny?  Shelley Tremain addresses this 
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concern in her article “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory,” 
describing biopolitics as “a vast apparatus, erected to secure the well-being of the general 
population, [which] has caused the contemporary disabled subject to emerge into discourse 
and social existence” (5).  Her argument thus suggests the formation of “disability” itself, in 
a contemporary context, attains meaning as a socially debilitating signifier through the 
advent of biopolitics.  Significantly, at the locus of women’s bodies and the site of 
reproduction, disability and the possibility of difference are policed keenly.   
For this purposes of this chapter, I raise the particular issue of the disabled female 
reproductive body.  Here, as a significant locus of difference and non-normative (non-
masculine) reproductive embodiment, what are the politics of pregnancy here and how do 
they greatly inform the politics of difference?  How might this proliferate feminist theoretical 
approach(es) to pregnancy?  And could this particular intersection of differences, both rooted 
in the body but informed heavily by cultural constructivism, further complicate and confound 
understandings of reproductive rights, feminism(s), and constructions of difference?  By way 
of a Foucauldian conception of biopolitics, infused with a feminist disabilities perspective, I 
seek to engage critically this contemporary site of pregnant embodiment.  Furthermore, in 
keeping with feminist standpoint theory, I ground this discussion in narrative, Anne Finger’s 
memoir of pregnancy as a disabled woman, Past Due:  A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and 
Birth. 
Historical Tableau:  Female Embodiment(s) and Reproduction 
Historically, the body – as a site of cultural construction, physical materiality, and 
lived embodiment – has remained a contentious subject of interrogation.  In a struggle to 
reconcile human ability and reasoning, much of the patriarchal perspective on “the body" 
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remains marked by an element of somatophobia: an eagerness to distance (hu)man 
experience from the material limitations, needs, and parameters suggested by the lived 
experiences of corporeality itself. The lasting legacy of the Cartesian divide, stated simply by 
Descartes’ well-known aphorism (“I think, therefore I am”), posits rationality as the 
distinguishing signifier of human existence.  As such, traditional patriarchal philosophy has 
“established itself as a form of knowing… [achieved] only through the disavowal of the 
body… and the corresponding elevation of mind as a disembodied term” (Grosz 4).  
Likewise in her work Dangerous Discourses of Disability, Subjectivity, and Sexuality, 
Margrit Shildrick asserts that “to be a self—and more significantly a subject—with effective 
agency is, in every sense of the word, to be capable of exercising autonomy” (19). Thus, 
bodily functions that may seem to “detract” from the powers of the “mind” have been 
negatively derogated within philosophical discourse.  Nevertheless, this conception of 
“autonomy” overtly discounts a variety of lived embodiments.  Much as a result, individuals 
identified and Othered by their non-normative embodiment have been summarily 
marginalized as well. 
 While oppressive and discursively violent, such a broad scope of Otherness illustrates 
the “stable,” self-reliant subject to be rare indeed.  For as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson states 
– “we will all become disabled if we live long enough” – corporeal fluidity is part of the 
human condition (14).  Furthermore, such a limited perspective on corporeality severely 
limits the interrogation of diverse embodiments – their differences made, by this model, to 
appear as pathologized “problems.”  Women’s bodies and resulting subjectivities – as located 
outside the hegemonic “strong, well-informed, non-disabled, masculine body” (Hughes 400) 
– have long been marginalized and medicalized in this manner.  Thus, much of feminist 
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theory politicizes and confounds these “problems” of the (non-normative) body in an effort 
to destabilize and subvert such an historical trend.  Nevertheless, within this conversation, 
there emerges a necessary space for disability and so-called disabled embodiment.   
 While I posit pregnancy as an embodiment “outside” of normative conceptions of 
disability, I do so with a caveat:  foremost, I do not seek to essentialize a definition of 
“disability” at large (for this chapter will counter such a myth directly).29  Pregnancy may be 
read as complementary to an analysis of disability – as another site of non-normative 
embodiment.  However, I do not group pregnancy with disability as I feel this could 
potentially elide the politics of difference and Otherness lastingly imposed upon those of 
“difference.” While pregnancy brings to bear many cultural and social concerns – public 
policing of the mother-to-be, for instance – society generally ascribes acceptance to the 
concept of pregnancy, albeit problematically.30   
Such a concern may be further highlighted by the social model of disability theory at 
the likewise problematic site of disabled embodiment.  In her formative work Extraordinary 
Bodies:  Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature, Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson posits that “the disabled figure operates as the vividly embodied, 
stigmatized other whose social role is to symbolically free the privileged, idealized figure of 
the American self from the vagaries and the vulnerabilities of embodiment” (7).  Here, 
                                                
29 I realize I do so here, despite state law rulings to the contrary.  For instance, in Florida and California, a new 
mother may file for temporary disability for her pregnancy.  While in many ways this may be seen as a 
progressive, liberalist concession to pregnant embodiment, it still reifies the narrowed ideal of “stable, 
individual, singular” Enlightenment subject.  Furthermore, it still problematically seems to graft “Otherness” 
onto an embodiment that is vastly responsible for the population’s admittance into the world. 
 
30 Here, I myself commit an elision of controlled pregnancies – bodies already Othered by race, or socio-
economically devalued by class, have been regulated from reproduction.  The legacy of Margaret Sanger and 
the overt use of eugenics in the early 20th century, though beyond the particular scope of this paper, may not be 
overlooked.  Ideally, a more lengthy discussion necessarily would address how such issues as these place 
pregnancy within a highly politicized context – one rife for the cytogenic testing within contemporary medicine, 
for example. 
101 
 
 
disability becomes the generalized foil to normative embodiment – which illustrates the 
problems of demarcating “disability” as it becomes a catch-all for socially ostracized 
Otherness.  For this reason, Garland-Thomson defines disability as “the attribution of 
corporeal deviance—not so much a property of bodies as a product of cultural rules about 
what bodies should be or do” (6). 
Notably, within history, differences have been grafted onto bodies – “raced” bodies, 
which challenged hegemonic whiteness; and likewise female bodies, so long presented as 
deformed or signified by a “lack.”  Contemporarily, and in contrast to different identity 
politics movements of the latter twentieth century, “disability” remains an often uncritically 
challenged signifier of difference within western society.  This occurrence seems no less 
bolstered by the emergence and perseverance of the biopolitical state.  Furthermore within 
this larger project of biopolitics and biopower, as Tremain states in a Foucauldian twist, 
“disability” is created by conceptions of bio-power rather than vice versa (Tremain 5); 
biopolitics create subjectivities of “normative bodies” to limit bodies’ variation in general. 
 Thus, the significance of embodiment and non-normative corporeality, as sites for 
oppression and supposedly pejorative difference, warrants further analysis via feminist 
theory.  In her work, Garland-Thomson goes on to further outline the complementary 
relationship between feminist and disability theories.  While both broad signifiers of 
embodiment – “female” and “disabled” – fall outside Enlightenment norms of the stable, 
self-reliant, and implicitly masculine subject, they share further attributes in the broader 
tableau of difference.  Feminism provides an “insistence on the relationship between the 
meanings attributed to bodies by cultural representations and the consequences of those 
meanings in the world” while disability studies proliferates feminist body theory analysis “so 
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that the bodily configurations and functioning we call ‘disabled’ will be included in all 
feminist examinations of culture and representation” (Garland-Thomson 21).  Furthermore, 
feminisms’ commitment to critique, for liberatory means, the construction and wholesale 
oppression of Otherness relies upon an “insistence that standpoint shapes politics; that 
identity, subjectivity, and the body are cultural constructs to be questioned” (21).   
Reproduction, Discipline, and Biopolitics:  Foucauldian Theor(ies) of the Body   
 Foucault illuminates the significant site of reproduction, a locus about which feminist 
theory and disability studies – as female and disabled embodiment – draw some significant 
findings on the body.  In his History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Foucault notes a particular shift in 
power over life and death that prefigures an era of biopolitics.  He remarks that through the 
Middle Ages the power of death and to kill served as a sovereign power “of the sword” 
(135).  However, with social and economic shifts primarily rooted in the eighteenth century, 
Foucault suggests that such notions of power shifted to the right to life (135).  With such a 
trend, he states, “one might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a 
power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (138).  Here, he moves toward an 
understanding of contemporary approaches not only to “discipline” the body, but also to 
regulate and normalize bodies as population. 
 In his discussion of technologies of power, Foucault focuses upon two distinct 
varieties extant since the 18th century that both “center on the body” (Birth of Biopolitics 
249).  On the one hand, he notes the “disciplinary power” which accounts for the 
individualized body, malleable in its docility; here, the primary goal is to capitalize upon the 
usefulness of the body (249).  Secondly, however, as a newer development informed by his 
particular focus on “biopolitics,” Foucault examines how bodies are examined en masse, as 
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part of what he calls a “population” that can be quantitatively represented and empirically 
understood (249).   This technology of biopolitics is one which “brings together the mass 
effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the series of random events that 
can occur in a living mass, a technology which tries to predict the probability of those 
events”  (249).  Here, bodies are reduced to their “general biological processes” such as the 
“ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population…” (Foucault, 
“Society Must Be Defended” 249, 243).   
 This macrocosmic perspective nonetheless polices and disciplines at the individual 
level.  I find that Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics, and its exertion upon the development of 
society’s “ideal” population, overlooks the highly politicized site of pregnancy itself.  A 
feminist analysis, which seems necessitated by the concern of pregnancy itself, addresses this 
oversight between the micro- and macrocosmic.  Taking the lived experiences, voiced by 
those within the biopolitical context, may provide further insightful perspective into the site 
pregnancy and constructions of difference therein.   
Past Due:  A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and Birth 
 My discussion of biopolitics, disability, and the site of female pregnant embodiment 
may be illumined by Anne Finger’s Past Due:  A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and Birth.  
The writer, in her own memoirs of disability and pregnancy, tells a narrative she finds far 
“past due” in its significant examination of her lived experiences:  that of an ostensibly 
disabled, pregnant woman.  As a woman who both works and is a patient within medicalized 
contemporary society, Finger’s experiences illustrate with great clarity the breadth of 
Foucault’s statements while providing a feminist standpoint perspective of one woman’s 
individual feelings, struggles, and emotional responses.  While Foucault’s broader discussion 
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of biopolitics regularly posits the site of power and normalization with the population en 
masse, a reading of Finger carefully balances this macrocosmic view with a look into the 
individualized manifestation of biopolitics; as such, her narrative configures and maps upon 
Foucault a particularly feminist disability reading of biopolitics and pregnancy.   
With her work in an abortion clinic, coupled with her own abortion in the past, Finger 
stands at the politicized position of a physically disabled woman with feminist politics.  Thus 
her internal grappling, over the issues of pregnancy, reveals at this particular locus of 
embodiment much about the present issue of (specifically, reproductive) biopolitics, 
feminism, and disability within society today: 
Thinking about reproductive technology is hard for feminists:  it’s one of 
those issues that doesn’t just divide the movement, but divides people within 
themselves.  If we believe in the right of women not to have children, then do 
we also have to support the right of women to have children?  To have access 
to technology that will help them to do that?  What about the fact that the 
unequal distribution of resources within our society often means that middle-
class women will have sophisticated medical techniques available to them, 
while poor women will struggle to get basic medical care?  Can we get access 
to these technologies without increasing medical domination over women’s 
bodies?  Do these hamper our finding new ways for adults and children to 
have real connections beyond biological parenting and outside of the nuclear 
family?  What about the very real pain that infertile women feel?  Do we think 
about control of our bodies only in terms of freedom from state control, or do 
we also think of it in ways that are more active? (44) 
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Here, she seeks to articulate the contradictions found at the intersection of disability, feminist 
theory, and the material realities of embodiment.  Furthermore, the subtext of her rhetorical 
questions unsettles status quo feminist readings of reproductive technology, neonatal politics, 
and how disabled women experience their reproductive and sexual bodies diversely.  She 
disrupts a kind of mainstream feminist theory, suggesting pregnancy and motherhood are not 
necessarily traditionally imposed roles for all women – namely, just abled women as viable 
“reproducers” within society.  What does it mean for a disabled woman, deemed “unfit for 
motherhood” (Thomson 26) by her visible embodied difference, to grapple with her own 
reproductive rights?  I suggest that her monologue expresses the anxieties that arise within a 
Foucauldian conception of biopolitics, albeit on a personal and individualized level.  Finger 
suggests the inadequacies of neo-liberalism here, questioning what rights one has and how 
these rights are enacting through society. 
 Past Due opens with a glimpse at Finger’s life prior to her concluding pregnancy – a 
woman, visibly afflicted by polio, who works in an abortion clinic and thus regularly 
contemplates her own past abortion.  Thus, the novel originates with overt issues of 
reproductive rights and technologies, and the conflicting personal emotions and experiences 
they have brought upon the narrator.  Finger’s narrative works to relate retroactively her 
pregnancy and labor.  As a memoir, the story provides momentary lapses in chronology to 
recount details of Finger’s disability and previous abortions. Prior to her pregnancy, Finger 
establishes herself as “a prisoner of medicalization,” locating herself at the site of pathology 
and difference from which she works throughout the text (4).  Thus, as she relates her story, 
Finger’s work likewise investigates political issues while keeping the material experience of 
women’s bodies at the fore of the text.  Much like the abortion clinic in which she works – 
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which Finger describes in terms of female embodiment – the text itself remains closely 
connected to women’s bodies and the emotional and physical pain therein.  A palpable 
materiality, of fluidity concerning both reproduction and death, pervades the piece:  
By the end of the day, the rooms are thick with the smell like menstrual blood, 
but richer; the smell of the core of women.  By the end of the day, the rooms 
are thick with mingled sadness and relief, and my head usually aches, and of 
course, my legs ache too. (5) 
Finger continually juxtaposes women’s bodily comportment, her own pain and physical 
experiences, alongside the larger contextualized issues she confronts within her memoir.  Her 
narrative feels regularly disrupted – or powerfully edified – by her own physical pain and 
disability. 
 Early in the text, the narrator reveals the historical details of her disability.  As a child 
in 1954, Finger developed polio when she was three years old (11).  She then wore a host of 
“crutches and braces” and underwent multiple corrective surgeries.  She suggests that even 
the efforts at her rehabilitation functioned problematically upon an ableist-informed model of 
subjectivity; such corrective measures, mentioned likewise by Thomson in Extraordinary 
Bodies, illustrate medicine’s pervasive efforts to focus upon a “cure” for pathologized 
disability.  This further complements Foucauldian biopolitics – the anxieties of who will 
reproduce, who will compose the population, necessarily upsets the subjectivities of those 
(the “disabled”) who are seen to embody ailments, disfigurements, and impairments. 
After basing her discussion within this context, Finger writes of her continuing 
struggles as a grown woman.  As permanently “afflicted” with polio in an ableist context, her 
movement remains non-normative and serves as reminder of her difference:  “I walk with a 
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cane now, a rolling walker, my body moving not with legs doing their own job, but a 
collective of shoulders and side and stomach – one whole side hitches up and then I toss my 
right leg forward” (12).  Her bodily comportment suggests her discussion of the body as 
whole – a unit nonetheless bound up in her own subjectivity.  Her physical movement 
involves the utilization of not only a cane – a direct challenge to the Enlightenment subject, 
as a sign of dependency – but she furthermore enlists her entire body in mobility.  Finger’s 
story bears an element of phenomenology, a “rematerialization” of the body, that directs the 
remainder of the piece.  Similarly, the mobility of her story remains dependent upon the 
narrative of her bodily comportment.   
Thus, Finger’s body and her subjectivity – situated amid the lasting legacy of mind/ 
body dualism – figures prominently in her text.  Specifically, Finger complicates the issues of 
pregnancy and bodily reproduction in her discussion of body and mind, and how she as a 
disabled individual wishes to be categorized.  In parts, her discussion illustrates that she has 
internalized the norms within her culture – and the embodied, lived experiences of 
biopolitics.  With her thoughts about pregnancy, she wants to produce something with her 
body.  At first, she discusses reproduction as a potential space of making something anew 
“out of [her] imperfect body” (18).  Pregnancy offers her a unique chance to “have control 
over [her] body:  instead of letting it grow more frail, letting it lose its power, I want to make 
it grow, to do more, not less” (18).  Here, Finger reveals the social pressures for 
heteronormative reproduction, as well as reproductive bodies, and her anxieties about 
capitulating to them.  Thus, she indicates that she is ideologically “within” the system – and 
thus views her body as problematically marginalized – by society. 
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However, while Finger’s discussion of pregnancy problematically cites the 
dominance of biopolitics and its manifestations in her own view of her body, she also 
indicates the kind of significant transgressive potential of pregnancy.  Finger notes that “the 
world tells me to divorce myself from my flesh, to live in my head” (18).  Her friend Mary, a 
self-avowed quadriplegic, complains she is often offered, in conciliation, “ ‘You still have 
your mind’ ” to which she replies, “I still have my body” (18).  This memory, evoked by 
Finger, speaks to the lasting dualism and oppression of viewing the body as separate, and 
lesser, for disabled individuals.  The “monstrous,” historically, as it indicates “disabilities do 
not simply mark evil, but function as menace in… prototypical villains” of literature and 
western culture (Thomson 36).  Thus one’s body became a mirror for one’s mind and spirit.  
Contemporarily, in an era of biopolitics, disability becomes “pathological rather than evil or 
immoral,” as a difference “fraught with assumptions of deviance, patronizing relationships, 
and issues of control” (Thomson 37).  Thus friend Mary’s frustration with the statement is 
clear; likewise, the transgression of her acknowledge (“I have a body”) is also marked.      
Finger reflects on Mary’s predicament with frustration.  She struggles herself with the 
powerful suggestion of not only where disabled individuals are within society, but also how 
they are to be interpolated.  Foucault notes, in his lecture series Abnormal, that “disability 
may well be something that upsets the natural order, but disability is not monstrosity because 
it has a place in civil or canon law.  The disabled person may not conform to nature, but the 
law in some way provides for him” (64). Despite the problematically flippant treatment of 
disability, Foucault nonetheless highlights the significant trend of liberalism to locate 
“disabled” individuals as marginalized, non-normative, but usefully “within” the system.  
Here, Mary and Anne’s sentiments express this co-optation:  their embodiment, as difference, 
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bolsters an understanding of able-embodiment.  Nonetheless, they are encouraged to 
“overcome” this difference with their mental faculties, which all the while reifies their 
bodies’ differences.  Nonetheless, as Finger here indicates, this problematic gesture merely 
encompasses “disabled” individuals through a reification of their difference; within a 
Foucauldian reference, power is enacted through “productive constraints” as it “enables 
subjects to act in order to constrain them” (Tremain 4). 
Much in the same vein as Mary, Finger wants her “power to be physical” (18).  She 
wants to reclaim her body as a potential site of empowerment, productivity – all things that, 
as a disabled woman, society dictates she cannot do; that at best she may have these things in 
spite (in an overcoming) of her body, not through her body, and here Finger forces the 
boundaries imposed upon non-normative bodies.  As she reflects on her own efforts at 
embodied agency, she likewise recalls an image of a US postage stamp with a man in a 
wheelchair, “peering into a microscope” (18).  The timing of her memory is symbolic, as her 
thoughts are apropos to her political potential as a disabled woman.  The stamp’s 
representation of a disabled man is that of a solitary, deliberate, “preferably male, brilliant, 
fleshless… Mind,” which shows the potential outlet for physical disabled individuals. In this 
moment, Finger decides she “[doesn’t] want to be fleshless” (18).  As such, she makes a 
gendered statement about her embodied difference as well; Finger is a woman, and not 
traditionally associated in a (gendered) fashion to rationality.  In so doing, she reclaims her 
gendered identity and her disabled identity, both entangled with her identification with the 
“body” by the same patriarchal discourses, and enacts her subjectivity through them.  She 
chooses to carry her pregnancy to term. 
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As a pregnant woman, Finger disrupts mainstream reproductive rights discourses by 
asserting the significance of disability so often overlooked therein.  As an abortion clinic 
worker, Finger situates herself as a feminist of leftist leaning thought in terms of reproductive 
issues.  Nonetheless, she stands “outside” of many such liberalist feminist discussions.  She 
notes that “most reproductive rights activists take a knee-jerk position against the anti-
abortionists, advocating ‘parental choice’ and ‘the right to privacy’ without examining the 
very real disability issues involved” in choices of abortion (Finger 25).  Regularly, when 
confronting this viewpoint on disability, Finger laments her inability to state that “disabled 
people [are] as good as everyone else” – a basic assertion she finds difficult to convey to an 
ablest audience (25).  While Finger necessarily supplants her discussion in terms of common 
liberal feminist arguments, infusing her discussion with an understanding of biopolitics 
further highlights the tension within her dilemma.  Though she may feel she is countering 
positions of privacy, and rights to one’s own body – but such a viewpoint in part neglects the 
pressures within larger society to be “proper” producers of healthy, “normate” children. 
To further inform her discussion, I look to an article recently published by a disabled 
woman who, along with her lesbian partner, chose to have children and were politically 
stymied by issues of fetus disabled development.  Their discussion highlights the multivalent 
intersection of feminist theor(ies), reproductive rights, and disability.  In an article entitled 
“The Choice of Two Mothers:  Disability, Gender, Sexuality, and Prenatal Testing,” Chloe 
Atkins discusses her moral concerns with amniocentesis.  A commonplace procedure, 
particularly for women aged 35 or older, amniocentesis has gained much support in 
contemporary medical discourse.  In her first pregnancy as a “geriatric parent,” Atkins and 
her partner elected to have amniocentesis.  However, she states that for her second child she 
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chose not to, as “we came to the conclusion that prenatal screening for disability became 
indistinguishable from that for gender and, as such, the procedure became morally untenable 
for us” (107).  She relates her internal conflict over the issue, citing conflicting global stances 
that outline disability, in the spirit of biopolitics, as somehow a markedly different sort of 
“difference.”  Atkins states that current “bioethical policies bar the use of technologies for 
determining a fetus’s gender but remain silent about their potential use for determining a 
fetus’s sexuality, and they actively endorse their use in screening for disabilities” (107).  
Through her own examination, Atkins determined that “disability as an ignoble trait is a 
cultural artifact” and thus begins to view it much as, historically, her own gender (female) 
and sexuality (lesbianism) have been construed and culturally constructed in a similar fashion 
(107). 
 Atkins also illumines concerns for reproductive technology within a biopolitics-
informed context.  As such, she speaks to the concerns voiced in Finger’s text as well, as a 
fellow disabled woman aware of social pressures against non-normative embodiment.  
Atkins, along with a broader aegis of social disability theorists, suggests that  
physicians and most of the public… erroneously presume that the lower 
quality of life associated with disability is a consequence of an individual’s 
variance from the statistical norm in terms of species’ functioning.  Instead, 
disabled activists argue they should focus on the role that prevailing attitudes 
and behaviors play in denigrating and isolating these ‘abnormal’ persons. 
(108) 
Here again, Atkins highlights Foucault’s argument that an era of biopolitics fixates upon the 
population as a whole, rather than individual bodies.  By omitting certain “abnormalities” 
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from full-scale maturation, or terminating “defective” pregnancies, society curtails the 
individual subjectivities of those living with non-normative embodiments. Her words again 
evoke Foucault’s:  “disallow it to the point of death” (138).  Discursively, for those alive as 
well as physically, for those who suggest a future embodiment of difference from the 
narrowly defined hegemonic norm of “able.”   
Thus, much as Finger laments of many pro-choice activists, liberalist concerns of 
“privacy” miss the very publicly policed bodies of difference – and such a perspective 
narrowly neglects an examination of “the very real disability issues involved” (25).  
Furthermore, within a Foucauldian context, such “privacy” and the array of choices protected 
by the “freedoms” of privacy look, upon closer scrutiny, more insidious than liberatory.  
Much as the transformation Atkins’s understanding of “disability,” Thomson suggests in her 
work Extraordinary Bodies, disability as a kind of socially constructed difference as gender 
or sexuality – and recognizes that, historically, she may have been classified by society.  
Significantly, Atkins and her partner make up a non-heteronormative family and their story 
may seem a first glance quite a progressive one; yet they are still confronted with “choices” 
which restrain their decisions within a liberalist context.  Their pregnancy remains policed.  
And Atkins recognizes that not only does such policing limit her rights as a potential mother 
as well as the future rights of the gestating fetus, but likewise 
the screening and weeding out defective (i.e., disabled) fetuses 
invariably casts aspersions on those who are disabled within society 
because disabled existence is devalued and disdained, in fact, opted 
against.  (108) 
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Atkins realizes that “disability” is shaped by culture and social perception.  Her revelation 
appeals to Finger’s earlier discussed frustrations with pro-choice advocates and other, 
perhaps inadvertently, ableist individuals.  Much as Foucault suggests that a society’s 
institutionalized offerings not only dictate who flourishes but who (albeit sometimes 
indirectly) suffers, Atkins recognizes social conditions rather than “natural” differences 
dictate the characterization of “disability.”   
Atkins’ primary focus centers around the prolific use of reproductive technology to 
determine the “health” of a prenatally developing fetus.  While Sawicki notes the potential 
promise of such technologies (194) – and Atkins and her partner’s pregnancies may serve as 
one example – there clearly seems space for “disciplining” and problematically policing 
within a Foucauldian biopolitical context.  As Bill Hughes notes in his article, “What Can a 
Foucauldian Analysis Contribute?”, the significance of such “visualizing technologies” that 
“discriminate between the normal fetus and the pathological fetus” furthermore “produce 
disabling information and knowledge in utero” (81).  Nonetheless, this kind of 
medicalization can prove ostracizing for an individual – in which the body is again placed 
problematically away from an idea of the “self” as somehow something to be reined in, 
repaired, rehabilitated, or cured. 
Finger’s larger narrative speaks to these details as well.  She, as a disabled woman 
who has been hospitalized and medically treated regularly before her pregnancy, frequently 
discusses the alienation she has experienced under institutionalized medical care.  For this 
reason, she elects to use midwifery rather than mainstream obstetrics with the goal of a home 
birth.  She contextualizes this choice in terms of a particular nightmare she has had.  Under 
the direction of a doctor (overtly characterized as “he” and thus removed from the pregnancy 
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experience by merit of his own gender and perhaps the larger patriarchal discourse of 
medicine), and gauged by a machine, she struggles to give birth.  In her “push[es] against 
gravity” in the labor dreams, Finger indicates the mechanization and “unnaturalness” in her 
remove from the experience (72); her own numbness prevents her from making decisions for 
herself, from feeling, from pain, and with medical precision the child is removed from her.  
The dream tellingly concludes with the passive voice “she has been delivered” (72).  As the 
child is simply characterized as an “it” in the preceding sentence – “it is held upside down for 
her to see” – I suggest Finger deliberately evokes the passive voice here to suggest her own 
lack of agency in the birth process.  The “labor” of childbirth, via technology and the 
patriarchal discourses of medicine and biopolitics, has been outsourced to a depersonalized, 
removed position.  The mother’s body seems little more than a vessel, a womb, an alarming 
retreat back to historical readings of the female body as passive purveyor of progeny. 
Finger concludes on a note of agency.  Her pregnancy and childbirth narrative remain 
fraught with conflict and uncertainty – she is unable to have a homebirth, has a C-section; 
nearly loses her child’s life to meconium aspiration; and is warned of her newborn son’s 
potential brain damage.  Despite his ultimately healthy development, her final thoughts 
directly grapple with her struggles, what she calls her decision to “take control of [her] body” 
(201).  She reframes her choices, as a site of subversion, in terms of responsibility for one’s 
body.  Finger accepts that she understands “why people want to surrender their lives to 
someone else’s power, to the power of the machine” (201).  Nonetheless, she celebrates her 
own choice of “knowing the self [she] knew in an unmedicated, wild birth” (201). 
Thus, Finger resolves on a note of resistance within an institutionalized, medicalized 
context that so closely governs pregnancy and much of females’ bodies.  Whereas much of 
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Foucault’s theory has been critiqued for the lack of agency ascribed to subjects – “docile 
bodies” as they are – I suggest Finger’s story provides such a space.  Despite the biopolitical 
state’s technologies, which “[try] to control the series of random events that can occur in a 
living mass” to “protect the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault, “Society 
Must Be Defended” 249), there are spaces to challenge or upset the macrocosmic lens of 
biopolitics.  Disability, as arguably a creation of biopolitics in its contemporary and 
pathologized status, proves a useful theoretical lens “in” to the discourse(s) concerning the 
policing of bodies en masse.  In as much as disability studies seeks to disrupt socially 
condoned oppression of non-normative embodiments, it likewise seeks to “valorize [the] 
voices, [the] embodied experiences, and [the] collective efforts to establish rights and 
overcome discrimination” for individuals within the disabled community (Hughes 79).  But 
within an era of biopolitics, non-normative bodies become figures of primary focus, around 
which disciplinary measures are made to seem “natural” or “normal” or even beneficial for 
society at large.  By taking the intersection of feminist theory and disability theory, via a 
standpoint perspective such as Anne Finger’s memoir, a proliferating perspective on 
embodiment may be acquired. 
Concluding thoughts:  Narratives of Disability and Pregnancy 
 While bodies of difference may be historicized well beyond the modern era – defined 
within this paper as the eighteenth century onward, via Foucault’s terms – the current trend 
of “disability” and the labeling of disabled bodies presents a cultural, ethical concern for 
feminism in particular.  Through the continued exaltation of medical science as arbiter of 
objectivity, classification, and pathologization on human subjects, “disabled” has come to 
signify those who fall outside of a neatly narrowed scope of “normate” subject – which is 
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oddly reminiscent of the Enlightenment subject.  Due to the biopolitical era, and the 
preoccupation with bodies as signifiers of difference (Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended” 
245), much of such social disciplining may be said to begin at the site of pregnancy.  As a 
(thus far) inherently “female” site of embodiment, it would seem that this useful locus of 
difference and non-normative embodiment is a vital space for feminist inquiries. 
 Feminist theor(ies), then, must reckon with this cultural construction of difference as 
“disability” – so closely akin to the derogation of women’s bodies as “Other” both within 
history and more contemporary moments.31  Nevertheless this will require a critical 
examination of “female empowerment” at large, for “one of the most pervasive feminist 
assumptions that undermines some disabled women’s struggle is the liberal ideology of 
autonomy and independence” which can leave “no space for the needs and accommodations 
that disabled women’s bodies require” (Thomson 26).  Much as white feminists have been 
critiqued for perpetuating, at times, their hegemonic racial privilege, ableist feminists must 
address their own biases.  By resorting to an Enlightenment subject ideal, feminist 
movements adopt a lens that was initially premised upon the Othering of women’s 
embodiment in the first place – and which risks the obfuscation and erasure of diverse lived 
embodiments.  This may be addressed and in part reconciled by the incorporation the voices, 
lived experiences, and embodied realities of non-normatively bodied women.   
Significantly, as in the case of Anne Finger and her text, voices of these experiences 
need to be shared and thusly heard.  Nonetheless Past Due: A Story of Disability, Pregnancy 
                                                
31 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, in her discussion of the complementary relationship between feminist theories 
and disability studies, discusses how “the practices of femininity have configured female bodies similarly to 
disability” (27).  She notes that “foot binding, scarification, clitoridectomy, and corseting were (and are) 
socially accepted, encouraged, even compulsory cultural forms of female disablement….  Similarly, such 
conditions as anorexia, hysteria, and agoraphobia are in a sense standard feminine roles enlarged to disabling 
conditions, blurring the lines between ‘normal’ feminine behavior and pathology” (27). 
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and Birth, touted by Adrienne Rich as a text that reveals “the real meaning of the statement 
that the personal is the political,” is currently out of print.  Seal Press, the text’s publishing 
company that claims on its website to have been founded “to provide a forum for women 
writers and feminist issues,” no longer offers information on the book in its directory.  While 
Finger’s title suggests the overdue urgency of her unique narrative, and of the diverse 
experiences it interrogates and illumines, it is no longer easily accessible.  While future 
feminist interrogations into disability may be diverse, I suggest the vitality of pregnancy as a 
site of investigation.  Narratives such as Finger’s further expand upon understandings of 
pregnancy and likewise challenge non-normative labeling and oppression:  both vital points 
of interest for feminist theor(ies).  
Here, again, the significant of “sighting” and a “site” conflate, much as my discussion 
between pregnancy and disability.  In Concerto for the Left Hand, Michael Davidson argues 
that “disability may be a theater or a museum, a place where something is seen” (25), 
demonstrating the significance of the relationship negotiated between “subject” and “object,” 
no matter how problematically inscribed.  Pregnancy works similarly – a sight/site or “a 
series of locations and spaces where political economy, bioregional differences, cultural 
representations, and medical bureaucracies converge” (25).  As Davis argues, via Foucault, 
the 19th and 20th centuries have witnessed a transformation from a “society of blood” and the 
sovereignty of kings to a “society of sex” based on the “medicalization of the body in the late 
19th century” (42).   Much as Judith Butler argues, “possibility for coalitional alliances” 
surface – material bodies at the site of normalizing discourses that, “in order to claim 
authority over their own bodies, have had to emerge from closets they never knew they 
inherited” (56).   
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Conclusion 
“…community must not mean shedding our differences, nor the pathetic pretense that these differences do not 
exist.”  - Audre Lorde (1984) 
 
“Sure you can do anything when you talking or writing, it’s not like living when you can only do what you 
doing.  Some people tell a story ‘n it don’t make no sense or be true.  But I’m gonna try to make sense and tell 
the truth, else what’s the fucking use?  Ain’ enough lies and shit out there already?” – Sapphire’s Push   
 
Through the journey of this dissertation, we have considered multiple narratives that 
open up a space for a radical refiguring of pregnancy as narrative.  We have accounted for 
the diverse circumstances that make a singular, normative rendering of “pregnancy” 
oppressively limiting; nevertheless, this normative reading largely prevails. Likewise, we 
have troubled the dominant rhetoric of reproductive politics, “choice.”  The fabricated, 
limited nature of choice – hinged clearly on privilege and in accordance with society’s notion 
of a “proper” mother – makes the lingering rhetoric not only misleading, but oppressive by 
eliding diverse women’s reproductive politics and outcomes.  Furthermore, as Reva B. Siegel 
notes in “Abortion as a Sex Equality Right,” this rhetoric “abstracts the conflict from the 
social context in which judgments about abortion are formed and enforced” (152). 
From Harriet Jacobs’s slave narrative to the advancements in biotechnologies, 
pregnant embodiment proves to have a diverse, multifaceted history that also provides rich 
space to reconsider subjects, relationships between individuals and communities, along with 
“dependence” and “Otherness.”  As Martha Albertson Fineman notes in The Autonomy Myth, 
there is “no autonomy to be found in motherhood” (169).  Rather than focusing upon this 
point merely in conservative interpretations, how instead might we continue to reconsider 
pregnancy to further disrupt illusions of autonomy, of the neatly segmented “self” unit to 
which all fail to fulfill?  Particularly in light of our discussion of critical disability, how could 
this beleaguered site of embodiment provide fresh insight into a host of “marginalized” 
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bodies and lived selfhoods that do not correspond to the idealized static, independent model?  
How can feminist efforts at gendered equality address, more directly, discrepancies within 
the family?  A continued effort to catalog these diverse histories and engage their narratives 
offers a prime space to engage these complex questions and consider their extensive 
ramifications.  Here, in the ultimate violation of individualized boundaries we are offered the 
foil for the individual – as well as the performative space about which the boundaries are first 
established legally, medically, if not metaphysically.   
A Praxis of Non-Hegemonic Pregnancy Narratives 
 At the core of my inquiry, as literary student and teacher, I aim to open up otherwise 
muzzled conversations through these alternative narratives in dialogue.  My research has 
developed in tandem with my teaching, and I have had the opportunity to share and learn 
from my students.  We ground our conversations first in the mainstream vernacular.  For 
instance, we consider the “pro-choice” and “pro-life” debate, which this dissertation has 
endeavored to prove inadequate for discussing American reproductive politics.  Students 
identify discomfort in the sweeping binaries, even without the fully contextual history of 
“choice” which we explore. 
Then, I provide a copy of Gwendolyn Brooks’ “the mother.” In the poem, the narrator 
struggles with the confinement of referential language, much as she does with the social 
pressures that have shaped her as “the mother.”  Her opening line, “Abortion will not let you 
forget,” works against the normative maternal ideals evoked by the title itself.  And from the 
outset, she cannot seem to speak as herself or of her relationship to the “children you got that 
you did not get” (2); along with the distance she creates through the use of second person, 
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she wrestles with the ambiguity of getting, receiving, and begetting – yet never seems to 
satisfactorily articulate her relationship to these children.  
The poem encapsulates this tension between the “I” and the fetuses/babies, resorting 
to powerful enjambment juxtaposed alongside the meter of the poem: while the rhythm of the 
poem connects, the form and visual alignment of verse counteractively separates and 
disjoints it.  Lines separate the identities of the poem as the verse openly struggles with the 
idea of life, death, the subject and the not-subject.  She also draws on traditions of mythic or 
fairy tale type mother archetypes – though a troubling, distorted focus on a mother’s 
consumption (“with gobbling-mother eye”).  But she does so only to state that she will not 
experience them.  
Her own struggles remain framed by a similarly problematic language.  While in part 
she clearly addresses her decision to her “dead children,” the speaker's admission that 
“believe that even in my deliberateness, I was not deliberate” again reckons with the tensions 
shaping not only her cultural circumstances and personal choices, but the larger context in 
which they are voiced.  She struggles to assign blame and autonomy:  “Though why should 
I/Whine that the crime was other than mine?”  Yet she finds futility here: “Since anyhow you 
are dead./Or rather, or instead,/You were never made.”  She herself troubles all of these 
boundaries within her poem but not to their necessary resolve.  Her poem establishes a 
tenuous kind of disparate connection, one that does not find resolve in the ruling of Roe v. 
Wade:  the spaces delineated therein, the (negative) right assigned, the identities established 
along tenuous lines, feel far from structured and consoling in “the mother.”  Her inability to 
speak on and to a subject, a state of being, in which she has inhabited – she does not know 
how to metaphysically understand her “killed children” as “dead or never made.”   
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This poem uses literary language to illustrate ambiguities within pregnant 
embodiment that defy our current narratives.  This example provides just one instance that 
“narratives of pregnancy” can engage real women’s materialities in a manner that is 
inarticulable in mainstream discourses, opening up a vibrant space to reconsider many 
subject positions.  Much as the opening story in my Introduction – that of a young woman 
who wanted marriage and children but had been forcibly sterilized – ruptured my own 
uncritically accepted conceptions, these narratives powerfully provide voice and space to 
identities erased by normative narratives of embodied life. 
 
 
 
 
 
Afterword: a process yet incomplete 
Pregnancy:  a process, an insistence that both defies and confirms time as a gauge and 
any idea of human identity as a static one; a becoming that posits the body at the center of the 
narrative yet again is always already shaped by cultural narrative – all while at once 
constituting a crude but indisputable “tub of guts” (Dewey Dell, As I Lay Dying).  At once 
plural and not-one, yet sufficient and contained and mitigated:  biologically, by the placenta; 
culturally, by multifarious lenses. 
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